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2Abstract
The present thesis is an empirical investigation into various aspects of the 
functioning of financial markets. The first chapter includes two studies o f the 
behaviour of the stock market: in the first one, the reaction to announcements of 
rights issues is analysed and several hypotheses are tested for a sample of UK 
companies. In the second study a switching regression model is applied to 
aggregate stock price data to see if a two-states model is better able to describe 
the behaviour of stock market prices.
The second chapter investigates the empirical relationship between 
managerial ownership o f shares and corporate performance, using a panel dataset 
of UK manufacturing companies. The two measures o f performance investigated 
are: market valuation, as expressed by Tobin's Q, and total factor productivity 
growth, measured by estimating a production function. The explicit consideration 
of companies with dual structures of voting rights enables me to study the effects 
o f a disparity in the ownership of equity and votes by managers, and the effects 
o f the concentration o f voting rights which is made possible by departures from 
one share-one vote.
Finally, the ability of technical analysis to predict future price behaviour is 
analysed in the third chapter which consists o f three studies. The first reports the 
results o f an experiment in which a Chartist product has been tested for its ability 
to help users to predict future asset price movements. The second analyses the 
behaviour o f three major exchange rates around support and resistance levels. 
The third tests two competing theories for their ability to explain the clustering 
observed in quoted prices. The approach used in this study of technical analysis 
differs from the previous ones since it employs inputs provided by technical 
analysts themselves and subjects them to empirical analysis, rather than trying to 
reproduce the 'data generation process' of technical analysts.
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Equity Market Studies
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1.1. UK Equity Rights Issues:
Announcement Effects and Long-Run 
Performance, 1981-1988
1.1.1. Introduction
We investigate two aspects o f equity rights issues: the stock price 
reaction on the announcement day, and the long-run relative performance of the 
companies participating in rights issues.
Rights issues are a common way for UK companies to raise capital. The 
method by which additional equity is issued in the UK is different from the one 
used in the US, where companies mainly place equity with an underwriter at a 
discount to the current price: the underwriter then sells the shares in the market. 
In the UK, a company has to offer the new shares first to the existing 
shareholders, in proportion to their existing holdings, who may subscribe the 
issue. If they refuse to subscribe it, then the company can sell the shares in the 
market. In practice, however, most o f UK rights issues are also underwritten, 
with the underwriter agreeing to buy any shares not taken up by the existing 
shareholders1.
In the US, several studies have documented negative abnormal returns at 
the announcement of an equity issue and have attempted to relate their magnitude 
to several variables, in order to test which theory best explains the observed 
average price fall. These studies often find contradictory results, and, generally, 
the explanatory power of the empirical models is very low.
In the UK we know o f no study which investigates the price reaction at 
the announcement o f rights issues and which tries to relate it to existing
1 Generally subject to a minimum amount being sold to the public.
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theories2. This study fills this gap by providing evidence for the UK stock 
market, detecting any behavioural differences which may be due to the existence 
in the UK of pre-emptive rights of shareholders.
Another aim of this study is to analyse the long-run performance of 
companies undertaking rights issues. A recent study by Ritter (1991) for the US 
stock market found that the evidence on the long run performance o f initial 
public offerings was consistent with the existence o f fads in the stock market 
which cause investors to be periodically overoptimistic about future prospects. 
We undertake a similar analysis for companies participating in a rights issue and 
find similar results.
The paper is organised as follows: in section 1.1.2 we briefly review the 
theories which can explain the observed price drop at issue announcements and 
their empirical implications; in section 1.1.3 we describe our methodology and 
data, in section 1.1.4 we investigate the abnormal returns at the announcement o f 
rights issues, testing several theoretical explanations; in section 1.1.5 we analyse 
the long-run performance o f companies issuing equity . Section 1.1.6 concludes.
1.1.2. Rights Issues: Theoretical Considerations
Companies can raise funds in several ways. They can use internally 
generated funds by retaining profits, or issue new securities such as equity, debt, 
or a combination of the two. The historical reliance of companies on internally 
generated funds has generally been seen as anomalous by academics3, but the 
view of many investment bankers and practitioners is that the reluctance by 
companies to issue additional equity is caused by the expected price drop for the 
existing shares which accompanies the new issue announcement. Negative 
abnormal returns at the announcement o f equity issues have in fact been widely
Since we commenced our study, we have seen a preliminary version of a UK study of 
rights issues (Davidson and Mallin 1992).
See Asquith and Mullins (1986) and references therein.
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documented for the US stock market4.
Several theories have been put forth to account for the abnormal returns 
at the announcement of equity issues. These fall broadly into three categories:
1) theories based on asymmetric information;
2) theories based on redistribution o f wealth;
3) theories based on a price-pressure hypothesis.
All o f these theories have implications for the magnitude and direction of 
the price change at the announcement o f the issue. We would like to mention at 
this point that the actual inflow o f the new shares into the market will be taken 
into account at the announcement o f the issue, so that any abnormal return which 
is due to the higher supply of shares should occur at the announcement, rather 
than at the issue date.
Theories based on asymmetric information maintain that the 
announcement of an equity issue is a signal based on the superior information 
that managers and insiders have on the prospects for the company. This superior 
information may relate to the fact that the existing shares are overvalued or that 
the internally generated funds are not sufficient to provide enough working 
capital. Alternatively, the equity issue may signal that the management wants to 
undertake new investment spending: this may be necessary in order to expand 
into new markets or to exploit new opportunities.
Myers and Majluf (1984) develop a model in which managers possess 
information on the company not available to non-insiders, and show that all 
equity issues convey negative information to the market since managers are 
supposed to act in the interest of current shareholders. This happens because, in 
their model, managers would not find it convenient to issue equity unless the 
current share price were overvalued.
Similarly, Leyland and Pyle (1977) construct a signalling model of
4 Asquith and Mullins (1986), Masulis and Korwar (1986), Mikkelson and Partch 
(1986), Schipper and Smith (1986).
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managerial ownership in which the percentage of shares owned by management is 
a signal of the value of a company. In their model, an equity offering which is not 
taken up by the management is a negative signal since it reduces the percentage 
of shares owned by managers.
The free cash flow theory by Jensen (1986) also predicts a negative effect 
of equity issues since the associated reduction in leverage gives more scope for 
slack on the part o f managers. According to the free cash flow theory, debt is a 
mechanism by which managers commit themselves to pay out part of the cash 
flow generated by the company; a lack o f constraints on the management may 
lead them to use the excess "free" cash flow in a wasteful way.
In summary, theories based on information asymmetries predict a 
negative reaction to the announcement of a rights issue. The price drop should 
also be related to the size o f the issue to the extent that size is a good proxy for 
the amount of information released. In particular, the free cash flow theory also 
predicts that equity issues made to fund new investment should cause the 
strongest negative reaction.
The second set of theories which have been proposed in order to explain 
the abnormal returns at the announcement o f rights issues are those based on the 
redistribution of wealth caused by the issue of new shares. These transfers are 
from the shareholders to the bondholders in the form of less risky debt, and from 
the shareholders to the Treasury in the form reduced tax savings.
A security issue which increases the equity capital without increasing at 
the same time the amount o f debt makes the existing debt less risky (holding 
everything else equal) and this causes a redistribution of wealth from existing 
shareholders to bondholders. The latter in fact find themselves, after the issue, 
with a better quality debt. In addition, since a share issue changes the capital 
structure of a firm and given the presence o f tax advantages for capital structures 
with a high debt proportion, a share issue causes a redistribution from existing 
shareholders to the Treasury. Both theories predict price drops at the 
announcement o f an equity issue which are smaller for new investment funding 
than for capital structure changes, and which have a negative relationship with
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the size o f the issue. The higher leverage after the equity issue should lower the 
share price by an amount which compensates for the tax loss and for the reduced 
riskiness o f debt associated with a lower debt/equity ratio.
The third set of theories predicts a negative abnormal return due to the 
existence of price pressure and due to transaction costs. The existence of 
transaction costs may cause a price drop because it is costly to readjust existing 
portfolios in order to absorb the new issue. In contrast, the price-pressure 
hypothesis simply states that an increase in the supply o f a security causes its 
price to fall, since demand curves for stocks are believed to be downward 
sloping.
The justification for the price-pressure hypothesis, that each security has 
some unique features so that close substitutes for it do not exist, contrasts with 
the current theoretical literature in finance which argues that demand curves for 
securities are horizontal and that prices for securities are determined only by their 
risk attributes and their expected returns. If markets are efficient, the price o f a 
security is independent o f the amount o f such security in the market, and is also 
independent of the amount which is being offered for sale at any moment in time.
Both the downward sloping demand curve hypothesis and the transaction 
costs explanations predict that the drop in share price should be uncorrelated 
with the reason for the issue, but that there should be a positive correlation 
between the size of the issue and the price drop.
These three groups o f theories do not allow positive price reactions to 
announcements of rights issues; however, possible positive effects may arise from 
favourable information released at the time o f the announcement. Furthermore, if 
a firm in financial distress issues equity, this may be a signal (especially if the 
offer is underwritten) that bankruptcy is less likely and the stock market reaction 
is expected to be positive.
In summary, we can group the possible effects on prices at the 
announcement of rights issues into the three categories:
1. no price effect: efficient markets hypothesis coupled with perfect
information and no transaction costs;
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2. positive price effect: favourable information, leverage reduction which 
reduces financial distress;
3. negative price effect: downward sloping demand curves, redistribution of 
wealth, asymmetric information, transaction costs.
In the next sections, we will investigate the abnormal return at the 
announcement of a rights issue, and we will relate it to the stated reason for the 
rights issue, the abnormal return before the issue, the size o f the issue, and the 
change in the debt/equity ratio induced by the equity issue. Although most of the 
US studies of equity issues have found significant and negative abnormal returns 
at the announcement o f equity issues, they generally obtain weak and contrasting 
results about the relationship between the abnormal returns and several 
explanatory variables, and no theory has been found to be able to explain much of 
the cross sectional variation of abnormal returns. In addition to exploring each 
relationship in isolation, we will employ a multivariate regression approach to see 
if a combination of variables is able to achieve a better explanatory power.
After having analysed the announcement day effect o f rights issues, we 
investigate the long-run performance o f the companies offering new equity. The 
efficient markets hypothesis implies that no abnormal performance should be 
observed after the day of the announcement of the equity issue, and Marsh’s 
(1979) study of UK rights issues was principally aimed at investigating this 
hypothesis. He was unable to reject the hypothesis o f efficient markets by looking 
at the cumulative abnormal returns for the two years after the equity issue, using 
a variety of benchmarks. His study reveals that the choice of the benchmark can 
affect the results considerably, especially in the presence of a strong size effect 
for UK companies.
We will analyse the long-run performance of companies participating in 
rights issues by computing the cumulative abnormal returns for the three years 
after the announcement, employing a variety o f benchmarks. Although we cannot 
control for the size effect, we find that in our sample period this is likely to have 
a neutral effect on the average cumulative returns. In contrast with Marsh (1979), 
we find that our results are consistent with ShiUeris (1984) idea that markets may
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be affected by "fads" or waves of pessimism and optimism which are exploited by 
managers deciding whether or not to issue equity.
1.1.3. Methodology and Data
We started our sample selection with the set o f all capital changes made 
by companies included in the 1988 release o f the London Share Price Database 
(LSPD). This database contains price and dividend data on all companies quoted 
in London since 1975, including those traded on the Unlisted Securities Market5. 
From these capital changes, we extracted all rights issues occurring between 
1981 and 1988, which amounted to 1253 issues made by 867 companies. The 
starting year 1981 was chosen since the Financial Times started to publish the 
annual index to its articles then.
Having identified all the companies making rights issues in the years 
1981-1988, we then searched in the Financial Times (FT) for the announcement 
dates o f these rights issues, using the annual index as a guide. We were able to 
find FT articles for 369 simple rights issues6 (made by 312 different companies) 
reporting the announcement, together with the reason for the rights issue. For 
these companies we then obtained daily price data around the announcement date 
from Datastream, together with monthly data on total returns from the LSPD 
database, which also reports the industrial classification.
The distribution by year of the rights issues included in the LSPD 
database and those for which we were able to find announcement dates is 
reported in table 1.1.
The LSPD database contains also data from 1955 for a selection of companies.
In selecting our sample of rights issues, we excluded those which were combined with 
other securities issues, in order to avoid possible extraneous effects.
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Table 1.1 Distribution of rights issues by year
Year LSPD Our Sample Percentage
1981 77 19 24.7
1982 61 20 32.8
1983 128 35 27.3
1984 101 26 25.7
1985 130 42 32.3
1986 204 41 20.1
1987 346 109 31.5
1988 206 77 37.4
Total 1253 369 29.4
We were able to find announcement dates for about 30% of the rights 
issues occurring during 1981-1988, with the percentage varying from 20.1% in 
1986 to 37.4% in 1988. Therefore, we believe that our sample is fairly 
representative of the population o f rights issues during this period.
For all the companies in our sample we also collected the reason for the 
rights issue as reported in the Financial Times. We classified the reason for the 
issue into one of four categories:
1) Finance an acquisition;
2) Finance expansion;
3) Restructuring and strengthening of the balance sheet;
4) Debt repayment.
Many companies state the reason for the rights issue with its 
announcement, while for others we had to rely on the comment from the
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Table 1.2 Distribution of the reason for the rights issue
Year Acquisition Expansion Restructuring Debt
Reduction
Total
1981 4 8 1 6 19
1982 3 8 3 6 20
1983 10 13 6 6 35
1984 7 9 7 3 26
1985 10 21 7 4 42
1986 6 22 9 4 41
1987 70 20 12 7 109
1988 40 20 13 4 77
Total 150 121 58 40 369
journalist. In several cases more than one reason was reported; in such cases we 
selected what appeared to be the most important one (i.e. the one focused on by 
the journalist or article, the one appearing in the heading of the article, or the one 
mentioned first in a list or reasons). An alternative to this was to have multiple 
classifications with all the reasons reported. We decided in favour of the first one 
to avoid classifying most companies under category 2) since most announcements 
report growth and expansion as one o f reasons for the issue.
The distribution by year of the reason for the rights issues is reported in 
table 1.2.
We can see from this table that during both 1987 and 1988 a high 
proportion of the rights issues have been motivated by acquisitions, in stark 
contrast to the previous years.
For each company and equity issue, we also computed various descriptive
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statistics: the company size (market value) and the issue size, the dilution of the 
new issue and the discount.
The size of the issue is defined as the ratio of the amount of the proceeds 
of the rights issue (issue price times new shares issued) to the market value of the 
existing shares on the day before the announcement. The dilution is defined as the 
ratio o f the change in the market value o f the existing shares to the proceeds of 
the issue7. A dilution of 0 means that the price o f the existing shares has not 
changed, while a dilution o f -100 means that the market value of the existing 
shares has decreased by the same amount as the proceeds of the rights issue. A 
negative value o f the dilution tells us by how much the market value o f the 
existing shares has decreased as a percentage o f the amount being raised. The 
discount is defined as the percentage difference between the price before the 
announcement and the issue price of the new shares. We report in table 1.3 these 
descriptive statistics for our sample.
Table 1.3 Descriptive statistics
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Market value 151.26 38.88 0.24 3525.0
Size of issue 28.80 21.60 4.63 116.3
Discount 22.20 18.40 0.00 90.7
Dilution -9.65 -8.32 -600.00 134.6
The median company in our sample is relatively small, having a market 
capitalisation of £39 million. Our sample includes also some very large 
companies, causing the distribution of the market value to be highly skewed and
Our definition follows Asquith and Mullins (1986).
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with a mean of £151 Million8. The median and the mean size o f the issue are 
respectively 22% and 29% of the existing equity. The mean and median discount 
are around 20%, while the median dilution is only 8%. The median value of the 
dilution in our sample is substantially smaller then the 28% in Asquith and 
Mullins (1986).
Having described our sample we now investigate the stock market 
reaction to the announcement o f rights issues.
1.1.4. Announcement Day Effects
For the companies in our sample we computed the abnormal return 
around the announcement of the rights issue. Since we do not know at what time 
of the day the announcements were made, we computed the abnormal return in a 
two-day period comprising the day o f the announcement and the following 
working day, in order to be certain to capture the market reaction to the issue 
announcement: this is standard practice in event studies such as this one.
In order to compute the abnormal return, we adjusted the two-day return 
of the stocks by subtracting the return on the stock market index during the same 
days. The stock market index that we used for this purpose is the FT All Share 
Index, a capitalisation weighted index of over 600 UK companies quoted on the 
London Stock Exchange. The FT All Share Index includes about 94% of stock 
market capitalisation, but a much smaller percentage, 45%, of companies. We 
chose this index since it is broadly based and computed daily: in any case, for an 
analysis of a two-day announcement return, the choice o f the benchmark is not 
likely to affect the results9.
The average (median) two-day abnormal return for the 369 companies in
The market capitalisation refers to the pre-issue value of the company. No adjustment 
for movements in the general price index has been made.
See Dimson and Marsh (1986) for a discussion of benchmark issues.
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our sample is -1.63% (-2.34%) with a t-statistic10 of -8.20. The abnormal return 
in our sample is of the same magnitude than the one reported in Davidson and 
Mallin (1992) for a sample o f UK companies for the same period11. In Figure 1.1 
we report the distribution of the two-day abnormal return: there is considerable 
variation in the reaction to the announcement of a rights issue, with 33% of the 
stocks experiencing a positive abnormal return. We will investigate next the 
relationship between the abnormal returns and several characteristics of the 
companies and the issue, in order to identify the determinants of the magnitude 
and direction o f the abnormal return.
We would like to mention at this point that a limit o f our analysis is given 
by the impossibility of controlling for the effects o f news released during the two 
days in which we compute the return. In more then one occasion, several other 
pieces o f news - such as new earnings forecasts, the willingness of the directors 
to participate in the issue, a bid to take over another company at a specific price - 
accompanied the announcement o f the rights issue. The two-day abnormal 
returns will therefore include components due to these other pieces of news 
which we will not be able to identify.
The standard error for the two-day abnormal return, 0.1988, has been computed, 
similarly to Asquith and Mullins (1986), as the standard error of the average abnormal 
return across all companies for the 48 days starting 68 days before the announcement. 
The exclusion of 20 days before the announcement is motivated by the possibility that 
some information on the issue might have already leaked into the market,
11 Davidson and Mallin (1992) find a much bigger abnormal return (-6.44) in 1991, a 
year not covered by our study.
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Figure 1.1 Frequency distribution of the two-day abnormal return
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Having established that the two-day abnormal return is negative on 
average, in order to discriminate among the various theories which attempt to 
"explain" a price drop at the announcement o f a rights issue, we investigate the 
relationship between the abnormal return at the issue date and various 
explanatory variables:
1) the reason for the issue;
2) the abnormal returns before the issue;
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3) the size o f the issue;
4) induced change in leverage.
We then combine the explanatory variables in a multivariate regression to 
judge their ability to jointly explain the cross sectional variation in the abnormal 
returns.
1.1.4.1. Reason for the Issue
Several o f the theories we have described in section 1.1.2 predict that the 
share price reactions to the announcement depends on the reason for the rights 
issue. While the overvaluation hypothesis predicts no correlation between the 
reason o f the issue and abnormal returns, other theories based on asymmetric 
information, such as the free cash flow theory, predict that the stock price 
reaction should be negative for announcements o f new capital spending, with no 
effect for issues which affect only the capital structure.
Conversely, redistribution theories predict a smaller price drop for issues 
motivated by new investment spending since these are the ones which affect the 
leverage of the company less. Downward sloping demand curve or transaction 
cost theories do not suggest different reactions depending on the reasons for the 
issue.
When we classify the rights issues according to the stated reason, we find 
that in all categories the average and median abnormal return is negative, but less 
so for acquisitions and expansions. Issues motivated by a reduction in leverage 
are accompanied by the biggest reductions in share price at the announcement; 
we report the results in table 1.4.
The abnormal return associated with acquisitions is significantly higher 
than the one associated with restructurings and leverage reductions, although it is 
still significantly negative (t-stat = 2.97). If we group together acquisitions and 
expansions, on one side, and restructuring and leverage reductions on the other, 
we find that the average abnormal return for the first group is -1.23, while for the 
second group it is -2.73: the t-statistic for the hypothesis that the two averages
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Table 1.4 Two-day abnormal returns by reason  of issue
Reason Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Acquisition -0.59 -1.35 -14.1 25.8
Expansion -2.03 -2.62 -23.5 29.6
Restructuring -2.48 -2.47 -42.9 13.0
Leverage reduction -3.08 -2.62 -21.0 18.9
Whole sample -1.63 -2.34 -42.9 29.6
are different is 1.81, significant at the 10% level.
The result that the abnormal returns are lower for issues motivated by 
leverage reductions and restructurings is consistent with redistribution theories 
which maintain that changes in leverage are an important determinant of the price 
fall, since these issues are the ones with the biggest effects on leverage. The 
result is also consistent with theories which see new capital expenditure and 
expansion as a positive signal for the future profitability o f the company.
Other authors have looked at the reason for the issue in order to 
discriminate among theories for the price fall: Mikkelson and Partch (1986) find a 
result similar to ours, that the average decline in share price is smaller when the 
purpose o f the issue is to finance capital expenditure. Conversely, Barclay and 
Litzenberger (1988) do not find any relationship between stated reason and 
abnormal returns.
1.1.4.2. Abnormal Return Preceding the Issue
Rights issues are generally preceded by abnormal positive returns in the 
months before the issue. Although none of the theories presented in section 1.1.2 
have strong implications for the relationship between abnormal returns in the run­
up to the issue and abnormal returns at the announcement, several authors have
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related the two variables, finding conflicting results12.
In order to investigate this relationship in our sample, we regress the 
abnormal returns on a constant and the cumulative abnormal returns in the year 
before the issue13. We have then added as further regressors the outperformance 
in the previous two years14. We report the results in table 1.5
Our results show that the cumulative abnormal returns in the two years 
before the announcement is an important determinant o f the reaction to the 
announcement of a rights issue. Although, as we have said above, no theory 
predicts a relationship of this kind, our result is consistent with theories based on 
asymmetric information. In fact, if we consider the cumulative outperformance as 
a manifestation of a decrease in the asymmetry o f information, our results imply 
that companies in which the asymmetry of information has decreased experience 
a smaller drop.
Our results are also consistent with the empirical observation that rights 
issues tend to be made by companies which have experienced positive abnormal 
returns, since an outperformance before the announcement leads to a lower price 
fall. Lucas and McDonald (1989) show how this can arise in a model in which 
companies are temporarily overvalued.
See Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald (1989); Asquith and Mullins (1986); Masulis 
and Korwar (1986).
We have used an equally weighted index of the constituents of the FTA as our 
benchmark; see section 1.1.5 for a discussion of benchmarks.
Note that we lose some observations since we do not have a complete history for all 
companies. If we have only a few observations in a year for a company, we consider 
the abnormal returns in just those months as the abnormal return for the whole year. 
This is done to minimise the loss of observations.
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Table 1.5 Two-day abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal 
returns before the announcem ent
constant 1-year 2-year 3-year R2 Obs.
-2.40
(-6.55)
3.96
(3.50)
5.80 369
-2.86
(-7.14)
3.55
(2.98)
2.98
(2.60)
8.58 347
-2.84
(-7.01)
3.74
(2.99)
3.13
(2.68)
0.89
(0.83)
9.37 322
Note: The dependent variable is the two-day abnormal return; heteroskedasticy consistent t-
statisties are shown in parenthesis.
1.1.4.3. Size of the Issue
Several theories predict that there should be a negative relationship 
between the size of the issue and abnormal returns at the announcement. In 
particular, the price-pressure hypothesis, in both the downward sloping demand 
curve and the transaction costs versions, predict that the price drop should be a 
function of the relative size o f the issue.
Asymmetric information theories do not have clear implications for the 
relationship, but the size o f the issue can give an indication of the amount of 
information disclosed: in particular, if the issue is motivated by a decline in 
internal cash flow, the amount o f the issue is a measure o f the problem. Finally, 
redistribution theories based on the tax advantage o f debt and transfer of value to 
bondholders predict a negative relationship since bigger issues have a stronger 
impact on leverage.
Several studies in the US have tried to relate the size o f the issue to the 
abnormal returns at the announcement, but their results have been fairly negative. 
Three studies (Mikkelson and Partch 1986; Masulis and Korwar 1986; Barclay
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and Litzenberger 1988) do not find any relationship at all, while two other studies 
(Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald 1989; Asquith and Mullins 1986) find rather 
weak evidence for a negative size effect.
Table 1.6 The size effect
Constant Logarithm of 
relative size
Logarithm of 
absolute size
Relative size 
dummy (RS)
Absolute size 
dummy (AS)
R2
-0.88
(-0.73)
0.53
(0.64)
0.00
5.04
(1.06)
-0.41
(-1.45)
0.01
-1.90
(-3.91)
0.54
(0.75)
0.00
-1.04
(-1.89)
-1.19
(-1.64)
0.00
Note: The dependent variable is the two-day abnormal return; heteroskedasticy consistent t-
statistics in parenthesis.
In order to investigate the size effect in our sample, we have regressed the 
abnormal returns at the announcement on a relative and an absolute measure of 
size. We experimented with the absolute size o f the issue since, as Barclay and 
Litzenberger (1988 p. 92) point out, in the case of downward sloping demand 
curves for shares, it is not clear that relative size is the correct measure for 
comparisons across firms. We also used dummy variables to reduce the impact of 
outliers: RS (AS) which is equal to one if the relative (absolute) size is above the 
median size. The results in table 1.6 clearly show that the size effect is not 
present in our sample with all the regressions exhibiting a very low R2 and 
insignificant coefficients.
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1.1.4.4. Changes in Leverage
We now investigate whether changes in leverage induced by the rights 
issue can be responsible for the price drop at the announcement. Reductions in 
financial leverage can be a negative signal according to informational asymmetry 
theories which see leverage as a way for managers to commit themselves to pay 
out cash flow. A reduction in leverage achieved with a rights issue can then be 
seen as a relaxation of the constraints in which managers operate and can lead to 
non-maximising uses o f cash flow, as in the free cash flow theory (Jensen 1986). 
Redistribution theories also see a decrease in leverage as a negative signal 
because of the lower tax advantages and the redistribution o f wealth to 
bondholders who, after the issue, have a less risky debt.
We have computed the leverage before the issue as:
LEV= D
(d + p + e )
where
D total amount of debt (both including and excluding short term
borrowings);
P preference shares and other equity capital such as deferred shares;
E equity capital.
We have included D and P at their book values since market values were
not available to us15, while E is the market value o f the common stock. After a 
rights issue, the leverage of the company changes due to changes in the amount 
of equity capital and the amount of debt outstanding, in the case that a part of the 
debt is paid back.
In order to investigate whether the change in leverage can explain part of
15 Indeed, we could not find company account data for 38 companies in our sample of 
rights issues, which are therefore excluded from this analysis.
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the fall in share prices at the announcement o f a rights issue, we have constructed 
variables measuring the change in leverage:
DLEV1 change in leverage excluding short term borrowings and
repayment of debt;
DLEV2 same as DLEV1 but including short term borrowings.
DLEV1 and DLEV2 measure the changes in leverage induced by the 
planned change in equity capital, which is equal to the amount of the proceeds of 
the rights issue16. These measures ignore that fact that some, or all, of the capital 
raised can be used to repay debt; indeed, some of the companies in our sample 
have expressly indicated debt repayment as the main reason for the issue.
For this reason we have constructed the variables DLEV3 and DLEV4 
which assume that the proceeds of the issues made by companies which have as 
the main reason for the issue debt repayment or restructuring are used in the first 
instance to repay debt, until this goes to zero. These variables are defined as:
DLEV3 change in leverage excluding short term borrowings but assuming
that companies which issue equity in order to repay debt, or to 
restructure their balance sheet, use the proceeds to repay their 
debts;
DLEV4 same as DLEV3, but including short term borrowings.
In table 1.7 we report the results o f our univariate regression of abnormal 
returns on the change in the leverage variables.
16 We have ignored the costs incurred by the issuing company (underwriter and other 
fees).
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Table 1.7 C hanges in leverage
Constant DLEV1 DLEV2 DLEV3 DLEV4 R2
-0.58
(-1.13)
0.52
(3.79)
2.80
-1.05
(-1.92)
0.17
(1.52)
0.60
-0.92
(-2.01)
0.19
(3.50)
2.24
-1.25
(-2.54)
0.10
(1.46)
0.24
Note: The dependent variable is the two-day abnormal return; heteroskedasticy consistent t-
statistics in parenthesis.
It appears from our results that the induced change in leverage has a 
significant effect on the abnormal return at the issue announcement, with higher 
reductions in leverage being associated with bigger price falls. This is consistent 
with both the incentive theories such as the "free cash flow" theory and the 
redistribution theories. Also, the leverage variable with only the long-term debt 
seems to have a bigger effect, while the inclusion of the (assumed) repayment of 
debt for those companies which have as the main reason for the rights issue either 
leverage reductions or strengthening o f the balance sheet, do not alter our 
conclusions.
1.1.4.5. Multivariate Analysis
As we have seen, several possible reasons for the abnormal return at the 
announcement o f rights issues have been proposed, but none has been able to 
explain empirically a substantial proportion o f the cross sectional distribution of
35
abnormal returns. We now put together the univariate results obtained above in a 
multivariate regression framework in order to asses our overall ability to explain 
the dispersion of the abnormal returns.
In addition to the variables considered above, we include one additional 
dummy variable in our multivariate regressions, D l, which takes the value o f one 
if the company had a rights issue in the year preceding the announcement. The 
rational behind this is that companies which had a rights issue in the year 
preceding the issue under analysis were probably not expected to have another 
issue so soon. Since the reaction at the announcement o f a rights issue will 
depend on how much the issue was anticipated, we expect this variable to have a 
negative impact on abnormal returns.
In table 1.8 we report 4 versions of the multivariate regression. In the first 
column we report the regression which includes as regressors all the variables 
that we have analysed before which are available for all companies. The second 
columns includes also the 2-year cumulative abnormal performance, which is not 
available for 22 companies. In the third column we add DLEV1 to the first 
equation and we lose of 38 companies. Finally, in the fourth column both 
variables are added with the sample shrinking by a total of 50 observations.
The multivariate analysis shows that we are able to explain between 7% 
and 15% of the cross sectional variation of the abnormal return at the 
announcement of rights issues. The variables maintain their sign and generally 
their significance, with changes in significance levels due to the loss of some of 
the companies rather than to the collinearity among the variables17.
We do not report the regressions which support this statement.
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Table 1.8 Multivariate analysis
Variable
Constant 6.47
(1.54)
8.12
(1.88)
8.90
(2.29)
9.94
(2.49)
Expansion -1.47
(-1.92)
-1.30
(-1.73)
-0.61
(-0.79)
-0.81
(-1.05)
Leverage
reduction
-1.83
(-1.68)
-2.32
(-2.10)
-1.03
(-0.95)
-1.86
(-1.64)
Restructuri
ng
-2.14
(-1.57)
-1.98
(-1.42)
-1.85
(-117)
-1.78
(-1.18)
1-year 3.90
(3.63)
3.55 
(3 19)
3.90
(3.42)
3.87
(3.26)
2-year 3.41
(2.98)
4.00
(3.12)
Logarithm 
of relative 
size
0.73
(0.89)
1.07
(1.30)
1.42
(1.41)
1.06
(1.15)
Logarithm 
of absolute 
size
-0.41
(-1.50)
-0.56
(-2.25)
-0.42
(-1.48)
-0.62
(-2.49)
DLEV1 0.44
(2.38)
0.18
(0.93)
D1 -2.38
(-2.11)
-2.27
(-2.08)
-2.04
(-1.79)
-2.02
(-1.83)
R2 0.0742 0.1134 0.0983 0.1481
Obs. 369 347 331 319
Note: The dependent variable is the two-day abnormal return; heteroskedasticy consistent t-
statistics in parenthesis.
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In summary, our results do not differ substantially from the ones obtained 
for US underwritten equity offerings. We find that the reason for the rights issue 
is a determinant o f the abnormal return, with acquisitions attracting the highest 
abnormal returns. The cumulative abnormal return in the two years before the 
issue is an important determinant of the size o f the abnormal return at the 
announcement, a result which is also obtained in the US. The size o f the issue in 
its relative definition has a positive but insignificant effect while in its absolute 
definition has a negative (sometimes significant) effect; it is difficult from these 
results to draw conclusions about the effect of size on abnormal return, a result 
similar to the US experience. Changes in leverage induced by the equity issue 
explain a portion of abnormal returns, although the significance of the variable is 
reduced substantially by the loss o f a few companies in the last regression. 
Finally, an equity issue which is preceded by another in the previous year attracts 
on average a two percent lower abnormal return than other equity issues.
1.1.5. Long-term Performance
In this section we investigate the long-run performance of companies 
undertaking rights issues. In a similar investigation o f the long-run performance 
of initial public offerings (IPOs), Ritter (1991) finds that the underpricing of IPOs 
at their issue is a short-run phenomenon which is more than reversed in 
subsequent years. We want to assess whether this happens for rights issues too, 
in order to throw more light on the determinants o f their timing and abnormal 
returns.
In order to assess the abnormal performance of a stock in the long-run, 
we have to define an expected return for that stock. Several methods have been 
used in the literature to compute expected returns with the most popular 
involving the return on an index of the total market (both equally and 
capitalisation weighted). The expected return is then calculated as the return on 
the index, either raw or adjusted by the Market Model or the Capital Asset
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Pricing Model (CAPM)18.
In this study we use four different ways to compute abnormal returns by 
subtracting from the raw returns of the issuing company:
1) the total return o f the FTA All Share Index;
2) the total return o f an equally weighted version o f the FTA index;
3) the total return o f the index of the FTA sector in which the company
belongs to;
4) the CAPM expected return defined as (1-P) RF + (3 RM; where RF is the
risk-free rate (here defined as the 90-day Treasury Bills Rate), RM is the 
return on the FTA All Share Index, and P is computed with an OLS 
regression for the whole 6 years period, excluding the month of the 
announcement.
The choice of the FTA All Share Index, which is a capitalisation weighted 
index o f over 600 stock quoted in the London Stock Exchange, is a natural 
choice for a UK benchmark, being the most broadly based index published for the 
UK stock market. However, since its constituents are weighted by market 
capitalisation, its movements are affected to a great extent by the price behaviour 
o f the largest companies. Since in this study we analyse sample averages in which 
all observations are equally weighted, we constructed an equally weighted 
version of the FTA All Share Index and used this as our preferred benchmark.
In order to control for the possible differential behaviour of the various 
sectors o f the economy, we also used, as a benchmark for each company, the 
return o f the sectors to which the company belongs. For the various sectors, we 
used 31 FT-SE Actuaries Share Indices which are capitalisation weighted indices 
of the constituents o f the FTA All Share Index grouped into sectors.
In addition, we also used as a benchmark the expected return computed 
with the simple CAPM. For the computation o f the companies' p, we have 
excluded the month of the announcement since its inclusion would have biased
18 Marsh (1979) discusses the relative merits of these models.
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the estimation; in fact, as we have seen in the previous section, abnormal returns 
are generated during that month. For similar reasons, some authors exclude also 
the period before the announcement since abnormal returns are generated in the 
run-up to the issue announcement, while others exclude the period following the 
rights issue since they claim that the issue changes the riskiness of the company. 
We decided to exclude only the issue month from the estimation period since we 
did not have any particular reason to favour one argument over the other and we 
preferred to keep the sample size for the estimation as large as possible.
For the calculation of the cumulative abnormal returns we used month- 
end data of total returns for both our companies and the indices. We started 36 
months before the month of the announcement, and we ended 36 months after 
the month o f the announcement19. In Figure 1.2 we report the average 
cumulative abnormal returns for the six years period, computed in the four 
different ways detailed above.
Several interesting phenomena are evident from this figure. First, there is 
not much difference in the pattern o f the cumulative abnormal return computed in 
the four different ways. Second, the cumulative abnormal return peaks in the 
month preceding the announcement of the issue, after a substantial run-up of 
around 25%. More interestingly, the abnormal performance after the issue reveals 
a substantial underperformance o f about 35% in the three years after the issue.
19 When the two-day announcement period felt into two months, we aggregated the two 
months into one.
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Figure 1.2 Cumulative abnormal returns around the issue 
announcement
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The positive cumulative abnormal return before the issue has been 
documented in several studies and does not call into question market efficiency, 
but the one after the issue would imply that the market is inefficient. We now 
investigate the significance and the robustness o f this result.
Several recent studies (Ritter, 1991; Dimson and Marsh, 1986; Franks, 
Harris and Titman, 1991) have found that abnormal return calculations over long 
horizons are sensitive to the benchmark used to compute them. In particular, for 
the UK, where a strong size effect is present, Dimson and Marsh (1986) have 
shown that the different size composition o f the sample under analysis and the 
benchmark, can conduce to wrong inferences with regard to long-run 
performance.
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In order to control for size one would ideally want to have a number 
(usually 10) o f size ranked portfolios rebalanced annually, as in Dimson and 
Marsh (1996), or a control portfolio constructed with companies matched by size 
(and possibly industry) as in Ritter (1991). Unfortunately, these were not 
available to us and we could not compute them since the version of the LSPD 
that we had access to extended only to 1988 (while we needed returns up to the 
end of 1991) and Datastream does not have total returns data and only limited 
dividend data20.
In order to evaluate the extent of the size bias in the post-announcement 
performance o f our sample, we employed two methods. First, we computed the 
abnormal returns by using the equally weighted FTA All Share Index for all 
companies in our sample which had a market capitalisation bigger that £50 
million before the announcement, and we used an index of the lowest decile of 
quoted companies21 for the rest22.
An inspection of the index of the lowest decile of companies by size, 
reveals that smaller companies outperformed, or performed in line with the FTA 
equally weighted index during the years 1981-1988, while they underperformed 
in the years 1989-1991. We therefore computed the cumulative abnormal returns 
after the announcement in the way detailed above for two subsamples: earlier 
rights issues (1981-1986) and later rights issues (1987-1988). The number of 
rights issues in the two subsamples are respectively 183 and 186. In the first 
subsample only the 1986 issues include one o f the three post issue years in which
In order to construct total returns for the companies in our sample, for which the post- 
announcement period extended beyond 1988, we had to obtain dividend information 
from Datastream, Extel Financial Services, and Bloomberg, and price data from 
Datastream.
We used the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Index, which is a market capitalisation 
weighted index of the smallest decile by market capitalisation of all the shares quoted 
in the London Stock Exchange. At the end of 1988, the last year of announcements in 
our sample, the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies index included all companies with a 
market capitalisation less than £112 million.
The number of companies adjusted with the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Index is 
211 .
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smaller companies underperformed the larger ones, while the second subsample 
only the 1987 issues include one o f the three post issue years in which smaller 
companies outperformed the larger ones. We expect to see the size effect clearly 
in this two subsamples.
Figure 3.1 reports the post announcement cumulative abnormal returns 
for the whole sample and the two subsamples, computed with and without the 
adjustment for size explained above.
Figure 1.3 Post announcement performance
-01 I sub. unadj. 
I sub. adj.
-0.2
-0.3
whole unadj.
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sub. adj.
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months after announcement
As expected, the size adjustment lowers substantially the performance o f 
the companies in the first subsample, bringing a cumulative abnormal return o f - 
10% (top line) to -20% (second from top). Conversely, in the second subsample, 
the size adjustment increases the returns from -60% (bottom line) to -50% (next
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to bottom line). Surprisingly, when the two subsamples are combined, the 
cumulative abnormal performance is similar with and without the adjustment 
(central two lines); this is due to the fact that on average, in our sample period, 
larger and smaller companies have had a broadly similar performance.
Another interesting fact revealed by the split sample analysis is that, both 
with and without the adjustment, the cumulative underperformance is much 
higher for companies undertaking rights issues in the high-volume years 1987- 
1988 (period in which there were an average o f 276 rights issues per year) than 
the 1981-1986 period (when only an average of 117 rights issues per year were 
made).
Although the size adjustment adopted here is rather unsatisfactory, since 
only two portfolios are considered, the results obtained point to the conclusion 
that the size effect does not seem to be responsible for the average 
underperformance of companies undertaking rights issues, since the 
outperformance of rights issues in the first subsample is compensated by the 
underperformance in the second subsample. Obviously, the cross sectional 
dispersion of the cumulative abnormal returns will be affected by the size 
adjustment, as our figure 1.3 suggests, but here there is no reason to believe that 
a size effect can be the cause for our results.
In table 1.9 we report the values o f the abnormal returns and cumulative 
abnormal returns23 from three years before to three years after the issue, 
computed by adjusting the raw returns with the FTA All Share equally weighted 
index, and their respective t-statistics for the hypothesis that the returns are 
different from zero24.
The cumulative abnormal returns have been calculated by adding monthly abnormal 
returns cumulatively, starting from the month before the announcement and going 
backwards, and starting with the month after the announcement and going forward.
The variance for each monthly average abnormal return has been computed from the 
sample of abnormal returns in that month. For the cumulative abnormal returns we 
used the average variance across all periods (separately for the pre and post 
announcement months) in the whole sample, times the number of months in the 
cumulation.
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Table 1.9 Abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns
T
I
M
E
Cum.
Abn.
Return
t-stat Abn.
Return
t-stat T
I
M
E
Cum.
Abn.
Return
t-stat Abn.
Return
t-stat
-36 26.09 6.18 -0.22 -0.28 0 -1.19 -1.52
-35 26.30 6.34 -1.37 -2.40 1 0.05 0.09
-34 27.67 6.76 -0.67 -1.27 2 0.41 0.49 0.35 0.61
-33 28.35 7.06 0.42 0.65 3 -0.02 -0.02 -0.43 -0.73
-32 27.92 7.06 -0.87 -1.42 4 -1.14 -0.98 -1.12 -2.26
-31 28.79 7.43 -1.38 -2.23 5 -2.48 -1.90 -1.34 -2.68
-30 30.17 7.94 0.54 0.82 6 -3.75 -2.63 -1.28 -2.19
-29 29.63 7.96 0.17 0.26 7 -4.34 -2.81 -0.58 -1.14
-28 29.46 8.07 -0.01 -0.01 8 -5.39 -3.27 -1.05 -2.08
-27 29.47 8.26 -1.09 -1.84 9 -6.19 -3.54 -0.80 -1.25
-26 30.56 8.75 -0.69 -1.12 10 -6.25 -3.39 -0.06 -0.12
-25 31.25 9.14 0.02 0.02 11 -6.50 -3.36 -0.25 -0.49
-24 31.23 9.40 0.79 1.22 12 -7.71 -3.82 -1.21 -2.46
-23 30.45 9.37 -0.55 -0.81 13 -8.73 -4.15 -1.02 -1.88
-22 31.00 9.83 0.13 0.20 14 -9.53 -4.37 -0.79 -1.61
-21 30.86 10.06 0.79 1.39 15 -10.78 -4.77 -1.25 -2.08
-20 30.07 10.08 1.40 2.46 16 -11.64 •4.99 -0.87 -1.49
-19 28.67 9.87 0.65 0.92 17 -12.86 -5.35 -1.22 -2.37
-18 28.02 9.94 0.47 0.72 18 -14.97 -6.05 -2.11 -3.63
-17 27.55 10.09 0.70 105 19 -15.89 -6.25 -0.92 -1.81
-16 26.85 10.15 1.50 2.16 20 -17.36 -6.65 -1.47 -2.87
-15 25.35 9.91 1.63 2.29 21 -18.01 ■6.73 -0.66 -1.07
-14 23.72 9.63 1.09 1.23 22 -19.67 -7.18 -1.66 -3.13
-13 22.64 9.56 2.63 3.98 23 -21.15 -7.54 -1.48 -2.49
-12 20.01 8.83 1.87 2.72 24 -21.14 -7.35 0.01 0.01
-11 18.13 8.39 1.02 1.85 25 -22.89 -7.75 -1.75 -2.86
-10 17.11 8.35 0.08 0.14 26 -24.69 -8.17 -1.80 -3.31
-9 17.03 8.74 1.36 1.83 27 -27.44 -8.89 -2.75 -5.00
-8 15.67 8.57 1.61 2.63 28 -28.36 -9.01 -0.91 -1.37
-7 14.06 8.23 2.87 3.63 29 -29.39 -9.17 -1.04 -1.71
-6 11.19 7.09 2.24 2.88 30 -30.73 -9.43 -1.33 -1.80
-5 8.94 6.24 2.39 3.38 31 -31.74 -9.55 -1.01 -1.71
-4 6.56 5.13 1.18 1.84 32 -32.90 -9.72 -1.16 -1.80
-3 5.37 4.87 2.11 2.95 33 -33.13 -9.62 -0.23 -0.23
-2 3.26 3.62 1.43 2.34 34 -34.63 -9.90 -1.50 -2.44
-1 1.83 3.14 35 -36.00 -10.13 -1.37 -2.30
0 -1.19 -1.52 36 -38.22 -10.54 -2.22 -3.58
Note: Cum. Abu. Return is the cumulative abnormal return from the issue month; Abn.
Return is the abnormal return in that month; t-stat is the t-statistic for the hypothesis 
that the abnormal returns are equal to zero.
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Table 1.9 reveals a steady decline in the performance of the companies in 
our sample, with an average cumulative abnormal return of -38% in the three 
years following the issue. Two explanations are possible for our results: 
benchmark errors, or the existence of "fads" in the market. We have already 
suggested that our benchmark can be deficient in many respects. More 
appropriate benchmarks can be constructed which control for size and industry 
classification simultaneously; other factors could also be controlled for, such as 
the riskiness o f the stock and its exposure to risk variables. Franks, Harris and 
Titman (1991), in order to analyse the postmerger performance of acquiring firms 
in takeovers, employ multifactor benchmarks which control for size, dividend 
yield and past performance.
The second possible explanation for our results is the existence of "fads", 
periods o f optimism and pessimism in the market which are exploited by 
companies which issue equity at a relatively low cost. This is the explanation that 
Ritter (1991) finds consistent with his results and which is also consistent with 
ours. In particular, the fact that companies which issued equity in high-volume 
years experienced also the biggest underperformance suggests that managers may 
be exploiting the temporary optimism of the market with respect to rights issues.
1.1.6. Conclusions
We have analysed, for a recent sample o f UK companies, the abnormal 
return at the announcement o f rights issues and the long-run performance of 
companies undertaking rights issues. Our study o f UK rights issues does not 
reveal sharp differences with similar previous studies of US underwritten security 
offers.
We document a negative abnormal return o f -1.63% (median -2.34%) at 
the announcement of a rights issue and we relate it to the stated reason for the 
issue, the size of the issue, the change in leverage, the abnormal returns before 
the issue and whether the company had another issue in the previous year.
In a multivariate regression framework we are able to explain between
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7% and 15% of the cross sectional dispersion of the abnormal return with these 
variables. In particular, the cumulative abnormal returns with respect to the 
equally weighted version of the FTA All Share Index during the two years before 
the issue, and the change in leverage implied by the issue, have a positive effect 
on the abnormal returns, while the absolute size o f the issue and the presence of 
an issue in the year preceding the announcement have negative effects. Among 
the reasons for the issue, acquisitions attract the smallest price falls compared to 
expansions, leverage reductions and restructurings.
The analysis of the long-run performance of companies undertaking rights 
issues reveals the surprising result that these companies experience an abnormal 
return of -38% in the three years starting the (calendar) month after the issue. 
Although we employed several benchmarks, our result is still subject to 
benchmark errors: in any case, we find no evidence in our sample that the size 
effect is likely to have affected our results.
Although our analysis was not a test o f this hypothesis, our results are 
consistent with the existence of "fads", or periods o f optimism and pessimism, in 
the stock market which lead to the overvaluation and undervaluation o f shares. 
Managers who possess superior information take advantage of the opportunities 
given by the mispricing of the shares o f their company, by issuing new equity 
when it is temporarily overvalued, effectively raising capital when it is cheap to 
do so.
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1.2. Business Conditions and Stock Returns: 
A Markov Switching Regression Model 
for the US Stock Market
1.2.1. Introduction
Several recent studies have found that macroeconomic factors explain 
only a small proportion o f the variance o f realised stock returns25. For example, 
Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989) find that only about 19% of the variation in 
monthly US stock returns can be attributed to various types of economic news. 
In addition, Roll (1988) tries to explain the returns of large US companies by 
relating them to contemporaneous information about market returns, industry 
influences and company specific news, but can only explain about 35% of the 
variation in these returns26.
Some authors conclude that the presence of a large unexplained 
component of stock returns suggests that "fads" or other investors’ irrationalities 
may be responsible for a large part o f the variation in stock returns27.
In this paper we investigate an alternative explanation: we argue that, a 
priori, the economic factors which supposedly affect stock returns may do so in a 
non-linear manner. We propose and estimate a two-state switching regression 
and find that the response o f stock returns to macroeconomic news clearly 
depends on whether or not the economy is in a recession, as, in most cases, there 
are substantial differences in the response coefficients in the two states. Using the 
same data as Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989), we find that the explained
A review of the literature is contained in McQueen and Roley (1990).
In theory, it should be possible to explain up to 100% of the variation in returns by 
using contemporaneous information (Roll, 1988).
For example Shiller (1984).
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component of the switching regression model goes up to around 30%. Even 
though this still leaves a large unexplained component, nevertheless we feel that 
this may constitute a step in the right direction and that there is certainly scope 
for future research.
Our study is organised as follows: section 1.2.2 outlines our theoretical 
and econometric models; our results are presented in section 1.2.3 and section 
1.2.4 summarises our conclusions.
1.2.2. Theoretical and Econometric Model
Asset pricing theories do not require that the relationships between state 
variables and asset prices are linear.
In the Lucas (1978) equilibrium asset pricing model, the prices of the 
various assets (p j are a general function o f a vector o f state variables (xj
Pr*'(xt)
The state variables then evolve according to a transition equation
xrTfo-i.Tk)
where qt are innovations. The F and T functions are not linear in general, and 
models have been generated were non-linearities are explicit. For example, 
Scheinkman and Weiss (1986) construct a model o f aggregate economic activity 
where a non-linearity arises because the distribution of income varies with the 
economic cycle: one of the results of their model is that unanticipated expansions 
in money supply increase output when output is low, and reduce output when 
output is high.
We believe that non-linearities can also be present in the reaction of stock 
returns to unexpected shocks to economic activity, although we have not derived 
this from a formal model. For example, on one hand, in a recession, positive 
innovations in economic activity may have a strong positive effect on stock 
returns due to expectations of higher future cash flows. On the other hand, in
49
periods of economic growth, the same type of positive innovation may not have a 
positive effect on stock returns, since the expectation of higher dividends could 
be offset by the possibility of higher future discount rates induced by monetary 
policy tightening. In other words, it may well be the case that in "particular" 
states o f the world some pieces o f information have a much bigger effect than in 
"normal" states; the direction of the effect could also change with the state.
This suggests that non-linearities may be present in the response of stock 
returns to economic news: ignoring it could lead to a model misspecification 
problem, and bias downward the importance of economic news. Therefore, 
modelling the relationship between stock returns and these economic variables in 
a linear manner may not be appropriate.
The issue to be addressed next is how to model these potential non- 
linearities. Several recent studies suggest that there is strong evidence for regime 
switching in US stock market returns. For example Schwert (1989) estimates a 
Markov switching model according to which the stock market may either be in 
the low or high variance state. Turner, Startz and Nelson (1989) consider a more 
general model in which either the mean, the variance, or both may vary with the 
state; they find that the hypothesis o f constant mean and variance can be rejected 
at usual levels o f significance. Van Norden and Schaller (1993) also find evidence 
for an asymmetric response of stock returns to the lagged dividend yield (used as 
a predictor variable).
These studies suggest that it is possible that stock returns could be 
affected differently by the same economic forces across different regimes. 
McQueen and Roley (1990) allow various pieces o f economic news to affect 
stock returns in different ways at various points in the business cycle, and find 
significant effects. However, the disadvantage with their approach is that they 
define in which state the economy is by employing an arbitrary rule. Their 
conclusions are likely to be sensitive to the particular definition o f the states. In 
addition, their model can only capture differences between pre-defined states.
In order to model the differential response of stock returns to news about 
economic fundamentals, without having to predefine the different states of the
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economy, we propose a two-state Markov switching regression model, first 
introduced by Goldfeld and Quandt (1973) and developed by Hamilton (1989), 
which not only allows the same pieces of news to have a different effect in the 
two states, but at the same time estimates the probability of the system being in 
each particular state. The state becomes then an unobservable variable and the 
estimation of the model in fact requires the maximisation of the likelihood 
function which includes the parameters determining the state.
Specifically, we assume that news about various fundamental variables 
affect the US real stock market returns according to the equation
Y=Pi*X+Ui
where
Y the real total return of the value-weighted NYSE index 
Pi vector o f response coefficients
X the matrix o f the explanatory variables (including the constant)
U| error term, distributed Uj ~ N(0,(Ji2)
i the subscript for the state, 1 or 2 in which the system is.
By construction, the error terms are uncorrelated with the explanatory (news) 
variables. We allow both the constant and the variance to be different across 
regimes following the results of Turner, Startz and Nelson (1989) who find that 
in a two-state switching model for the US stock market returns, the version with 
a switching constant and switching variance is superior to the restricted ones.
In addition, we assume that the transition between states is governed by a 
first-order Markov process described by two parameters:
Pi = Prob(State(t) = i | State = i (t-1)) for i=l,2
which represent the probability that the system stays in state i at time t, given that 
it was in state i at time t-1. This model has been proposed by Hamilton (1990) as 
an extension of his switching model for time series, and is applied here in a 
regression framework. The assumption that the states evolve according to a
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Markov process constitutes the structure on the evolution of the states. If the 
two estimated probabilities p, and p2 are not significantly different from 0.5, this 
implies that no Markov process exists for the evolution of the states. Values of 
the probabilities significantly lower than 0.5 mean that the system is more likely 
to switch state than to remain in the current one; conversely, values higher than 
0.5 imply persistence in the states.
The parameters to be jointly estimated are: the two vectors of regression 
coefficients (3i5 the two variances o 2, and the two transition probabilities p;. We 
employ a maximum likelihood estimator, conditional on initial conditions, 
implemented via the EM algorithm of Dempster, Laird and Rubin (1977); a more 
formal presentation of the model, together with a description of the estimation 
procedure is contained in the Appendix.
1.2.3. Results
We use the same monthly dataset as Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989) 
for the 1926-1986 period and, as in their work, we examine seven different 
pieces o f news. The dependent variable is the real return (including dividends) on 
the value-weighted NYSE index (RR), the explanatory variables are innovations 
in: real dividends (RD), industrial production (IP), nominal long term (LI) and 
short term (SI) interest rates, the inflation rate (IR), the real money supply (RM) 
and stock market volatility (VO)28.
We made no attempts to select the variables to include in our multivariate 
two-state regression according to specific theories, since we wanted to 
investigate the explanatory power of a switching regression model as compared 
with a one-state model. Moreover, the inclusion o f variables which may be 
irrelevant for determining stock returns does not affect our model, as they would 
attract a (near) zero coefficient in the estimation procedure. We have therefore 
used all the series included in the Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989) dataset.
28 For details of the definitions and sources of the variables, see the Data Appendix.
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In order to compute the innovations in our series, we follow the same 
procedure as Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989) and estimate a vector 
autoregression (VAR); we then assume that the residuals from this VAR 
represent the true innovations. We first reproduce Cutler, Poterba and Summers 
(1989)'s results in table 1.10. Using three lags in our VARs in order to generate 
innovations, the simple OLS regression o f stock returns on the seven innovation 
variables can explain 18.5% of stock returns29. Unanticipated increases in 
dividends and industrial production have a positive and significant effect, while 
innovations in volatility have a significant negative effect. Surprises in real 
money, inflation or interest rates appear to have little impact on stock returns.
When the same estimation is conducted for the period 1946-1986, also 
reported in table 1.10, the innovation variables explain only 14.9% of stock 
returns, with volatility and real dividends having a similar effect as in the whole 
sample estimation, but with industrial production not having a significant effect 
any longer.
We then estimated the two-state Markov switching regression for both 
the whole sample and the shorter one, and we report the results in table 1.11. The 
estimation procedure may be sensitive to initial conditions, so we estimated the 
switching regression by starting with values for p, and p2 equal to 0.5 and with 
values for the coefficients two standard deviations away from the OLS estimates, 
in several combinations; all our estimations have converged to the same 
maximum.
As measured by the adjusted R2.
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Table 1.10 OLS results
Variable 1926-1986 sample 1946-1986 sample
Constant 0.010 0.010
(0.005) (0.007)*
IP 0.427 0.100
(0.218)** (0.148)
IR -0.079 -0.075
(0.054) (0.061)
VO -0.022 -0.017
(0.004)** (0.003)**
RD 0.081 0.050
(0.014)** (0.012)**
SI -0.0682 -1.23
(0.889) (0.780)
LI -2.64 -2.15
(1.987) (1.58)
RM 0.195 0.180
(0.158) (0.460)
R2 0.185 0.149
Log 1112.47 893.40
likelihood
Note The dependent variable is RR; the regressors are innovations in the respective 
variables; heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. A * (**) 
means that the t-statistic for that variable is significant at the 10% (5%) level.
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Table 1.11 Two-state switching regression results
1926-1986 sample 1946-1986 sample
Variable State 1 State 2 State 1 State 2
Constant 0.010
(0.010)
0.008
(0.001)**
0.011
(0.005)**
0.005
(0.002)**
IP 1.14
(0.355)**
-0.057
(0.101)
0.807
(0.798)
0.054
(0.159)
IR -0.005
(0.007)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.002 
(0.002) *
-0.001
(0.001)
VO -0.029
(0.014)**
-0.021
(0.003)**
0.049
(0.012)**
-0.025
(0.003)**
RD 0.194
(0.039)**
0.035
(0.009)**
0.104
(0.038)**
0.037
(0.012)**
SI 0.010
(2.565)
-1.12
(0.557)**
1.29
(0.981)
-3.24
(0.722)**
LI -4.28
(7.32)
-1.685
(1.37)
-4.97
(2.04)**
-0.385
(2.03)
RM -0.725
(0.566)
0.361
(0.126)
0.012
(1.48)**
0.159
(0.340)
a 0.008
(0.001)
0.001
(0.000)
0.002
(0.000)
0.001
(0.000)
P 0.946
(0.038)
0.991
(0.007)
0.929
(0.052)
0.984
(0.012)
R2 0.366 0.195 0.372 0.293
Log
Likelihood
1912.21 1359.32
Note The dependent variable is RR; the regressors are innovations in the respective 
variables; heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. A * (**) 
means that the t-statistic for that variable is significant at the 10% (5%) level.
In our sample, the persistence in the two states is high and switching 
among them relatively infrequent: the estimated probability that next period we 
will remain in today's state is above 0.9 for both states and both sample periods. 
The expected duration of state 1 is one year and 6 months for the whole sample
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and one year and two months for the shorter sample; the expected duration of 
being in state 2 is respectively 9 and 5 years. The smoothed probabilities of being 
in the first state, which are the probabilities computed with information available 
for the whole sample, are plotted in Figures 1.4 and 1.5
Figure 1.4 Probability of being in state 1, smoothed values: 1926-86
1.2  
26 30 34 38 42 46 50 54 58 62 66 70 74 78 82 86
There appears to be a clear business-cycle interpretation o f the states as 
they correspond to downturns in economic activity. Indeed, a regression of the 
probability o f being in state 1 on changes in industrial production yields a 
coefficient o f -2.41 with a "t" value of -4.36 for the whole sample and of -2.87 
with a "t" value o f -2.13 for the smaller sample. We will therefore call state 1 the 
"recession" state.
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Figure 1.5 Probability of being in state 1, smoothed values: 1946-86
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The whole sample estimation is clearly dominated by the 1929-1933 
recession and fails to identify some o f the switches which occurred in the period 
after 1946. A bigger number of switches are identified in the smaller sample: this 
is probably due to the fact that the estimation procedure assigns the same 
characteristics to all periods in the same state, so that some of the milder 
recessions which occurred after 1946 did not look like a downturn when 
compared with the 1929-1936 one. A switching regression model with three or 
more states would be necessary in order to identify milder and more severe 
downturns, together with periods of slow and high growth, but at the cost o f 
increasing substantially the number of parameters to be estimated
Turning to the parameter estimates for the whole sample and to the 
corresponding standard errors variable by variable, we can see that innovations in 
activity have three times as large an effect in recessions than in the restricted OLS 
case. Moreover, there appears to be an insignificant effect in the other state, 
possibly because the positive effect o f future cash flow is offset by expected 
higher discount rates due to expectations o f monetary policy tightening. Real
46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86
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dividend growth seems to have a positive effect no matter what state we are in, 
although the effect in downturns is much stronger. Unanticipated increases in 
volatility have a similar significant effect across states (but o f opposite sign in the 
shorter sample), while shocks to inflation have a bigger effect in downturns, with 
the coefficients not significantly different from zero. Turning to the effect of 
interest rates one can see that shocks to short rates only matter in non 
recessionary times, while shocks in long rates have a much greater (although not 
significant) effect in recessions. Finally, we find that unanticipated increases in 
real money only have a significant positive effect in normal times. Surprisingly, in 
downturns we see a negative though insignificant effect.
The results for the constant and the variance o f the error term across the 
two states is suggestive of the presence o f heteroskedasticity. The variance in the 
first state is 8 times as high as that in the second state (only twice as high in the 
subsample). The constant is also higher in the first state, but not significantly so. 
These results seem to be in line with intuition, in that the "recession" state is one 
where risk is relatively high and the investors are compensated for this risk by a 
higher average returns.
With the exception of the coefficient on volatility, the results for the 
smaller sample are qualitatively similar to the ones for the whole sample, with 
again the coefficient on real dividend growth several times higher than both the 
OLS and the normal state, and innovations to the long rate now significant in the 
recession state.
Having described the results of our estimation, we now discuss how the 
two-state model compares with the one-state OLS results. Testing for the two- 
state Markov switching model against the alternative of a one-state model (in this 
case the OLS model in table 1.10) cannot be done easily since under the null 
hypothesis the transition probabilities p} and p2 are not identified and as a result, 
the asymptotic distributions o f the likelihood ratio, Wald and Lagrange multiplier 
tests are non-standard. A few tests have been proposed in the literature for this 
particular problem, such as the standardised likelihood ratio test (Hansen, 1992) 
and Monte Carlo simulations (Cecchetti, Lam and Mark, 1990). The first one 
involves a grid search through all the dimensions of the parameter space and
58
would require a prohibitive amount of CPU time to conduct in this context; the 
second one, in addition to the similarly high computing time, suffers from the 
lack of an asymptotic theory for the test statistics.
Recently, an asymptotic test has been proposed by Garcia (1992). Van 
Norden and Schaller (1993) report the significance levels computed by Garcia 
(1992): for the case of switching means and variances, the critical values for the 
non-standard distribution of the likelihood ratio test at the 5% and 1% 
significance levels are respectively 14.11 and 17.38. At those significance levels, 
and for a similar dataset to the one employed here30, both for the whole sample 
and for the post war sample, van Norden and Schaller (1992) find that the null 
hypothesis of a one-state model for the univariate series o f excess returns over 
the 90 day Treasury Bill is easily rejected at the 5% significance level, suggesting 
that the two-state model is preferable to the one-state model.
Our specification, however, is multivariate and the same significance 
levels do not necessarily apply. Nevertheless, we feel that the results reported 
below, together with the univariate ones o f van Norden and Schaller (1992) 
suggest that in our case too the two-state model is a better description of the 
data.
First, in order to have an idea o f the fit o f our switching regression model, 
we compute a "pseudo" R2. For the whole sample, the R2 for both states is 31.3 
while for the shorter sample it is 34.1; in both cases substantially higher than the 
18.5% and 14.9% of the OLS regression. Second, we compute a Wald test for 
the hypothesis that the two vectors of coefficients, excluding the constant31, are 
equal, with the variance allowed to vary among the states, and find that we can 
comfortably reject the null hypothesis with a X2(7) equal to 30.2: the results are 
reported in table 1.12. It should be noted that the main reason o f this rejection is 
the difference of the coefficients on innovations in industrial production and real
Specifically, the CRSP value-weighted US monthly stock market returns for the period 
1927-1989.
With a switching constant, the two states are identified under the null hypothesis; 
therefore the Wald test is valid.
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dividend growth which are significantly higher in the first state.
Table 1.12 Test of equality of the coefficients in the two sta tes
Coefficient Difference Standard error t-statistic
IP 1.196 0.371 3.220
IR -0.004 0.007 -0.601
VO -0.008 0.014 -0.535
RD 0.160 0.041 3.935
SI 1.132 2.698 0.419
LI -2.593 7.526 -0.344
RM -1.086 0.587 -1.849
1.2.4. Conclusions
General asset pricing theories suggest that prices may be related to the 
state variables which determine them in a non-linear manner. Our results provide 
evidence in support of the existence of non-linear relationships among US stock 
market returns and a series of innovations in macroeconomic variables. The two- 
state Markov switching model applied here clearly identifies two states which are 
related by us to periods of recession and normal growth.
The recession period lasts an average o f one and one half year, while the 
normal growth period lasts an average o f 9 years. The two states are highly 
persistent with few switches among them. Our results show that, in the recession 
state, positive innovations in industrial production have a three times higher 
effect on returns than the OLS results suggest; a similar result is present for
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innovations in real dividend growth.
We confirm McQueen and Roley's (1990) finding that the stock market 
response to macroeconomic news depends on the state o f the economy, but we 
do not have to define, as they do, the states a priori since these are identified 
endogenously by our model as part o f the estimation procedure.
While in our model innovations in macroeconomic variables explain a 
much larger fraction o f the real returns o f the US stock market than one-state 
models, we still find a large unexplained component in stock prices. We feel, 
however, that our results are encouraging, showing that there is scope for 
research into more complex non-linear models, such as those with time variation 
in the transition probabilities.
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1.2.5. Appendix
Hamilton (1991) shows that given an initial estimate o f the vector of 
parameters A(|3,a,p), AX1), the improved estimate A(1+1> can be obtained by 
iterating once the following system:
f =2
t=2
n(/+0 _  2 
P i j  T
ZpU-i = iY r ,& )
t-2
where p(St=i) are the smoothed probabilities: the probabilities of being in each 
state, based on the whole sample of observations, and the P^+1) are the 
improved estimates of the switching parameters.
The implementation o f the EM algorithm involves first the computation 
of the smoothed probabilities p(st= l) for given parameter values; second, two 
OLS regressions are run, with the observations weighted by the square root of 
the associated smoothed probability, and estimates of the coefficients and the 
standard deviations are obtained; third, the parameters of the Markov transition 
matrix which are implied by the smoothed probabilities are computed.
This procedure is then iterated until a fixed point is found, which it has 
been shown by Hamilton (1990) to coincide with the maximum likelihood 
estimate for the system. The R2 reported in the tables is the one from the latest 
set of OLS regressions.
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If, as is our case, the variance of the two states is different, it is possible 
that the estimation technique finds the maximum of the likelihood function with 
one state having the variance close to zero. We have not encountered this 
problem: Hamilton (1990) shows, however, that the inclusion o f Bayesian priors 
can overcome this problem.
1.2.6. Data Appendix
The definitions of the variables used in our regressions are:
RR Real returns computed from the value-weighted NYSE total return index
RD Log of real dividend payment on the value weighted NYSE portfolio
IP Logarithm of industrial production
LI Moody's AAA corporate bond yield
SI 3-Month Treasury Bills Rate
IR CPI inflation rate
RM Logarithm of real money supply Ml
VO Log of stock market volatility (average squared daily return on S&P
composite index during month)
The data were kindly supplied by the Interdisciplinary Consortium for 
Political and Social Research in Ann Arbour, MI.
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2.
The Effect of 
Managerial Ownership of Shares 
and Voting Concentration 
on Performance
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2.1. Introduction
The motivation of the studies presented in this chapter is to provide 
empirical evidence on the effects on corporate performance generated by both the 
ownership by managers o f shares and votes o f the company which they manage, 
and the distribution of voting rights among holders of claims to the cash flow o f a 
company.
Empirical evidence on these issues is limited to the relationship between 
market valuation and ownership o f shares by managers, and is generally 
inconclusive. We believe that further research on this relationships is of crucial 
importance since, as we will see below, several studies o f the stock market 
reaction to announcements of restructurings which involve changes in managerial 
ownership rely on the presence o f a strong and positive relationship between 
performance and managerial ownership of equity.
In addition to market valuation, we will also investigate another measure 
o f company performance: total factor productivity growth. No empirical evidence 
is available on the effect o f managerial ownership o f shares on productivity, and, 
again, this is a serious gap in the literature since numerous studies which analyse 
the effects o f restructuring mechanisms which involve dramatic changes in 
management ownership, such as leveraged and management buyouts, state that 
the increased productivity which usually follows restructurings is attributable to 
the increased managerial stakes in the company.
The literature on the incentive effects o f the ownership of shares by 
management, reviewed in the section 2.2, often makes the claim that the 
reduction in the separation of ownership and control should result in lower 
agency costs, and therefore higher performance. An alternative view is, however, 
that managerial ownership of shares may help a management to entrench and 
isolate itself from the market for corporate control which supposedly disciplines 
them with the threat o f a takeover. We will argue that these two opposing effects 
of managerial ownership o f shares can be separately identified, since the first one 
is related to the ownership of claims to cash flow and the second one to the
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ownership of votes: these are not necessarily held in equal amounts by managers 
of companies which issue shares with different voting rights.
Recently, another issue has become the focus o f attention of researches in 
the corporate performance field: the possible effects on performance of voting 
structures with departures from one share-one vote. These voting structures are 
not very common, possibly because until recently it was a requirement of the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) that shares traded on the Exchange had a 
one share-one vote structure. The theoretical academic debate which followed 
the relaxation of the NYSE rule has come to the conclusion that one share-one 
vote and a simple majority rule (50% of the votes) is generally the optimal voting 
structure. In particular, the existence o f differential voting rights may lead an 
inefficient management to replace an efficient one: this could happen whether or 
not the management itself owns shares in the company.
Although several empirical studies have investigated the price differentials 
o f shares with the same claims to dividends but with different voting rights, no 
such study, in our knowledge, has investigated the consequences o f the presence 
of shares with differential voting rights on the performance o f the company. In 
this chapter we will investigate the relationship between a voting concentration 
index, whose construction we explain in section 2.3, and two measures of 
performance: market valuation and total factor productivity growth.
The plan of the chapter is as follows: section 2.2 briefly reviews the 
theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between corporate 
structure and performance; section 2.3 presents the methodology employed and 
the problems encountered; section 2.4 contains the study on the relationship 
between managerial ownership of shares and performance while section 2.5 
contains the study on the relationship between voting rights and performance. 
Finally, section 2.6 contains our conclusions.
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2.2. Corporate Structure and Performance
2.2.1. The Separation of Ownership and Control
Corporate control and the agency problems generated by the separation 
of ownership and control are the central issues in this chapter. The "classical" 
model of the firm, characterised by an entrepreneur-owner who provides the risk 
capital, employs the factors o f production and maximises profits, has come under 
severe criticisms since at least the 1930's for not adequately representing the 
modem corporation, in which the entrepreneurial and risk bearing functions are 
provided by different individuals. In this section we will first introduce the main 
criticisms to the "classical" model and then see the mechanisms of control which 
have evolved to overcome this agency problem: these mechanisms are both 
internal to the firm (such as incentive contracts) and external (such as takeover 
pressure):
Berle and Means (1932) recognised that the separation of ownership and 
control, coupled with a dispersed ownership o f the shares of a corporation, may 
give managers the possibility of pursuing their own interests instead of those o f 
the shareholders. Managers may have as their objectives, aggrandisement and 
sales growth, rather than profit maximisation, and, especially in widely held 
corporations, have an opportunity for shirking and perquisite-taking given by the 
lack of monitoring by shareholders. Coase (1937)32 views the firm as a set of 
contracts between an entrepreneur and a group of workers who are individually 
maximising their utility. However, an important feature of the literature 
developed around this idea has been the recognition that contracts are costly to 
write and enforce, and that an incomplete contract framework is more 
appropriate to the study o f the modem corporation.
32 And successively Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976).
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The separation of ownership and control is the outcome of a trade-off 
between two opposing forces: on one side, there is the desire of the risk-bearers 
to diversify their risks by holding a small proportion o f equity capital in various 
firms; on the other side, if  managers do not own all the equity (risk) capital they 
will tend to do more on-the-job consumption, since they would not have to suffer 
the full consequences o f their non-maximising behaviour. In theory, this last 
problem could be remedied by writing contracts which specify what type of 
actions managers can and cannot undertake, thereby safeguarding the interests of 
the shareholders. However, since contracts specifying all possible circumstances 
(in addition to being verifiable by a third party) are either too costly, or simply 
not enforceable, some other mechanism, internal or external to the firm, is 
necessary to prevent the management from taking actions which are not in the 
interest o f the shareholders.
Incentive contracts can be used as a way of aligning the interests o f 
managers and shareholders, but the incomplete-contract nature of the relationship 
among the two parties is such that performance-related compensation is not 
enough to make the interests o f the two parties coincide. Performance on the part 
of managers is very difficult to assess, since the overall performance of a 
company is also affected by outside shocks whose effects cannot be properly 
quantified. When trying to judge the performance of managers, shareholders face 
a signal extraction problem and try to infer managers' ability from a noisy signal, 
the overall performance o f the company. Campbell and Marino (1989) show that 
in such a situation, risk-averse managers are led to choose investments which do 
not maximise the value of the firm.
Nevertheless, performance-related contracts are widely used, taking 
sometimes the form of options to buy shares of the company at a pre-specified 
price, but the magnitude of their impact is questioned in a study by Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) who analyse the pay-performance relationship and find that 
although this is present and significant, it is too small, implying an increase of 
salary and bonus for the chief executive officer of only 45 cents per $1000 of
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increase of shareholder wealth33.
Even in the absence of external shocks, if monitoring costs are present, a 
manager who owns less then 100% of the equity of a company will not bear the 
full consequences of his actions and this may lead to non-maximising behaviour. 
This would be anticipated by shareholders who may allow some form of non­
maximising behaviour as a substitute form of compensation. Demsetz (1983) 
argues that, in a world with no monitoring costs, when a manager is hired by the 
owner of a firm, the on-the-job consumption will be lower since the owner will 
demand a greater reduction in the remuneration of the hired manager that the 
owner's own on-the-job consumption. If, however, monitoring costs are high, on- 
the-job consumption will also be higher and the direct remuneration of the 
manager lower, but this would not necessarily be, according to Demsetz (1983), 
an inefficient means of production.
Since it is practically impossible to perfectly align the interests of owners 
and managers, there is the need for supervising the actions of managers. In 
theory, a check on management is provided by the board of directors, which is 
chosen by the shareholders; this is not always enough though to stop the non­
value-maximising behaviour of managers. In fact, first, managers can influence 
the selection of the other (outside) directors, and, second, outside directors lack 
detailed information on which to base their judgement, since managers do not 
have an incentive to disclose correct and complete information unless it were 
favourable to them. In addition, even if shareholders have the power to appoint 
and fire directors, these face a free-rider problem since monitoring managers and 
choosing directors is a public good and few find it convenient to spend time and 
resources in these activities. Given the high costs involved in monitoring 
management, this will be done only by shareholders who have a sufficiently high 
stake in the company.
Since internal mechanisms o f control may not be enough, there is the need 
for additional external mechanisms for controlling the management, to make it
Kaplan (1992) finds similar results for Japan.
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act in the shareholders' interest. The external checks on the management rely on 
the market for corporate control which uses the takeover mechanism as its main 
vehicle. As we will see, there are several possible effects which are generated by 
takeover pressure.
Scharfstein (1988) has shown that, under asymmetric information 
between shareholders and managers, the takeover threat is in fact more efficient 
than an incentive scheme in disciplining management, since an incentive scheme 
would have to be based on information which is known, and verifiable, by all 
parties. If shareholders cannot discriminate between a bad result which has been 
caused by self-interested managers and one caused by an unfavourable 
environment, any contract among the two parties would result in managerial 
inefficiency; in this case, an informed raider can mitigate this inefficiency by 
bidding for firms whose managers have shirked, but not for those whose 
managers were unlucky. The crucial hypothesis here is obviously that the bidder 
is better informed than the shareholders: if this is not the case, then the 
conclusion may be reversed.
The reason why the takeover mechanism may act as a monitoring device 
is that companies quoted in the stock market can be seen as subject to a 
continuous auction, so that, if the management of a company is not maximising 
the value o f the firm and this is reflected in a low stock market value, then a 
competing management may buy the company at the current price, impose value 
maximisation and, once the share price has reacted, realise the difference.
However, the corrective properties o f the takeover mechanism encounter 
some difficulties. One is the puzzle presented by Grossman and Hart (1980) who 
give reasons why the gain from a takeover would not go the new management, 
but to the existing shareholders. They argue that small shareholders of the target 
firm have no incentive to tender their shares to the bidder, until the bid price fully 
reflects the expected increase in profitability under the new management. If 
making a bid is costly, then a bidder who has to pass the whole gain to the 
shareholders would have no incentives. In practice, there are a number of reasons
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why the bidder may still be able to extract gains from a takeover34 but these are 
often offset by the high transaction costs involved in a bid, especially those which 
are resisted by the incumbent management. Commenting on these issues, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1988, p. 12) conclude that "with high transaction costs, hostile 
takeovers can punish only the most dramatic cases of non-value-maximising 
behaviour".
On the other hand, if a raider gets personal benefits from the acquisition, 
he could implement it and pay a premium even if there are no efficiency gains. 
This would be the case if a management, instead of distributing to the 
shareholders the cash flow remaining after all projects with positive net present 
value have been financed, uses it to make acquisitions with negative net present 
value. The "free cash flow theory" proposed by Jensen (1986) contemplates this 
possibility: this theory predicts that agency problems between managers and 
shareholders are bigger in those companies which have large cash flows and few 
investment opportunities. An interesting corollary of this theory is that a way for 
managers to commit themselves to pay out the free cash flow is to incur a large 
amount of debt which, unlike dividends, must be repaid to avoid bankruptcy: this 
is the reason why debt may act as a disciplinary device for managers.
In conclusion, takeovers can be either a solution or an expression of 
agency problems, depending on the motives behind them. They are a solution 
when they help to replace inefficient managers, or force good managers to 
maximise firm value; they are instead an expression of agency problems when 
they are undertaken by managers who have as their objectives aggrandisement or 
who are trying to extract personal benefits from the takeover.
Whether takeovers are a way to impose value maximisation or a way for 
managers to pursue their own goals, there is an incentive for managers of 
possible targets to adopt strategies that would make themselves less vulnerable to 
takeovers. Theorists in favour o f takeovers argue that the desire of avoiding
In the U.S. one such reason is given by the profits made by buying the first 5% of 
shares at the pre-bid price before disclosure of the stake has to be made by filing a SEC 
form.
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being taken over makes managers act in such a way as to maximise the value of 
the firm, as expressed by the stock market, since, given that takeovers are costly, 
it would not pay an external management to replace the incumbent one, unless it 
believed that it could do better. According to this reasoning, takeovers are an 
effective way of preventing managers from pursuing their own objectives at the 
expense o f shareholders, and a way of replacing managers who are simply not 
good enough.
Critics of the takeover mechanism argue, instead, that there are other 
ways o f preventing takeovers which do not involve value maximisation, and 
which can take much time and energy for the management to implement, thus 
creating an undesirable waste of resources. These include antitakeover defences 
such as amendments to the corporate charter, poison pills, and share repurchases, 
as well as other methods of entrenching a management.
A potential negative effect of the takeover pressure may also be an 
excessive concern on the part of managers for short-term movements in share 
prices (called short-termism): since a higher share price would make a takeover 
more costly, and so less likely, if the market reacts disproportionately to current 
earning figures in forming earnings expectations, this concern on the part of 
managers is justified, and may force them to sacrifice projects which have a 
payoff in the long-run, in favour of others with a lower net present value, but 
with payoffs which occur in the short-term. It follows that one of the effects of 
short-termism would be the reduction in investments and R&D expenses, as a 
way of increasing current earnings. Although it is generally believed that short- 
termism can arise only in an inefficient market, Stein (1989) has shown that this 
problem can also arise in a perfectly efficient market, as long as managers care 
about current share prices.
2.2.2. Empirical Evidence
We will review below those empirical studies which provide insights, 
directly or indirectly, on the relationship between managerial ownership of equity
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and voting rights, and on the consequences o f separating voting rights and claims 
to cash flow. In particular, we will present the empirical evidence on the 
importance of internal mechanisms of control, and on the effects of takeovers and 
of going private transactions such as leveraged and management buyouts, on 
performance.
These studies concentrate mainly on the stock price reaction on the day of 
the announcement o f a particular restructuring. To the extent that the stock 
market reacts instantly and without bias to all newly available information, 
correctly discounting to the present all the consequences of the restructuring, 
these studies provide a way of judging the desirability o f particular types of 
restructurings. Very few studies concentrate their attention on the actual changes 
in the profitability or productivity of companies following a restructuring.
2.2.2.1. Internal Mechanisms of Control
We start by reviewing studies which attempt to test the importance of 
mechanisms, internal to the firm, for monitoring management. Warner, Watts and 
Wruck (1988) study the relationship between stock price performance and top 
management replacements. They find an inverse relationship between the 
probability of a management change and stock price performance, which suggests 
that poorly performing managers are indeed replaced: the actual monitoring 
mechanism which is at work may come either from the board of directors, mutual 
monitoring among the managers, or by the presence of large shareholders. 
However, the model estimated by the authors has predictive ability only for 
extremely good or bad performances (within the lowest decile of performance the 
probability o f turnover is only 0.06) and the change in management can occur up 
to two calendar years after the bad performance is observed.
Lewellen, Roderer and Rosenfeld (1985) study the relationship between 
managerial ownership of acquiring firms and abnormal stock returns at the 
announcement of a merger, and find that it is positive and significant. Given that 
some mergers may be expression of agency problems (as suggested above), the 
higher abnormal stock returns obtained with higher management ownership is the
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expression of the lower probability of a value-decreasing merger. To the extent 
that higher management ownership decreases agency problems, the results 
suggest that internal mechanisms of control are inefficient in preventing managers 
who own little stock in their companies from undertaking value-decreasing 
mergers.
The role o f large shareholders as a partial solution to the free-rider 
problem has been explored by Shleifer and Vishny (1986). From their work it 
emerges that the main role of large shareholders is to facilitate takeovers, rather 
than to overcome agency problems. Large shareholders are mainly investment 
funds and insurance companies which hold large portfolios and are generally well 
diversified: they lack the incentive to supervise closely the activities of companies 
in their portfolios since it would take them a substantial amount of time and 
energy to do something which is not related to their main business.
Outside directors have probably a bigger role to play in the monitoring of 
the management, but their presence is seldom encouraged in reality. Weisbach 
(1988) examines the relationship between the presence of outside directors and 
the turnover of chief executive officers. Controlling for ownership structure, 
industry, and size, he finds that in outsider-dominated boards there is a stronger 
association between prior performance and the probability of resignation. 
Nevertheless, outside directors often have interests in the continuation of the 
present management, and lack the information necessary to judge the actions o f 
the management. To have an effective role, outside directors should be chosen by 
shareholders, should have no interest in the company, and their incentive to 
provide efficient monitoring should be given by the desire to maintain their 
reputation as good non-executive directors. Kaplan and Reishus (1990) find that 
reputation is indeed important for directors by estimating that top executives of 
companies that reduce their dividends are less likely to receive additional outside 
directorships.
Concluding, while empirical studies find some evidence that stronger 
internal mechanisms of control, such as the presence o f outside directors or of a 
large shareholder, are associated with higher monitoring of managers, they do not 
show that the level of monitoring is sufficient, suggesting instead the contrary.
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2.2.2.2. Hostile and Disciplinary Takeovers
A distinction which has become frequent in the literature is between 
hostile and friendly takeovers: a friendly takeover is not opposed by the 
incumbent management at its announcement, making it very similar to a merger, 
while a hostile one generally encounters resistance from the incumbent 
management, which often adopts defensive measures. By reviewing the empirical 
evidence, we want to see to what extent hostile takeovers have succeeded in 
increasing the efficiency and profitability o f the companies involved, in order to 
judge whether insulating from the market for corporate control can be positive 
(short-termism argument) or negative (entrenchment argument) for the 
shareholders. The motive behind the takeover determines what changes we can 
expect to observe: if takeovers are prompted by efficiency considerations, they 
should result in a more productive firm; if the objective o f the merger is, instead, 
market power, then we should see an increase in industry concentration. Finally, 
if takeovers are prompted by agency problems, then we would see either a 
decrease in productivity or no change at all.
We are interested in the relationship between hostile takeovers and stock 
price performance, as well as in changes o f productivity and profitability of firms 
taken over. Unfortunately, no single empirical study, or group o f studies, can 
provide a coherent picture on the effects of takeovers since conflicting results are 
often obtained for different samples. We will therefore present the main studies 
and their conclusions indicating, wherever possible, what can account for 
differences in results.
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988a) examine ownership and financial 
characteristics of the firms in the 1980 Fortune 500 sample, 82 of which were 
either acquired by a third party, or underwent a management buyout. The authors 
classify the target firms as either friendly or hostile, depending on the reaction of 
the incumbent management to the tender offer, and look at the differences among 
these two groups and the average firm in the sample. Boards of directors of 
friendly targets owned on average over 20% of the company, significantly more 
than the 10.9% of the whole sample and the 8.3% of the hostile targets. Also, the
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incidence o f a member of the founding family on the management team was 
significantly higher for friendly targets (40%) than for the average firm in the 
sample (24%), and this was significantly higher than for hostile targets (10%). 
These differences could be due to two effects of high management ownership of 
shares: difficulty of completing a hostile takeover when managers own a 
substantial amount of shares, and lower agency costs due to stronger 
convergence of interests. An additional possible explanation for this result is that, 
given that a bid is made, managers who own a big amount of shares have a strong 
financial incentive to accept the tender offer at a premium, so may not resist it. 
The authors warn that the differences that they find between friendly and hostile 
targets could also be caused by other characteristics o f the firms which are not 
controlled for, such as size.
The authors also look at the values of Tobin's Q - defined as the ratio o f 
the market value of the firm to the replacement cost o f its tangible assets - and 
find that hostile targets have a significantly lower Q than both the average firm in 
the sample and friendly targets. The lower Q, which is taken to imply that the 
company is undervalued with respect to the rest o f the economy, may be due 
either to mismanagement, or to the low value of the assets caused by 
technological progress and increased foreign competition; the last reason is 
consistent with the finding that hostile targets were older and growing more 
slowly than the average firm in the sample. A related result is that firms which 
divest part of their businesses and those acquired in hostile takeovers are 
underperformers in their industries, while companies making acquisitions do not 
seem to be outperformed. By running probit regressions, the authors also find 
that the probability of a friendly takeover is not influenced by the market value of 
the company or by Q, while the probability o f a hostile takeover is negatively 
related to both of them35.
Concluding, hostile targets were smaller, older, growing more slowly, had 
lower Tobin's Q, more debt, and less investment, compared with the average
35 The regression includes both the industry Q and the deviation of Q from the industry 
average, but the first one is more important and statistically significant.
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Fortune 500 company. Friendly targets had a board with higher ownership, but 
did not share the same characteristics of hostile targets, suggesting that there 
could be a relationship between the reasons for the takeover and whether it is a 
friendly or a hostile one. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988a), in fact, interpret 
these findings as evidence that friendly takeovers are motivated by the 
exploitation of synergies, while hostile ones are o f a disciplinary nature.
A potentially more useful classification o f takeovers is the one by Martin 
and McConnell (1991) who classify them as disciplinary if there is top 
management turnover after the takeover. By looking at a sample of 253 
successful tender offers occurring between 1958 and 1984, they find that 
disciplinary takeover targets had a stock market performance significantly lower 
than other targets; when the authors divide the sample into friendly and hostile 
takeovers, they find no difference in turnover rates or in stock market 
performance prior to the takeover. Furthermore, the.authors find that the 
abnormal returns for both bidders and targets, and the probability of multiple 
bids, are not influenced by whether the takeover was disciplinary, or friendly, 
suggesting that competition for target firms does not depend on the motive of the 
takeover.
We now look at the evidence on the consequences of takeovers. One 
consistent result about mergers and takeovers is that shareholders of acquired 
firms gain a premium of about 20%36, while bidder's shareholders break even or 
have very small gains (Caves, 1989). Since the acquirer is generally bigger than 
the acquired company, the combined share value increases by 7-8% on average 
after the merger. In their review of the early evidence on the performance o f 
takeovers as expression o f the market for corporate control, Jensen and Ruback 
(1983) report that shareholders o f target firms realise on average 20% gains in 
mergers and 30% in takeovers, while bidding firms on average do not lose37. The
This shows a rising trend with values around 40% for the latest acquisitions.
The authors view the market for corporate control "as a market in which alternative 
managerial teams compete for the rights to manage corporate resources" (Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983, p. 6).
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authors report evidence that, after one year, the share price of the bidding firms 
drops, which suggests that, at the time of the merger, the market overestimates 
the future efficiency gains (Jensen and Ruback, 1983, p. 20). The authors claim 
that the source of the short-term gains does not appear to be an increase in 
market power, but in efficiency, even though they are not able to identify it.
Very few studies relate the stock market gain to real performance 
improvements; one such study is Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1990) who analyse 
the post-merger changes in operating performance by looking at the 50 biggest 
takeovers in the period 1979-1983. Using company accounts data they find that 
operating cash flow performance, relative to the industry, increases in the five 
years after the merger, due to improvements in asset productivity. The 
improvement in cash flow performance is not achieved by cutting capital 
expenditures or R&D, even if the industry-adjusted growth rate per employee 
declines significantly in the post-merger period; an increase in asset turnover 
rather than in operating margins is responsible for the higher operating returns.
Since shareholders o f the target firms in this sample earn on average a 
45% return, the authors look at the relationship between this abnormal stock 
return and the increase in cash flow performance, and find a significant and 
positive correlation. They claim that "the abnormal equity returns ... are broadly 
consistent with the value increases implied by the post-merger cash flow return 
increases" (Healy, Palepu and Ruback, 1990, p. 21). In contrast to this positive 
performance effects, Caves in his review of the evidence on realised profits and 
productivity after mergers concludes that business units involved in mergers "on 
average suffer substantial declines in profitability and losses in market share" 
(Caves, 1989, p. 170). The differences among the two studies may be due to the 
different sample period (more recent in the former) and to different data source 
and measures of performance employed.
Since most studies of performance after mergers have failed to explain the 
positive stock market reactions with improvements in efficiency, other possible 
sources o f gains to shareholders of takeover targets have been investigated. One 
of these alternative sources o f gains can be transfers from other parties, such as 
employees, customers, and the Treasury (in the form o f tax savings). These
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transfers may be important in explaining the premium paid in a takeover: several 
studies have attempted to measure them and some have found that in a few cases 
the redistribution o f wealth after a takeover can alone explain the whole premium 
paid. However, no significant pattern has emerged and, although redistributions 
may have important effects, they are rarely believed to be the main determinant of 
a takeover.
The last issue that we discuss in this review is the evidence on short- 
termism: this can be caused by myopia on the part of the market, or on the part 
of the managers. Jensen (1988) reports empirical findings which he interprets as 
evidence against short-termism on the part o f the market. These are that: 1) 
price-eamings ratios differ among companies; 2) stock prices respond positively 
to increased investment expenditure announcements; 3) higher institutional 
holdings are not associated with decreases in R&D expenditure; and 4) firms with 
high R&D expenditure are not more vulnerable to takeovers. Also, he argues that 
if the market undervalues a company, maybe because it does not value correctly 
long-term projects (short-termism argument), then the acquiring company can 
offer a premium over the current price to the shareholders, and still have an 
incentive for the takeover. This argument has testable implications: companies 
which succeed in resisting a takeover should improve their performance in the 
long-run, and after the failed tender offer - once the information on 
undervaluation has been revealed - the price should not revert to pre-bid levels38. 
These predictions are the empirical implications o f market myopia, or short- 
termism on the part of the stock market and have been tested in various empirical 
studies and rejected overwhelmingly39.
The other, and possibly more important, form of short termism is 
managerial myopia, and this may be a consequence o f takeover pressure: if 
shareholders are imperfectly informed, and form earnings expectations by looking 
at the current level o f earnings, it is in the interest o f managers who want to
This holds only if the reason why the bid has subsequently failed is not the arrival of 
new information which shows that the firm is overvalued at the new price.
See Jarrel, Brickley and Netter (1988, p. 57) for references.
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avoid a takeover at a low stock price, to invest in projects with lower net present 
value, but shorter horizon. Unfortunately, to date, there is no direct empirical 
evidence on the importance of managerial short-termism, also because the nature 
of the problem itself makes it difficult to observe: as noticed by Stein (1988, p. 
76)
"whether takeover pressure makes managers work harder or makes 
them behave more myopically, it must be true that a lot of the action, for 
better or for worse, occurs rather invisibly in companies that are never 
actually subject to bids".
The implications of managerial myopia are different from those of stock 
market myopia. With managerial myopia, long term projects and R&D would be 
performed, and valued, but only investment projects with high net present value 
(not just positive) would be undertaken.
2.2.2.3. Going Private Transactions, LBOs, and 
MBOs
Going private transactions are carried out by a group of investors, 
generally including the incumbent management, which buys all the shares of a 
company and withdraws it from public trading. Going private transactions which 
are financed by large amounts o f debt are known as Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs), 
or Management Buyouts (MBOs) when the incumbent management takes part in 
the transaction.
The possible sources of gains in going private transactions are less 
evident than for mergers and takeovers. For example, synergy gains cannot be 
obtained by going private since only the ownership structure of the company is 
affected by the transaction; moreover, in an MBO the management of the 
company is not replaced, and any gains involved cannot be due to the 
replacement of an inefficient management. Wealth redistributions from 
bondholders, the Treasury, and employees could have an important role as they 
do for takeovers, as also savings from registration and listing fees: costs involved 
in shareholders' services may be substantial and include also the time that top
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managers have to spend in activities related to publicly traded corporations. 
However, the main argument generally given o f why MBOs result in a more 
profitable company are the improved managerial incentives.
We now look at the characteristics of companies proposing to go private, 
and at the consequences of their decisions on stock prices, productivity, and 
possible wealth transfers. In their sample o f 72 firms which proposed to go 
private during the 70s, DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Rice (1984) find that the 
median management stake before the buyout was high (above 50%), the ratio of 
long-term debt to assets was low (12.6%), and the companies were fairly small. 
At the announcement of the buyout, the share prices increased by 22.3% on 
average, but companies withdrawing the going private proposal experienced later 
a stock price decrease of 8.9%40.
The gains from an LBO may come from improved management efficiency 
for four reasons: 1) the substantial amount o f debt can prevent misuse of free 
cash flow for projects with negative net present value; 2) managers have 
increased stakes in the company, and therefore more incentives not to shirk; 3) 
private companies may find it easier to adopt substantial compensation packages; 
4) higher concentration of ownership increases the incentive for closer 
monitoring. All these reasons point to an increase in the performance of the 
company following a buyout.
Various studies, reviewed below, have found improvements in operating 
cash flow (before interest) and on returns on asset and cash flow per employee, 
both on a before and after tax basis.
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) study productivity changes after LBOs at 
the manufacturing establishment level. They identify 1108 LBOs which took 
place between 1981 and 1986 (35% of which are MBOs) out of the 20,493 
establishments for which they have data, and look at total factor productivity, 
which is often regarded the most neutral measure o f performance for a firm.
40 The difference between the decrease and the previous gain may reflect a higher 
expectation of a new bid.
81
Plants involved in LBOs were more efficient than non-buyout plants, and 
continue to be more efficient for at least three years after the LBO; also, the 
difference between LBO plants and non-LBO plants is higher in the three years 
after the buyout than in three years preceding it, suggesting that buyouts are 
associated with increases in productivity. Moreover, the subsample of MBOs 
shows greater short-run productivity increases than LBOs.
Similar results are found by Smith (1990b) who investigates performance 
after 58 MBOs completed in the period 1977-1986; she finds that operating 
returns increase significantly from the year before to the year after the MBO. The 
author cannot relate increases in operating returns with cuts in employment or in 
R&D expenditure, but finds significant reductions in the industry-adjusted 
accounts receivable collection period (time allowed for paying bills) and the 
inventory holding period. She interprets the change in performance as due to the 
incentive effects of the change in ownership structure but offers an alternative 
explanation (which parallels a similar one about mergers): since managers have 
private information about the company's prospects, they exploit favourable 
information by buying the company before the information is revealed in the 
market (undervaluation hypothesis).
In her sample, management ownership and concentration of ownership 
increase substantially after the buyout: the median holding of officers, outside 
directors and other major shareholders changes from 35.5% to 95%; also 
financial leverage increases with the ratio o f debt to book value of tangible assets 
increasing from a median o f 0.59 pre-buyout to a median of 1.01 after the 
buyout. The incentive effect o f an increased management ownership does not find 
support from the results reported in a previous version of the same paper where 
she regresses changes in performance on the change in the percentage of 
common stock held by outside directors, and finds no relationship among the two 
variables.
Hall (1991) has reviewed a series of empirical studies on the effects o f 
two types o f restructurings on the horizon of the investment decisions (short- 
termism). She focuses on two types of corporate restructuring: substantial 
increases in leverage (with or without a change in control), and takeovers. As a
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measure of investment horizon, she employs the level o f R&D expenditure and 
concludes that: 1) a large fraction of restructurings have little to do with 
investment horizons, and especially those which do not involve changes in 
financial structure have no effect on investment; 2) increases in debt are 
associated with decreases in investment of all kinds (not just R&D), but this 
decreased investment expenditure is an optimal response to the higher cost of 
capital given by the smaller free cash flow, and the necessity o f raising capital at 
the higher real interest rates in the 80s.
Concluding, the evidence on LBOs shows that shareholders of LBO firms 
earn substantial returns; productivity and operating performance increase in the 
years immediately following a buyout and reductions in all types of investment 
occur in leveraged transactions, but this seems to be the optimal response to the 
higher cost of capital. The main reason for the improvements after an LBO is 
regarded to be the increased management ownership, but the proposition that 
management ownership per se increases productivity or profitability has never 
been tested: we will provide below prima facie evidence that the postulated 
positive incentive effects o f managerial ownership are not easily found in the 
data.
In this review, we have seen that the available empirical evidence does not 
provide a clear picture o f the relationship between managerial ownership of 
shares and performance: instead, it is often assumed that higher managerial 
ownership is associated with improved incentives, but no direct empirical 
evidence on this issue is provided. In the next sections we aim to provide such 
evidence by analysing the empirical relationship between managerial ownership of 
shares and votes and corporate performance.
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2.3. Methodology and Data
In the present study, we focus on the empirical relationship between 
variables which capture special aspects of the separation between ownership and 
control and performance. The two measures of performance which we analyse 
are: market valuation, as expressed by Tobin's Q, and total factor productivity 
growth.
We use a panel dataset of 389 UK quoted companies41 observed during 
the years 1972-86; the panel is unbalanced and comprises 3993 observations42. 
Firm-level data originates mainly from company accounts to which information 
on share prices is added; all companies in our sample have observations for the 
years 1979-81. Data were originally obtained by merging information from the 
Exstat dataset and the Datastream on-line service, and has undergone a thorough 
process of "cleaning" by various members of the Centre for Economic 
Performance. This original dataset has been supplemented by us with data on 
managerial ownership of equity and votes, and on voting concentration (collected 
by the author from various sources), and with the calculation of Tobin's Q for 
which data on market value of common equity and loan capital was also added.
The first variable which we have collected is the percentage of shares 
owned by the management of a company. Since in the UK there is no dataset 
which has consistent historical information on this variable, we had to obtain it 
from company accounts directly, or through old Extel cards43. Company 
accounts report the holdings of each director of the company (whether or not 
they are managers of the company), but, given the difficulty of identifying which 
of the directors were also managers, we adopted the assumption that
This is a subset of the dataset collected at the Centre for Economic Performance, 
London School of Economics and Political Science.
For the sample selection procedure, the exact definitions of the variables used and the 
sources of the data, see the Data Appendix.
Extel is a private service which provides, at annual frequency, a series of cards 
summarising the information contained in company accounts.
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management ownership could be effectively proxied by the ownership of the 
whole board of directors. For all 389 companies, we have collected data on the 
percentage of shares (OWNE) and votes (OWNV) owned by managers in the 
year 1981 or 1982, depending on availability. We report the frequency 
distributions of OWNE and OWNV in table 2.1.
The average (median) managerial ownership of shares in this sample is 
16.8% (8.6%), while the average (median) managerial ownership of votes is 
18.0% (10.0%). In companies with differential voting rights there is in general a 
substantial difference among managerial ownership of equity and votes, 
confirming for the UK the results found for a sample of 45 US companies by 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985). In their sample, the median ownership of 
corporate officers and their families in companies with dual-classes of shares is 
56.9% of votes and 24% of equity. In our case the values are 18.4% and 11.2%.
The second variable which we have constructed is the concentration of 
voting power in the 389 companies in our sample for each year that they appear 
in the dataset. In companies which have a one share-one vote equity structure, 
the concentration of voting power among equity holders is at its lowest, since a 
holder of equity claims has an equal percentage of votes. However, there are a 
number of companies which have an equity structure which departs form one 
share-one vote.
The possible sources of departures form one share-one vote that we have 
identified are:
1) the presence of two or more types of ordinary shares with identical rights 
to dividends and seniority, but with different voting rights (generally one 
class of shares has no voting rights at all), or shares with similar voting 
rights, but different rights to dividends;
2) the presence of preference shares with voting rights attached to them.
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Table 2.1 Distribution of the percentage of sh ares  and votes owned 
by m anagem ent
Percentage Frequency 
of OWNE
Frequency 
of OWNV
0-1 92 92
1-5 74 71
5-10 37 32
10-15 24 24
15-20 27 22
20-25 22 23
25-30 25 24
30-35 13 14
35-40 16 20
40-45 15 15
45-50 14 17
50-55 13 15
55-60 10 11
60-65 4 4
65-70 1 1
70-75 1 3
75-100 1 1
Total 389 389
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Table 2.2 Number of com panies with departures from one share-one 
vote
1975 1980 1985
Non voting or differential voting equity 77 65 46
Voting preferred capital 71 68 61
Total number of companies 115 108 85
Note Some of the companies have both non-voting and voting-preferred equity capital.
In order to give an idea of the extent of the presence of differential voting 
rights among UK manufacturing companies, we report in table 2.2 the total 
number of companies in the EXSTAT dataset which had equity with differential 
voting rights in three years, 1975, 1980 and 1985, together with the source of the 
departure from one share-one vote.
The presence of shares with voting rights which causes departures from 
one share-one vote is a relatively common phenomenon in UK quoted 
companies. One of the reasons why in the UK the number of companies with 
differential voting rights appears to be higher than in the USA may be that in the 
UK a rule similar to the one which prevented companies without one share-one 
vote from listing their shares on the New York Stock Exchange, has never 
existed.
We now describe the construction of the variable VCON which measures 
the concentration of votes with respect to the equity capital of a firm. The 
concentration index has a value of zero for companies with one share-one vote, 
and a value of one if votes and equity are completely separated; for companies 
with departures from one share-one vote the index has been computed by means 
of a Lorenz Curve, as previously done in a similar context by Levy (1982).
In order to construct the index we have followed this rule: we have 
identified all sources of equity capital (rights to dividends) and all sources of
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votes (excluding those voting rights which are exercisable only in certain 
circumstances) and have computed for each class of capital the percentage of the 
total votes and equity which it represents.
In the following cases we had to employ special assumptions: in the case 
of share capital with different dividend rights (such as deferred shares) we have 
imputed the amount of equity represented by such shares by comparing the share 
price of two classes with different dividend claims. For example, if a deferred 
share has a price equal to half of an ordinary share, the deferred share is 
considered equivalent, in amount of equity, to half of an ordinary share: if, as is 
often the case, deferred shares have the same voting power than ordinary ones, 
these would have higher voting rights per equity capital.
For preferred capital, which carries a fixed dividend, we have adopted the 
assumption that it does not represent equity, and is just like debt. This is in 
conformity with the practice in the UK where preferred capital is valued like 
debt, and not like equity. Although preferred capital may have some elements of 
equity, since part of it may be converted into ordinary shares at a later date (or if 
special circumstances arise), or may include some elements of participation in 
high earnings of a company, we believe that ignoring these equity elements 
introduces a smaller error than if we tried to account for them in an ad hoc way.
Once all the sources of equity and votes were identified, we constructed a 
concentration index by using the Lorenz curve method which involves 
constructing a curve as in Figure 2.1 (starting from the origin of the axis with the 
lowest votes-per-equity ratio) and then computing the ratio of the area between 
the curve and the 45° line, to the maximum area, which is 0.5. Figure 2.1 reports 
the construction of VCON for an hypothetical company which has two asset 
classes: one with 50% of the votes and 25% of the equity and the other with 50% 
of votes and 75% of equity. The voting concentration index in this example is 
VCON = (0.125/0.5) = 0.25.
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Figure 2.1 Construction of VCON
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The distribution o f the voting concentration index (VCON) for our 389 
companies is reported in table 2.3.
As can be seen from this table, although the great majority o f companies 
have a concentration index equal to zero, 51 o f them have a value higher than 
0.001 and 32 have a value greater than 0.144. We have also subdivided the 
companies with a voting concentration greater than zero into two groups: those
Two companies in our sample, although with departures from one share-one vote, 
have a value of VCON less than 0.001.
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Table 2.3 Distribution of the voting concentration index
VCON Companies
0-0.001 338
0.001-0.01 9
0.01-0.1 10
0.1-0.2 5
0.2-0.3 3
0.3-0.4 4
0.4-0.5 3
0.5-0.6 •2
0.6-0.7 0
0.7-0.8 5
0.8-0.9 6
0.9-1 4
with non-voting equity (NVOT=l), and those with voting preference 
(NEQ=1)45.
In table 2.4 we report the median managerial ownership of shares and 
votes for companies in the whole sample and those with VCONX). As can be 
seen from the table, companies with departures from one share-one vote have 
higher managerial ownership of shares and votes than the average company in 
our sample: this is due to the higher ownership stakes of managers of companies
45 There are two companies in our sample which have both non voting equity and voting 
preference shares.
with non voting shares. We would like to point out that the variable VCON is not 
in any way related to individual holdings: a value of VCON greater than zero 
allows the possibility that some shareholders own different proportion of shares 
and votes, but it does not say anything about actual holdings. What VCON 
determines, though is the upper limit to the separation of ownership of shares and 
votes.
Table 2.4 Median ownership of equity and votes held by 
m anagem ent
Sample Median
OWNE
Median
OWNV
Number of 
companies
VCONX) 11.22 18.43 53
NVOT=l 17.13 34 31
NEQ=1 3.48 3.84 24
Whole Sample 8.59 9.98 389
The companies in our dataset are classified according to 14 industry 
groups according to the 1980 SIC codes: these industries are reported in the 
Data Appendix. In table 2.5 we report the distribution of our companies in these 
industry groups and the distribution of those companies with departures from one 
share-one vote: we can see from this table that the phenomenon of departures 
from one share-one vote does not seem to be industry specific.
Finally, in table 2.6 we report some descriptive statistics for the 
companies in our dataset: the values refer to the year 1981 or 1982, depending 
on availability46.
In all our cross section equations we include a dummy to allow for differences between 
1981 and 1982.
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Table 2.5 Industry distribution of companies
Industry N companies N companies 
with 
VCON>0
Percentage of 
companies
1 36 8 22.2
2 35 4 11.4
3 10 3 30
4 84 11 13.1
5 3 0 0
6 39 5 12.8
7 14 2 14.3
8 37 3 8.1
9 29 4 13.8
10 33 5 15.2
11 24 3 12.5
12 11 1 9.1
13 31 3 9.7
14 3 1 33.3
Total 389 53 13.6
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Table 2.6 Descriptive statistics
Employment Capital Value Added Market Value
Sample Mean 4452 43391 40878 75530
Sample Median 842 4643 6417 7070
Note Employment is measured as number of employees, Capital, Value Added, and 
Market Value are expressed as thousands of 1972 UK pounds.
For the analysis of the effects on market valuation, we have estimated a 
cross-section regression, using for all 389 firms either the year 1981 or 1982, 
depending on availability, with Tobin's Q as the dependent variable. For the 
construction of the value of Tobin's Q we have followed Blundell, Bond, 
Deveraux and Schiantarelli (1988) and defined it as:
2 =
(MVE+TLC)
((l - d e p )r c c ) -1
PIPM
WP
where
MVE the market value of ordinary shares (voting and non-voting);
TLC the book value of debt;
RCC the replacement value of the capital stock 
DEP depreciation (set here equal to 8%).
For the computation of the market value of a company, we have valued all 
ordinary capital at market prices47; debt has been entered at book prices, given
When prices were not available for non-voting shares, we have assumed that ordinary 
shares with the same rights to dividends had the same value. This is equivalent to 
assuming that voting rights do not have value in themselves.
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the non-availability of market prices for it; and the replacement cost of capital has 
been computed with the technique explained in Wadhwani and Wall (1986)48.
For the study of the effects on total factor productivity growth, we have 
estimated, on the whole panel, a productivity function of the Cobb-Douglas type, 
whose residual represents the relative productivity of the companies in the 
sample. Since companies may show different productivity levels for reasons that 
we cannot control for, such as the quality of the labour force employed, we 
decided to eliminate these firm-specific effects by estimating our equation in first 
differences: to the extent that these firm-specific effects are constant, they will 
disappear with the first differencing of all variables.
The production function which we have estimated has as the dependent 
variable the logarithm of the real value added, and as regressors the logarithm of 
employment and capital stock, with the addition o f an industry-level variable 
representing the average hours worked during the year49. All the equations 
include, unless otherwise specified, industry and time (year) dummies. The value 
added variable has been proxied by adding the remuneration of the employees 
with the interest payments, the depreciation and amortization, and profits. 
Employment is the number of employees (domestic and overseas) and the capital 
stock is the same variable used for the replacement cost of capital.
Since the employment and capital variables are jointly determined with 
value added, causing a simultaneity problem for the estimation procedure, we 
estimate the equations using the generalised method of moments, described in 
Arellano and Bond (1991), which exploits the moments restrictions implied by 
the lack of correlation between lagged values of all the variables and the error 
term in the levels equation50. The lack of correlation is crucial to the estimation
Details on all variables can be found in the Data Appendix.
The reason for the inclusion of this variable are detailed in Muellbauer (1987), 
together with an explanation of why we may expect a higher coefficient on the average 
hours worked than on the employment variable.
The estimations were carried out by using DPD (Dynamic Panel Data), a program 
written by Arellano and Bond (1988) in the Gauss programming language, which is 
available from Dr. S. Bond, Institute of Economics and Statistics, University of
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procedure since this relies completely on that assumption: there are two possible 
tests for detecting such correlation. The first one, the m2 test proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991), is a test on the actual measure o f second-order serial 
correlation of the residual in the differenced equation (we should have first order 
serial correlation in the differenced equation if the levels equation has an 
uncorrelated error); the second test is an indirect one since it tests the validity of 
the instruments (Sargan test) and so tests the consequences rather than the serial 
correlation itself.
Unfortunately, as we will see below, our basic equation exhibits second- 
order serial correlation, according to the m2 test, so there is the possibility of our 
estimates being inconsistent. We have dealt with this problem in two ways: one is 
to make sure that the instruments are not "invalid” according to the Sargan test, 
and the second is to estimate the same equation with a lagged dependent variable, 
and see if any of the conclusions differ, once the second order serial correlation 
disappears.
When presenting the results, we will report the two-step estimates, which 
is the most efficient of those proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), and the 
corresponding heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics. Arellano and Bond 
(1991) show, though, that the estimates of the standard errors obtained with the 
two-step estimates are biased downwards, so that the t-statistics tend to be 
biased upwards. We will indicate all the occasions in which the inference from 
one-step estimates (with heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics) differ from the 
one presented.
We treat employment and capital stock as endogenously determined, and 
instrument them with their lagged values; for the employment variable, we 
employ all the moments restrictions implied by the lags from 2 to 5, while for the 
capital stock we employ only the lags 2 and 3 as instruments. All other 
endogenous variables, such as the lagged dependent variable and other firm-level 
variables, are instrumented with their second and third lag.
Oxford.
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Table 2.7 Basic production function
Dependent variable 
LRVAD
Unrestricted Constant returns 
to scale
Lagged dependent 
variable
Share of 
labour
Constant -0.015
(-1.11)
-0.021
(-1.50)
0.019
(0.94)
-0.021
(-1.5)
LEMP 0.764
(11.36)
0.856
(15.49)
0.353
(6.04)
0.857
(2.27)
LCAP 0.040
(0.59)
0.144 0.063 0.143
LAHR 0.712
(2.57)
0.678
(2.32)
0.893
(2.01)
0.682
(2.32)
LRVAD(-l) 0.584
(18.56)
SHARE 0.010
(0.02)
Serial correlation -2.74 -2.81 -1.31 -2.81
Instrument
validity
56.47
(45)
56.53
(46)
59.79
(47)
56.68
(47)
Number of 
Observations
2835 2835 2835 2835
Note t-statistics, computed with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, are shown in 
parenthesis.
In table 2.7 we report the results o f the estimation of the basic production 
function, with and without the constant returns to scale restrictions, and with a 
lagged dependent variable. The dependent variable is LRVAD, the logarithm of 
the real value added, the regressors are time and industry dummies, LEMP, the 
logarithm of total employment, LCAP, the logarithm of the capital stock, and
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LAHR the logarithm of the average hours worked.
As can be seen from the column 1 o f table 2.7, the unrestricted 
production function shows decreasing returns to scale, with the sum of the 
coefficients of LEMP and LCAP equal to 0.804. This is surprising since the 
majority of empirically estimated production functions exhibit increasing returns 
to scale (Konig, 1992). A similar result has been obtained by Nickell, Wadhwani 
and Wall (1992) who employ a sample of 122 companies from the same dataset. 
We share their belief that the result of decreasing returns to scale is probably due 
to a poorly measured capital stock; in this case it is preferable to impose constant 
returns to scale at the outset. We impose constant returns to scale in column 2 of 
table 2.7, and this becomes our basic production function. In column 3 we add 
the lagged dependent variable which removes the second order serial correlation 
without altering the (long-run) coefficient on employment. Finally, in order to 
account for the possible heterogeneity among companies, which could result in 
different values of the elasticities, in column 4 we include the variable SHARE 
which represents the share of labour in value added. The coefficient on this 
variable is very small and insignificant, so we shall ignore it in the following 
analysis.
Essentially, we will test the importance o f variables for productivity 
growth, by including them in the estimation of the production function. We could 
think of this "augmented" production function as the reduced form of a system of 
equations which includes a technological relationship (the production function) 
and other (unspecified) behavioural equations which are then substituted out.
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2.4. Managerial Ownership of Shares and 
Performance
Managerial ownership of shares in the company they manage generates 
two important but contrasting incentive effects: on the one hand, it makes 
managers bear the consequences of their actions directly, while on the other, it 
enables them to entrench and insulate themselves from the market for corporate 
control. The former effect is due to the ownership by managers of residual claims 
to cash flow (equity), while the latter is given by their effective power to control 
which is mainly, but not exclusively, given by the ownership of votes. These two 
effects have not been separately studied in the empirical literature, mainly because 
the great majority of companies have a one share-one vote rule so that a certain 
percentage of shares is tied to the same percentage o f votes. In this section we 
focus in particular on companies which have shares with differential voting rights, 
in order to identify these two different effects.
We also provide additional evidence on the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm value which casts doubts on the various results 
already obtained for the US. This is particularly important, since, as we have seen 
in section 2.2, several studies on takeovers and leveraged buyouts give an 
increase in managerial ownership as the main explanation for the increase in value 
of the target company at the announcement of the restructuring.
2.4.1. Market Valuation
We start our empirical analysis of the relationship between market 
valuation, expressed by Tobin's Q, and managerial ownership of shares, by trying 
to replicate the results obtained for the US by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1988b), McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1987). 
These studies find a non-linear relationship among the two variables. Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988b) find that the relationship is piecewise linear: positive 
for managerial ownerships between 0% and 5%, negative between 5% and 25%,
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and positive thereafter. McConnell and Servaes (1990) use instead a quadratic 
specification which implies that the relationship is positive between 0% and 
somewhere in the region of 35-50%, and negative thereafter. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1987) find a positive relationship between 0% and 1%, negative 
between 1% and 5%, positive between 5% and 20% and negative thereafter.
The results for the US do not therefore seem to point towards any 
definitive conclusion. We report in columns 1 and 2 of table 2.8, the results for 
the UK by using the piecewise linear specification of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1988) (columns 1 and 2) and the quadratic of McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
(columns 5 and 6), plus a specification which includes dummy variables instead of 
levels (columns 3 and 4). The regressions are estimated by OLS using separately 
both the percentage of equity and the percentage of votes owned by managers. 
Columns 1, 3 and 5 refer to managerial ownership of equity while columns 2, 4 
and 6 refer to managerial ownership of votes: the results are very similar among 
the two groups given the high correlation between managerial ownership of 
shares and votes. All equations include industry dummies and the 1981 dummy51. 
The variables in table 2.8 are defined as:
OWN 0-5 equal to managerial ownership when this is less than 5%
equal to 5 otherwise;
OWN 5-25 equal to 0 if managerial ownership is less than 5%,
equal to 25 if managerial ownership is greater than 25%, 
equal to the percentage of managerial ownership minus 5 in all 
other cases;
OWN 25-100 equal to 0 if managerial ownership is less than 25%,
equal to managerial ownership less 25 in all other cases;
DM equal to 1 if managerial ownership is between 5% and 25%,
0 otherwise;
DH equal to 1 if managerial ownership is greater than 25%,
0 otherwise;
OWN percentage of managerial ownership;
OWN2 the square of managerial ownership;
51 These variables already account for a of 17.21.
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Table 2.8 Managerial ownership of equity and votes and Tobin's Q
Dependent Variable:
Q
Equity Votes Equity Votes Equity Votes
OWN
0-5
-0.02
(-0.99)
-0.02
(-0.92)
OWN
5-25
0.01
(1.48)
0.01
(1.39)
OWN
25-100
-0.01
(-2.38)
-0.01
(-2.33)
DM -0.04
(-0.44)
-0.05
(-0.51)
DH -0.04
(-0.62)
-0.04
(-0.65)
OWN 0.42
(0.92)
0.36
(0.81)
OWN2 -1.09
(-1.48)
-0.97
(-1.36)
R2 18.2 18.16 17.30 17.31 17.74 17.73
Note t-statisties, computed with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, are shown in
parenthesis.
The first column of table 2.8 reports the results obtained in our sample for 
the specification of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), but our results are 
exactly opposite: a negative relationship between 0% and 5%, a positive one 
between 5% and 25%, and a negative one thereafter. In column 2 we estimate the 
same specification, but now with the percentage of votes rather than equity, and 
we obtain a similar result to column 1. When we employ the specification with 
dummies the results are insignificant. Furthermore, the quadratic specification of 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) fails to give significant parameter estimates.
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These results clearly show that none of the previous results obtained for 
the US is replicable for the UK, although there seems to be a tendency of Q to be 
smaller and decreasing for high values of management ownership of equities 
and/or votes. However, there are no theoretical justifications for such an effect 
since, for ownership levels greater than 50%, the possibly negative effect of 
entrenchment should already be present in full, since control is completely in the 
hands of management (in practice, 25-30% is the level of managerial ownership 
which guarantees control), while the effect of the higher association of ownership 
and control should be monotonically increasing.
One way of disentangling the effect of managerial ownership of equity 
from the one of ownership of votes, is to look at what happens when managers 
own a different amount of equity and votes. In order to do this we run a 
regression of Q on the difference between votes and equity ownership by the 
management divided by their equity holding (OWNDIF). table 2.9 reports the 
result of the simple regression of Q on OWNDIF: this suggests that there is a 
negative relationship between the extent to which votes owned by managers are 
not "covered" by holdings of equity. In order to see if this result may be due to 
other factors which have an influence on Q, we add to the regression other 
variables to try and capture these effects.
The reason for introducing other explanatory variables is that empirical 
measures of Q cannot easily incorporate the value of the intangible capital the 
company has accumulated by means of, for example, brand names and reputation, 
or by the development of patents and know-how. To the extent that these factors 
are industry-specific, they will be captured in the industry dummies, but a lot of 
variation is still expected to be present within industries. The variables generally 
used to try and capture the value of the intangible capital are advertising 
expenditure and R&D. Unfortunately, these data are not available for UK 
companies for our sample period52, so we enter size (the logarithm of the 
replacement cost of assets, LRCC) as an additional regressor, in order to capture 
at least that part of the intangible capital which varies with size. We also enter the
52 Only recently it has become compulsory to disclose R&D expenditure.
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amount of total loan capital as a percentage of assets (PTLC) as a measure of 
free cash flow: a higher loan capital means that less cash is left at the discretion 
of the managers. In a separate robustness exercise, we include the growth rate of 
the labour force (GROWTH) measured as the growth in the previous three years 
to take into account different growth prospects which may also influence Q.
Table 2.9 Difference between equity and votes ownership and 
Tobin's Q
Dependent Variable:
Q
Basic equation Include controls Include
growth
PRATE as 
Dep. Var.
OWNDIF -0.96
(-2.59)
-0.99
(-1.93)
-0.97
(-1.89)
-1.68
(-2.45)
PTLC 0.25
(1.81)
LRCC -0.11
(-2.99)
GROWTH 0.53
(4.06)
R2 17.82 18.73 21.48 14.06
Note t-stati sties, computed with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, are shown in 
parenthesis.
The negative effect of OWNDIF is still present even after entering size 
and loan capital. Size is negatively correlated with Q while the loan capital seems 
to have a positive effect, possibly because of the incentive effects of debt. The 
result is robust to the use of the profit rate (PRATE) in place of Q as the 
dependent variable.
Leech and Leahy (1991) find, in a sample of 470 UK listed companies, 
that ownership controlled firms (defined with regard to the distribution of equity
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ownership) are profitable and fast growing: in particular, they find a positive 
relationship between ownership control and profit margins, the rate of returns on 
shareholders' capital, rate of sales growth and the rate of growth of assets. Leech 
and Leahy, however, do not identify whether managers own shares or not, indeed 
they define as management controlled firms those which they cannot classify as 
ownership controlled, so a direct comparison with our results is not possible.
Managerial ownership of shares, when accompanied by an equal 
percentage of votes, does not seem to matter for market valuation; this casts 
doubts on the usual explanation given for the increase in market valuation 
following a takeover or a buyout. Our results suggests that it is not so much the 
amount of equity in the hands of managers that is important, but the inequality in 
the amount of equity and the amount of votes owned or controlled by them. Our 
econometric analysis suggests that the value o f Q in our sample is lowered by an 
amount o f up to 0.17 due to the disparity between equity and votes.
2.4.2. Productivity Growth
We now look at the effects of managerial ownership of equity and votes 
on productivity growth. In table 2.10 we report the estimates of our basic 
production function with the addition of variables measuring the amount of 
equity and votes owned by managers.
It should be stressed that a limit of this analysis is that data on 
management ownership has been collected for only one year so that implicitly we 
are assuming that management ownership has remained constant at the 1981-82 
level for the whole time a company is present in the sample. This may seem a 
strong assumption and is likely to introduce noise in the results; however, 
managerial ownership is generally believed to be quite a sticky variable, and one 
study by Mikkelson and Partch (1989, p. 287) for the US finds that in a sample of 
240 firms
"[tjhere is considerable variation in managers' voting stakes across 
firms: but little variation over time for most firms. The absolute value of the 
change over five-year intervals in the proportion of votes controlled by
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officers and directors is less than 10% of outstanding votes for approximately
85% of our observations".
The variables that we use to capture the effects of managerial ownership 
are: first, the percentage of ownership of equity (OWNE), and then two dummies 
(DME and DHE) respectively 1 if OWNE is between 5% and 25%, and 25% and 
100%. The results show that there is a positive, although not significant effect of 
managerial stakes between 5% and 100%, with the significance of the coefficient 
reduced substantially in the one-step estimate (not reported) for both column 1 
and 253.
In column 3, we look at the disparity between equity and vote ownership 
by including in the basic equation the variable OWNDIF. The results suggest a 
strong (up to 3% per annum in our sample) and significantly negative relationship 
between OWNDIF and productivity growth. The result is still present when we 
also include OWNE (column 4) and when we interact OWNE and OWNDIF (not 
reported).
We now perform a variety of robustness tests of our functional 
specification to see if the result still holds when we relax certain restrictions, and 
when we include other variables which have been shown to have an effect on 
productivity growth: these are variables which represent product market, labour 
market, and financial effects.
53 Results for the ownership of votes are very similar to the previous ones, since OWNE 
and OWNV are highly correlated, and are not reported.
Table 2.10 Managerial ownership of equity and productivity growth
Dependent Variable: LRVAD
LEMP 0.844
(15.3)
0.827
(14.7)
0.850
(15.4)
0.838
(15.2)
LCAP 0.156 0.173 0.150 0.162
LAHR 0.676
(2.30)
0.675
(2.30)
0.679
(2.32)
0.674
(2.30)
OWNE 0.0001
(0.84)
0.0001
(0.76)
DME 0.008
(1.73)
DHE 0.004
(0.81)
OWNDIF -0.222
(-2.52)
-0.215
(-2.42)
Serial correlation -2.81 -2.81 -2.82 -2.81
Instrument validity 57.5
(46)
57.6
(46)
56.6
(46)
57.7
(46)
Note t-statistics, computed with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, are shown in 
parenthesis.
In table 2.11, we report various robustness exercises, in column 1 we 
report the estimation of our basic equation with the lagged dependent variable; in 
column 2 we relax the constant returns to scale assumptions; in column 3 we 
estimate the equation without industry dummies, while in column 4 we include 
three digit industry dummies54, and in column 5 estimate the equation with OLS.
These classify our sample into 42 different industries. See the Data Appendix for
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Table 2.11 R obustness tests  of basic specification
Dependent
Variable:
LRVAD
Add lagged 
dependent 
variable
No constant 
returns to 
scale
No industry 
dummies
Three digits 
industry 
dummies
OLS
LRVAD(-l) 0.585
(18.6)
LEMP 0.348
(5.92)
0.751
(11.1)
0.703
(11.5)
0.883
(16.4)
0.813
(22.9)
LCAP 0.067 0.040
(0.589)
0.297 0.117 0.187
LAHR 0.877
(1.97)
0.715
(2.59)
0.886
(3.11)
0.664
(2.25)
0.848
(2.46)
OWNDIF -0.175
(-3.13)
-0.261
(-3.17)
-0.305
(-3.36)
-0.220
(-1.60)
-0.238
(-2.26)
Serial
correlation
1.30 -2.784 -2.493 -2.947 -2.815
Instrument
validity
58.7
(47)
56.4
(45)
57.1
(46)
56.7
(46)
Note t-statistics are computed with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
In table 2.12 we report a further series of tests. In column 1 we add to 
our basic specification variables which represent the market structure in which 
the company operates55: MKSH is the market share of the company, which is 
included both as a level and in difference form (DMKSH); CONC is the 5-firm 
concentration ratio; and IMP is import penetration by industry. The controls are
further information.
See Nickell, Wadhwani and Wall (1992) for a comprehensive analysis of the 
influences of market, labour, and financial effects on productivity growth.
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insignificant with the exception of import penetration which seems to have a 
negative effect on productivity growth.
In column 2 of table 2.12 we report the results obtained with the inclusion 
of variables which pick up labour market effects and financial effects. These are 
respectively: UDEN which is the union density by industry, and BR, the 
borrowing ratio at the beginning of the period (which is also included in 
difference form, DBR) which measures the financial pressure and the availability 
of "free cash flow”. We also include a small-firm dummy, SMDUM, which is 
equal to 1 if the average employment during the years 1979-1981 is less than 
1000 employees. This regression again shows the robustness of our basic result, 
and also confirms previous results (Nickell, Wadhwani and Wall, 1992) that 
financial variables have an important effect on productivity levels and growth.
In column 3 of table 2.12 we add a term to obtain a second order 
approximation o f a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) production function. 
The CES term is positive and significant, but this does not alter our basic result. 
In Column 4 we estimate the basic equation with instruments dated t-3 or earlier 
which are more likely to be uncorrelated with the error term, but this does not 
change our conclusions; finally, in Column 5 we use the logarithm of real sales 
LRSLS as the dependent variable. All the equations in table 2.12 therefore 
confirm our basic result.
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Table 2.12 Additional robustness tests
Dependent
Variable:
LRVAD
Add market 
structure 
variables
Add labour 
and financial 
variables
Constant 
elasticity of 
substitution
Instruments 
dated t-3 or 
earlier
LRSLS as 
dependent 
variable
LEMP 0.851
(15.2)
0.832
(15.7)
0.987
(9.92)
0.790
(20.3)
0.850
(15.4)
LCAP 0.149 0.168 0.013 0.210 0.150
LAHR 0.679
(2.32)
0.735
(2.51)
0.705
(2.42)
0.701
(2.35)
0.679
(2.32)
OWNDIF -0.207
(-2.32)
-0.269
(-3.01)
-0.226
(-2.63)
-0.179
(-2.39)
-0.222
(-2.52)
MKSH -0.035
(-0.73)
DMKSH 0.833
(0.49)
CONC -0.012
(-0.43)
IMP -0.068
(-2.47)
BR 0.027
(4.56)
DBR 0.021
(3.66)
SMDUM 0.002
(0.45)
UDEN -0.060
(-1.53)
CES 0.071
(2.05)
Serial
Correlation
-2.84 -2.78 -2.70 -2.84 -2.82
Instrument
validity
56.8
(46)
55.7
(46)
59.3
(47)
61.39
(50)
56.6
(46)
Note t-statisties, computed with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, are shown in
parenthesis.
As with the results on Q, we have a strong negative relationship between 
the disparity between shares and votes which is robust respect to a variety of 
tests.
We have seen that, subject to the assumption on the constancy in 
managerial holdings of shares during our sample period, the disparity between
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equity and votes in the hands of management has a strong negative effect on 
productivity growth. Managerial ownership of shares also seems to have a 
positive effect on productivity growth, with companies which have managerial 
ownership above 5% exhibiting a productivity growth about 1% higher than the 
rest: the results are, however, not significant and deserve further investigation56.
For example, Tsetsekos and DeFusco (1990), by constructing portfolios according to 
managerial ownership and controlling for size, have found that managerial ownership 
does not have an effect on portfolio returns.
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2.5. Voting Rights and Performance
Two theoretical papers (Grossman and Hart, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 
1988) have recently addressed the question of the importance of one share-one 
vote rule for the share capital of a firm, and derived conditions for its optimality.
Grossman and Hart (1988) focus on the takeover mechanism and show 
that one share-one vote encourages the selection of the best team, even if in some 
instances departures from one share-one vote can achieve a higher return for 
shareholders, since this would allow them to extract a higher price from the 
acquiring party in a takeover. The authors argue, however, that the return of this 
"surplus extraction” is likely to be small so that the market value of the firm is 
generally maximised with one share-one vote. Grossman and Hart (1988) show 
also that the conditions under which one share-one vote maximises the value of 
the firm are that private benefits to control must be small in relation to security 
benefits.
Harris and Raviv (1988), employing somewhat different assumptions, 
show that a simple majority rule (50% of votes in a control contest) coupled with 
one share-one vote constitutes a socially optimal structure; dual classes of shares 
may nevertheless increase shareholders1 wealth, since they increase the possibility 
of extracting the benefits of control from the winning candidate in a contest, 
although this may lead to an inferior management taking control. For Harris and 
Raviv (1988), however, the total market value of shares with unequal voting 
rights is predicted to be higher than with one share-one vote; in fact, the 
complete separation of equity and votes maximises the value of the firm in the 
short run.
The effect of departures from one share-one vote depends, in both 
papers, on the relative importance of extracting part of the benefits from the 
winning candidate, and the probability that a worse team wins the contest: the 
overall effect is essentially an empirical issue. We do not know of any previous 
study with empirical evidence on the relationship between the value or the 
performance of a firm, and the presence of dual classes of shares; as we will see 
later, the evidence presented here tends to favour one share-one vote structures,
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and implicitly attributes to voting structures with dual classes of share the role of 
keeping an inefficient management in power.
We will be analysing below the relationship between voting concentration 
and two measures or performance, Tobin's Q and total factor productivity 
growth.
2.5.1. Market Valuation
We have seen in the previous section that the disparity between equity 
and votes in the hands of management has a negative effect on market valuation, 
as expressed by Tobin's Q; we want'to see now if the conclusion is still present 
when we consider voting concentration in general, not just the stakes owned by 
management.
Several previous studies have estimated the value of voting rights by 
computing the difference between the price o f shares with and without voting 
rights57; although these studies conclude that voting rights are valuable, since 
they generally carry a positive price, they are not able to answer the question of 
whether the existence of differential voting rights also affects the market value of 
the firm, and not just its distribution among the various types of shares.
We have, therefore, analysed the relationship between Q and the 
concentration of voting power in the security structure of the companies in our 
dataset. We have first run a regression of Q on VCON, the value of the our 
voting concentration index: the results in table 2.13 show that this variable has a 
negative and significant coefficient which suggests that a company with a 
complete separation of equity and votes has a value o f Q which is 0.178 lower 
than the average company58 (the sample average for Q is 0.24).
Subsequently, in order to allow for possible non-linearities, we have run 
the regression with two dummies: the dummy VDM takes the value of 1 if
See Levy (1982) for example.
All regressions include industry dummies, unless specified.
I l l
VCON is greater than 0 but less than 0.1; while VDH is equal to 1 when VCON 
is greater than 0.1. The number of companies with VDM=1 is 19 and with 
VDH=1 is 32. The results in table 2.13 show that the two variables have 
negative, although not highly significant coefficients; also, as expected, the 
coefficient of VDH is greater in magnitude than the coefficient of VDM. In a 
separate regression, we include two dummies to allow for a different effect 
depending on the origin of the departure from one share-one vote, whether the 
presence of non voting equity, NVOT=l, or the presence of non equity (such as 
preference shares) with voting rights, NEQ=1. The results of the regression 
including this classification also show a negative, but not highly significant 
relationship.
Table 2.13 Concentration of voting rights and Tobin's Q
Dependent Variable:
Q
Voting
concentration
Voting concentration 
dummies
Source of 
differential voting
VCON -0.178
(-1.96)
VDM -0.078
(-1.67)
VDH -0.118
(-1.54)
NVOT -0.12
(-1.53)
NEQ -0.06
(-1.44)
R2 17.4 17.5 17.5
Note t-statistics, computed with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, are shown in 
parenthesis.
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We now add the usual regressors for robustness tests and report the 
results in table 2.14. The effect is still present after the inclusion of both the total 
loan capital as a percentage of assets (PTLC) and of the logarithm of the 
replacement cost of assets (LRCC). The same applies to the inclusion of the 
growth rate of the labour force (GROWTH).
Table 2.14 Concentration of voting rights and Tobin's Q: robustness 
tests
Dependent Variable:
Q
Include controls Include growth PRATE as Dep. Var.
VCON -0.19
(-2.13)
-0.19
(-2.11)
-0.12
(-1.27)
PTCL 0.245
(1.82)
LRCC -0.114
(-3.04)
GROWTH 0.53
(4.06)
R2 18.95 21.70 14.10
Note t-statistics, computed with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, are shown in 
parenthesis.
In the last column of table 2.14, we have also experimented using the 
profit rate as dependent variable. Although the result is not significant, it points in 
the same direction as the previous one, with VCON having a negative effect on 
the profit rate.
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2.5.2. Productivity Growth
We investigate now the relationship between voting concentration and 
total factor productivity growth. In table 2.15 we report the results for the 
inclusion in the production function equation of VCON; of the two dummies 
VDH and VDM (which are equal to one respectively if VCON is greater than
0.1, and between 0 and 0.1) and of NVOT and NEQ.
In column 1 of table 2.15 we report our basic production function with 
the addition of the variable VCON estimated for the sample of 389 companies; 
for this particular set of regressions, however, we do not need data from 
Datastream, so we can use the larger sample of 814 companies59. Therefore, in 
column 2 we report the results of the same regression estimated with the larger 
sample. The results do not differ greatly (apart from the coefficient on LAHR), 
and we do not report estimations with the larger sample any longer.
From the results in table 2.15 we see that all variables representing voting 
concentration attract negative coefficients, although they are not always 
significant. In particular, in columns 1 and 2 VCON has a negative coefficient, 
although its significance is low. In column 3 the dummy VDM, which represents 
intermediate concentrations not too far from zero (those between 0 and 0.1) has 
a coefficient bigger in magnitude and more significant than the dummy VDH. 
This is hard to justify in terms of voting rights concentration. Also, from column 
3 we see that the stronger effect comes form companies which issue preference 
shares with voting rights, which are generally associated with smaller departures 
form one share-one vote.
59 See the data appendix for details about the construction of the sample.
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Table 2.15 Voting concentration and productivity growth
Dependent Variable: LRVAD Basic equation Large sample
LEMP 0.855
(15.5)
0.894
(16.4)
0.851
(15.4)
0.851
(15.5)
LCAP 0.145 0.106 0.149 0.149
LAHR 0.673
(2.30)
1.132
(4.57)
0.675
(2.31)
VCON -0.009
(-1.11)
-0.010
(-1.35)
VDM -0.019
(-2.41)
VDH -0.009
(-1.69)
NVOT -0.009
(-1.75)
NEQ -0.019
(-2.36)
Serial correlation -2.81 -3.79 -2.82 -2.83
Instrument validity 56.8
(46)
52.3
(46)
56.9
(46)
56.9
(46)
Note t-stati sties, computed with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, are shown in
parenthesis.
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Table 2.16 R obustness tests of basic specification
Dependent
Variable:
LRVAD
Add lagged 
dependent 
variable
No constant 
returns to 
scale
No industry 
dummies
Three digits 
industry 
dummies
OLS
LRVAD(-l) 0.585
(18.5)
LEMP 0.352
(5.96)
0.763
(1 1 3 )
0.708
(11.6)
0.890
(16.5)
0.813
(22.9)
LCAP 0.063 0.040
(0.59)
0.292 0.110 0.187
LAHR 0.893
(2.01)
0.707
(2.55)
0 .887
(3.11)
0.660
(2.24)
0.851
(2.47)
VCON -0.001
(-0.11)
-0.008
(-0.98)
-0.008
(-0 .82)
-0.009
(-1.10)
-0.004
(-0.42)
Serial
correlation
1.30 -2.7 -2.49 -2.94 -2.81
Instrument
validity
59.8
(47)
56.6
(45)
57.2
(46)
57.1
(46)
Note t-stati sties, computed with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, are shown in 
parenthesis.
In Tables 2.16 and 2.17 we investigate the robustness of the result of the 
basic specification which includes VCON. The sign on the coefficient of VCON 
remains negative in all regressions without becoming significant.
In summary, the evidence of a negative relationship between voting 
concentration and total factor productivity growth remains very weak. This does 
not imply that voting concentration is not related to productivity levels. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to make any inference on productivity levels with 
our dataset since we need to difference the variables in order to eliminate firm-
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specific effects, and the first difference of VCON does not contain much 
information in our sample since very few firms make changes to their equity 
structure which influences voting concentration.
Table 2.17 Additional robustness tests
Dependent
Variable:
LRVAD
Add market 
structure 
variables
Add labour and 
financial 
variables
Constant 
elasticity of 
substitution
Instruments 
dated t-3 or 
earlier
LRSLS as 
dependent 
variable
LEMP 0.854
(15.3)
0.837
(15.8)
0.988
(9.93)
0.792
(20.4)
0.684
01.3)
LCAP 0.146 0.163 0.012 0.208 0.316
LAHR 0.672
(2.30)
0.733
(2.50)
0.700
(2.40)
0.700
(2.34)
0.768
(2.98)
VCON -0.011
(-1.31)
-0.008
(-0.97)
-0.008
(-0.95)
-0.006
(-0.89)
-0.010
(-1.60)
MKSH -0.036
(-0.74)
DMKSH 0.704
(0.41)
CONC -0.01
(-0.35)
IMP -0.07
(-2.56)
BR 0.026
(4.45)
DBR 0.021
(3.68)
SMDUM 0.003
(0.65)
UDEN -0.060
(-1.52)
CES 0.068
(1.98)
Serial
correlation
-2.84 -2.77 -2.70 -2.84 -1.53
Instrument
validity
57.0
(46)
56.1
(46)
59.5
(47)
61.3
(50)
54.5
(46)
Note t-statistics, computed with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, are shown in 
parenthesis.
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2.6. Conclusions
In this chapter we have analysed the incentive effects of managerial 
ownership of shares and votes, and of the concentration of voting rights, in a 
panel of 389 UK quoted companies observed in the years 1972-86, of which 53 
exhibit a departure from a one share-one vote security structure. The departures 
from one share-one vote allow us to estimate the effects of equity and vote 
ownership separately: we have found that some o f these effects are present and 
important for both measures of market valuation and productivity growth.
The result that, in our sample, managerial ownership of shares is not 
related to market valuation, as expressed by Tobin's Q, casts doubts on the usual 
explanation o f greater convergence of interests given for the increase in market 
value following a takeover or a buyout which results in a higher percentage of 
shares in the hands of the management. Managerial ownership of shares seems 
however to have a positive effect on productivity growth, even if our estimates 
are not highly significant.
The disparity between equity and votes ownership has, instead, a strong 
and negative effect both for market valuation and productivity growth, when 
managers own more votes than equity claims: this is probably due to the power 
that vote ownership has of entrenching management and insulating it from the 
market for corporate control, and the lack of the convergence of interests due to 
the lower equity holdings. When equity and votes are held in the same 
proportion, the two effects on market valuation seem to balance out.
Departures from one share-one vote allow any shareholder, not just 
managers, to choose different proportions of equity and votes, so we have used a 
measure of voting concentration to assess the impact of dual-classes security 
structures on the total market value of the firm. Positive values of voting 
concentration have a negative effect on market valuation and a possibly negative 
effect on productivity growth, providing further evidence that the incentive 
effects of equity and vote ownership are present and important.
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Although further work on particular aspects of the separation of 
ownership and control is necessary, especially about the relationship between 
management ownership and productivity growth, we believe that the evidence 
presented here allows us to conclude that managerial ownership of votes 
generally leads to lower market-valuation and productivity, unless it is 
accompanied by an equal amount of equity.
119
2.7. Data Appendix
2.7.1. Sample Selection
We started our sample selection from the Exstat database which, in the 
version available at the London School of Economics, has a sample of around 
1800 UK manufacturing companies. For these companies the data has been 
checked and "cleaned" by various members of the Centre for Economic 
Performance, leaving a sample of 814 companies with at least four continuous 
years of data, which was our starting point. For all of these companies we 
checked whether they were also included in the Datastream service, where price 
data are available, and we found over 500 companies (Datastream has also data 
for dead companies). For each of those we then tried to get data on managerial 
ownership of shares and votes, from various sources. This left us with a sample 
o f 389 companies for which a full dataset was available.
Below, we report the exact definitions and sources of the variables 
employed in this study. Items starting with a C are obtained from the EXSTAT 
dataset, while those starting with a D come from Datastream. Industry level 
variables were already included in the dataset of the Centre for Economic 
Performance.
BR Borrowing ratio (D733)
CES (LEMP-LCAP)2
CONC Five firm concentration ratio (Industry specific) 
Source: Census of Production, summary tables
First difference in BRDBR
DEP Depreciation for plants and machinery: set at 8%
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DH
DHE
DM
DME
DMKSH
GROWTH
IMP
LAHR
LCAP
LEMP
LRCC
LRVAD
MKSH
1 if managerial ownership (equity or votes) is greater than 
25%
0 otherwise
Same as DH, but referred only to ownership of equity
1 if managerial ownership (equity or votes) is between 5% 
and 25%
0 otherwise
Same as DM, but referred only to ownership of equity 
First difference in MKSH
Growth rate of the labour force in the previous three years
Import penetration: ratio of import to home demand 
(Industry specific)
Source: Business Monitor
Logarithm of average hours worked (Industry specific) 
Source: Department o f Employment Gazette
Logarithm of the capital stock constructed as described in 
Wadhwani and Wall (1986)
Source: Centre for Economic Performance
Logarithm of total employment (C15+C17)
Logarithm of RCC
Logarithm of the real (deflated with WP) value added VAD 
defined as wages (C16+C18), plus profit sharing (C72), plus 
profits before tax (C34), plus depreciation (C52), plus 
interest payments (C53+C54)
Market share computed as the percentage of sales (C31) of a 
company to total sales in the industry (the number of firms in 
each industry is kept constant over the years)
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MVE
NEQ
NVOT
OWN 
OWN 0-5
OWN 25-100
OWN 5-25
OWN2
OWNDIF
OWNE
OWNV
PIPM
Market value of all ordinary equity (including non-voting) 
plus deferred capital (D302) and preference capital (D306) 
Source: Datastream, when available, otherwise London Share 
Price Database
1 for those companies which have preference shares with 
voting rights
0 otherwise
1 for those companies which have ordinary capital which 
carries partial or no voting rights
0 otherwise
Percentage of managerial ownership (same as OWNE)
Managerial ownership (in percentage) when this is less than 
5%
5 otherwise
0 if managerial ownership is less than 25%
percentage of managerial ownership minus 25 in all other
cases
0 if managerial ownership is less than 5%
25 if managerial ownership is greater than 25% 
percentage of managerial ownership minus 5 in all other cases
square of managerial ownership (OWNE2)
COWNV -OWNE)
OWNE
Percentage of equity owned by company directors 
Source: obtained by the author from company accounts,
Extel cards, and the International Stock Exchange Yearbook
Percentage of votes owned by company directors 
Source: same as OWNE
Price index for plant and machinery
Source: Price Indices for Current Cost Accounting HMSO
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PRATE
PTLC
Q
RCC
SHARE
SMDUM
TLC
UDEN
VCON
VDH
VDM
Profit rate. Cash flow (D136+D137) divided by RCC
TLC
RCC
{m v e + tl c ) p ip m
((l -DEP)RCC) WP
Capital stock (CAP) converted into nominal terms with WP
Share of labour costs in value added defined as wages 
(C16+C18) divided by VAD
1 if average employment in the years 1979-1981 was less than 
1000 employees
0 otherwise
Book value of debt; total loan capital (D321)
Union density (Industry specific)
Based on data from the Workplace Industrial Relations 
Survey interpolated and extrapolated using the aggregate data 
from the Department o f Employment Gazette
Concentration of voting rights (construction explained in 
section 3)
The data on all the types of shares issued by companies is 
taken from the D record o f the Exstat dataset, together with 
the voting rights of each share. Prices for the securities were 
obtained from Datastream, when available, otherwise from 
the London Share Price Database. All departures from one 
share-one vote have also been verified in the International 
Stock Exchange Yearbook
1 if VCON> 0.1
0 otherwise
1 if 0<VCON<0.1 
0 otherwise
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WP Wholesale prices (Industry specific): producers' price indices
taken from Trade and Industry until 1979, thereafter British 
Business and unpublished data from the Business Statistical 
Office
The Exstat dataset reports the industrial classification of the Stock 
Exchange and the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries. The industry level data, 
however, is available for the classification according to the Department of Trade 
and Industry's Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). Therefore, we had to 
match the 42 Exstat industries to the SIC ones. Below we report the fourteen 
SIC 1980 industries and the corresponding Exstat industrial classifications used 
in our study.
1. Food, Drink and Tobacco (49, 50, 46, 45, 63)
2. Chemical Industry (16, 67, 68, 37, 66)
3. Metal manufacturing (26, 33)
4. Mechanical Engineering (22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 29)
5. Instrument Engineering (31)
6. Electrical and Electronic Engineering (19, 36, 39)
7. Manufacture of Motor Vehicles and Parts Thereof (41, 43)
8. Manufacture of Metal Goods not elsewhere specified (20, 21, 28, 32, 34)
9. Textile Industry (61, 61, 62)
10. Footwear and Clothing (59, 64)
11. Manufacture of Non-Metallic Mineral Products (12, 14, 15)
12. Timber & Wooden Furniture (3 8)
13. Paper & Paper Products, Printing & Publishing (52, 53, 54)
14. Other Manufacturing (65)
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3.
Technical Analysis
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This chapter comprises three essays, written by Prof. C.A.E. Goodhart60 
and myself, on the behaviour of prices in financial markets and on the ability of 
technical analysis to predict their future movements.
’Technical analysis’ generally refers to the use of technical (mathematical) 
rules for the forecasting of prices, employing as only inputs past values of the 
price series. The main difference between technical analysis and econometric 
time-series modelling is the absence in the first one of any statistical test in 
support o f the relationships uncovered, which are generally simply 'backtested' on 
past data61. Chartism, the study of charts and patterns, is also considered a part 
of technical analysis, although it involves subjective judgement.
Notwithstanding the lack of statistical support for the forecasting power 
of technical analysis, its use is widespread in the financial community. A recent 
survey on the use of technical analysis and chartism in the foreign exchange 
market, conducted under the auspices o f the Bank of England, found that 
technical analysis is indeed widely used in London62 as one of the main inputs of 
tactical allocation decisions:
One of the clearest results of the questionnaire survey was that chart 
analysis appears to exercise its greatest influence when dealers are 
formulating forecasts or trading decisions concerning relatively short time 
horizons ... At the shortest horizon (intraday to one week) approximately 90% 
of respondents reported using some chartist input when forming their 
exchange rate expectations, with 60% judging charts to be at least as 
important as fundamentals. At longer forecast horizons, of one to three 
months or six months to one year, the weight given to fundamentals 
increases. At the longest forecast horizons of one year or longer, the skew 
towards fundamentals is most pronounced, with around a third of respondents 
relying on pure fundamentals and some 85% judging fundamentals to be 
more important than charts. (Taylor and Allen, 1992, pp. 308-309)
Prof. C.A.E. Goodhart is Norman Sosnow Professor of Banking and Finance and a co­
director of the Financial Markets Group at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science.
Backtesting a technical trading rule means computing the net profits that the rule 
would have generated if applied to a historical time series of data.
In 1988, the time of the survey, London was, and continues to be, the largest foreign 
exchange market.
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The potential importance for the determination of asset prices of this 
sizeable number of chartism followers is beginning to be appreciated. Frankel and 
Froot (1990a, 1990b) analyse the path of the US dollar in the 1980s as the 
outcome of an interplay between those following fundamental analysis and those 
following technical analysis; however they make no attempt in these studies to 
examine what technical analysts might actually have been predicting. Instead, 
they make the working assumption, for the purpose of their model, that technical 
analysts assume that foreign exchange spot prices would remain constant.
Technical analysts have, in fact, been viewed by economists as being 
effectively 'noise' traders, about whose effects in asset markets there is now a 
large amount of theoretical literature (Campbell and Kyle 1988, De Long et al 
1990); virtually no empirical evidence has been collected, however, of how 
successfully, or badly, technical analysts perform.
How, and why then, did technical analysis continue to be used, and 
people make a living by developing, operating and selling it? Economics 
textbooks generally dismiss technical analysis as inconsistent with the working of  
efficient markets, and hence of no value63, without asking how technical analysts 
are able to stay in business. Perhaps the most common view among economists is 
that there will always be openings for plausible quacks, and soothsayers, even 
when they really know nothing. In such cases the market price will tend to be set 
by rational efficient agents, though they will have to take account of the presence 
of such noise traders (De Long et al 1990), and technical analysts will tend to 
lose money on balance. Technical analysis would then continue only if its 
adherents want to believe or because 'there are always more fools bom'.
In the present study we investigate this issue directly, by testing the ability 
of technical analysis to predict future price movements, in such a way as to avoid 
the main criticisms which have been levied against previous works in the area: 
that they are not acceptable for their methodology to an academic audience; 
and/or that they are judged irrelevant by practitioners. There is a vast literature
See for example Graham, Dodd and Cottle (1962), and Copeland and Weston (1988).
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which addresses market efficiency64 and seriously questions it, but, although the 
results obtained in this study have implications for market efficiency, this is not 
the main purpose of our research. The presence of market inefficiency does not in 
fact necessarily imply that the rules used by technical analysts can generate profits 
in excess of naive rules.
In section 3.1 we introduce technical analysis and its main tools together 
with the recent theoretical literature on its effect on the pricing of assets. In 
section 3.2 we report the results of an experiment in which a commercially 
available technical trading system has been tested for its ability to help traders 
make profitable decisions, while in section 3.3 we test a trading rule based on 
''support" and "resistance" levels provided by technical analysis of various 
financial institutions, section 3.4 contains a study which is not directly addressed 
to technical analysis; in it we analyse the clustering of prices and spreads, and 
tests the prediction of two alternative theories which purport to explain the 
phenomenon.
See for example Taylor (1992) and references therein.
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3.1. Introduction
Technical analysis, as opposed to fundamental analysis, aims to provide 
forecasts of the likely future movements of a price series based entirely on past 
price movements. The main assumption of technical analysis is that all factors 
affecting prices in financial markets are instantly reflected in the price itself65, 
with new information being incorporated in the price possibly even before 
becoming public knowledge, due to the presence of insiders.
The difference between technical and fundamental analysis is not in the 
belief o f what determines prices, but on what constitutes worthwhile research: 
while fundamental analysis studies the factors which affect prices, technical 
analysis concentrates its attention on prices themselves. Below, we will briefly 
introduce the most common technical indicators. These are:
1. chart analysis;
2. moving averages and momentum indicators;
3. support and resistance levels.
As hundreds of different approaches have developed through time for 
various assets and markets, we cannot be exhaustive66; more comprehensive 
surveys of technical analysis are: Edwards and Magee (1966) and J.J. Murphy 
(1986)67.
The study of charts and chart formations - often referred to as 'chartism* - 
is probably the best known form of technical analysis. What a technical analysts 
looks for in a chart is a pattern which he recognises and which is associated with
See J.J. Murphy (1986).
It is often claimed that there are as many approaches as technical analysts.
The use of technical analysis dates at least back to the 1800s. Charles Dow was the 
founder and first editor of the Wall Street Journal and he made his predictions by 
looking at the co-movements of two stock market indices, the Dow Jones Industrials 
and the Dow Jones Transportation inventing what is known today as the 'Dow theory'. 
See Glickstein and Wubbels (1983) for a recent test of the Dow theory.
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a subsequent price development. The most common patterns are the head and 
shoulder, the double tops and bottoms, triangles, diamonds and channels. Each 
pattern, in order to be correctly identified, must satisfy certain criteria, laid down 
by the analyst himself in terms of magnitudes and timing. Once identified, these 
patterns provide generally for an "objective", or the likely direction and 
magnitude of the movement of the price series.
Moving averages are the most widely used among the technical 
indicators. Although they certainly contain less judgmental input than chart 
analysis, they can be of any arbitrary length, with the most common being 20, 50 
and 200 days. A moving average of a price series, when compared with the 
current price, is supposed to give an indication of the trend of the market. By 
construction, moving averages will not be able to identify turning points in a 
price series, since they react slowly to changes in trends, but, if trends last long 
enough, a rule based on moving averages can be profitable. While moving 
averages apply to trends and price levels, momentum indicators pertain to 
changes in prices and their speed.
Support and resistance levels are other widely used technical indicators. 
These are particular price levels (the support below, and resistance above the 
current price) at which it is believed to be a sufficient demand or supply in the 
market to stop the price from going through them. We will look at supports and 
resistances more in detail in section 3.3, where we will test a trading rule based 
on them.
Although researchers in financial markets have long recognised the 
widespread use of technical analysis68 by practitioners, the lack of a theory which 
gives technical analysis a proper role has largely prevented analysis of the effects 
and implications of its use. In fact, the 'efficient markets hypothesis', in its weak- 
form, states that current prices reflect all available information, so that excess 
returns cannot be earned by looking at past prices (Fama 1970). This has been a 
widely held view until recently, when theoretical models have been proposed in
68 Roberts (1959), Jensen & Benington (1970).
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which technical analysis can have a role.
For example, Brown and Jennings (1989) develop a two-period dynamic 
model of equilibrium in which rational investors with heterogeneous information 
use historical prices in forming their demands. As for the implications of their 
work for efficient markets theory, the authors conclude:
What is not clear from textbook discussions of weak-form efficiency 
is whether the statement that ’technical analysis has no value* is an 
implication, derived by logical reasoning, of the assumption that the market is 
weak-form efficient, or whether it is the defining characteristic of weak-form 
efficiency. If the latter is assumed, then the market discussed in this work is 
not weak-form efficient. Technical analysis does have value. Alternatively, in 
the case that 'technical analysis has no value' is an implication of market 
efficiency, this work demonstrates that this inference may be unwarranted, 
given a definition under which the noisy rational expectations equilibrium is 
efficient (Brown and Jennings, 1989, p. 542)
An alternative possible explanation for the importance of technical 
analysis is that, once enough people believe that the market will move in a certain 
direction, it will do so, whether or not the original basis for the view had any 
basic validity. This is commonly known as the 'sunspot' theory, which states that 
decisions based on irrelevant data or analyses may become self-fulfilling and self- 
justifying if enough people believe in them. This syndrome may be more 
permanent when the market's horizon is short-term, as it is believed to be the 
case in the foreign exchange market.
Froot, Sharfstein and Stein (1992) also construct a model in which 
technical analysis can have value. They assume that there are at least some 
traders who trade over short horizons and they derive an equilibrium which can 
possess a particular type of informational inefficiency, even in presence of fully 
rational agents. Froot, Sharfstein and Stein (1992) note that in general, for a 
trader to profit on his information, it is necessary that there are other traders 
acting on the same information that he is. If traders have short horizons, they may 
choose to focus on completely extraneous variables which may not bear any 
relationship with fundamental variables:
Yet, the veiy fact that a large number of traders use chartist models 
may be enough to generate positive profits for those traders who already know
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how to chart. Even stronger, when such methods are popular, it is optimal for 
speculators to choose to chart ... Such an equilibrium can persist even if 
chartist methods contain no relevant long-term information. (Froot, 
Sharfstein and Stein, 1992, p. 1480)
Unfortunately, these theories which allow technical analysis to play a role 
are not directly testable, but they suggest interesting areas of research: first, on 
the weakest assumptions which are necessary to generate an equilibrium in which 
technical analysis plays a role; and, second, on the actual use of technical analysis 
in financial markets and on the results that this achieves.
In the next sections we will be addressing the second of these areas of 
research by testing some of the predictions made by technical analysts, and by 
analysing the results of an experiment designed to replicate the actual use of 
chartist inputs in the trading decision process. We do not have any particular 
theory in mind for why technical analysis should or should not work; the focus of 
the papers is purely empirical and its aim is to expand our knowledge of the 
performance o f technical analysis.
One might think that chartism would leave testable imprints on the data, 
but there has been remarkably little testing o f its economic impact. For example, 
if the breaking of a longer-term moving average by a shorter term moving 
average would be a well known buy/sell signal to technical analysts, then (non­
committed) observers seeing such an event approaching should move in to 
buy/sell beforehand. Hence, the intersection o f the moving averages should act as 
an attractor, causing prices to move increasingly rapidly towards that event 
(Bowden, 1989). Again, the clear breaking of a support or resistance line should 
lead technical analysts to expect a large further move in the same direction; hence 
support and resistance levels should act as repellors, causing prices to move 
rapidly away from them, especially when broken.
Previous studies of the effectiveness o f technical analysis in predicting 
future price movements have generally concentrated on the (simulated) 
profitability of certain filter or trading rules: these studies have been criticised in 
two respects. First, showing that a trading rule has been profitable in the past is 
no guarantee or proof that it will work in the future; indeed, profitable trading
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rules can always be found ex post to work in any time series, even a random walk 
(Tomek and Querin, 1984). Second, since there is no agreement on what 
constitutes a generally applicable technical trading rule, works which 'prove' that 
technical analysis does not work - by showing that some trading rules do not 
generate profits, or have ceased to generate profits - are dismissed by 
practitioners as irrelevant, since those trading rules may not be the ones that a 
technical analyst would have employed for that particular market and time 
period.
More important, though, is the claim by technical analysts that their job 
involves a lot of judgement and that it cannot be confined to a set of 
mathematical rules blindly applied to price series. This makes testing technical 
analysis in a way which is acceptable to both the people who use it and to an 
academic audience more difficult since it requires that the main inputs - the 
predictions of technical analysis models - be provided by technical analysts 
themselves, on an ex ante basis, and that these are then properly tested.
Furthermore, a major difficulty in generalising the results of empirical 
tests of technical analysis is that there is no such thing as the technical analysts 
prediction, or approach, any more than there is a single fundamentalist prediction, 
or approach. The forecasts of technical analysts are heterogeneous. This 
heterogeneity was exemplified in the second survey exercise carried out by Allen 
and Taylor, who telephoned a panel of chart analysts every week from June 1988 
to March 1989 to find our their expectations with respect to the sterling-dollar, 
dollar-mark, and dollar-yen exchange rates for one and four weeks ahead. They 
commented as follows:
Statistical tests of individual chartists' forecasts revealed a significant 
difference between individual forecasters' accuracy - chartists do not all 
appear to react in a uniform manner to chart formations. Indeed, one 
particular chartist consistently outperformed all other chartists and a range of 
alternative economic and statistical forecasting methods, in terms of 
forecasting accuracy, although the statistical significance of this finding, in 
what was a relatively small sample, should be viewed cautiously. (Allen and 
Taylor, 1989c, p. 550)
In the essays which we present below, we have limited ourselves to the
133
study of two specific types of technical analysis predictions: one concerns a 
chartist product which is marketed world-wide to over forty institutions (mainly 
banks with substantial trading volumes); the other involves technical indicators 
which are divulged to thousands of users through Reuters screens. Although the 
group of potential users of this product is quite large, we cannot claim, for the 
reasons above, that the results achieved here are representative of the whole 
practice of technical analysis: we hope though that our work will attract other 
researchers in the field.
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3.2. Chartism: A Controlled Experiment
In this section we report the results of an experiment undertaken at the 
Financial Markets Group of the London School of Economics, in which a 
commercially available product has been tested for its ability to help traders make 
profitable decisions.
The use of such products is widespread in the London foreign exchange 
market, as reported by Taylor and Allen (1992, p. 306). In their questionnaire 
survey among foreign exchange dealers based in London, 36% of the respondents 
claimed to use chartist computer graphics packages and 65% on-line commercial 
chartist computer services; also 21% of respondents claimed to rely on advice 
from outside commercial organisations for technical analysis, while 42% to 
subscribe to chartist publications.
In the course of our attempts to do some empirical work on the effects of 
technical analysis, we talked to several technical analysts in London. One of 
these, Mr B. Georges of Fiamass Ltd., was sufficiently confident that his firm's 
product was capable of making money for his clients that he was prepared to 
make it available to us in a form which enabled us to do a controlled experiment. 
Sceptics will note that in the event of the experiment being unsuccessful, in the 
judgement of Mr Georges, his name, or that of Fiamass Ltd. would not be 
revealed, while if reasonably successful, it would be. This would protect the firm 
in case of failure, and give it, perhaps, some marketing advantage, if successful69.
As described further in the next section, the experiment was carried out 
by the authors as independent observers at arm's length from the firm. We had no 
personal interest in the outcome, though the firm did put up half the funds to pay 
incentives (to be described in more detail subsequently) for the participants of our 
simulated trading exercises. These participants were chosen by us, had no contact 
whatsoever with the firm, and their names and addresses are available on request
While perhaps undesirable in principle, it would have been hard to have the co­
operation of a firm of that kind without such an arrangement.
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from us. Most were L.S.E. students responding to an advertisement, but we also 
invited some professionals with experience in foreign exchange trading to 
participate70.
The product that Fiamass markets is the capacity to take an asset price 
series, of any frequency, and calculate instantaneously as each new data point 
occurs, a number of lines (displayed in different colours on screen and 
superimposed to the price series) that describe certain aspects of the market's 
behaviour. Some of these lines are standard, such as moving averages of differing 
periodicities, while other are proprietary constructs of the firm. Since the 
algorithms of these are believed by Fiamass to be commercially valuable, we 
neither asked, nor were told, how they are formulated. Fiamass believes that the 
addition of all these extra lines on a screen showing the movements o f an asset 
price series can assist any user, whether a trained dealer or not, to envisage the 
likely future movements of the asset price.
Fiamass also believes that training, under their own supervision, to use 
their product improves performance: indeed they normally hold training exercises 
for dealers of clients buying their product. But for those freed for the first time 
with their product (the additional lines on the screen) Fiamass no longer thought 
it worthwhile, as they previously had done, to try to explain in some detail how 
they might best interpret the patterns of the these lines in order to maximise 
trading profits. They came to feel that such interpretation was otiose for first time 
users, and that it was just as successful to allow, indeed to encourage, users to 
assess such developing patterns entirely subjectively and intuitively. We asked the 
firm to supply us with a written introduction to the use of their lines on screen 
which we could supply to all those of our participants using their lines. This is 
shown in the Appendix.
Sceptics may still wonder whether our contacts with the firm might leave us with some 
predisposition to find that their technical analysis was 'successful'. Perhaps so, though 
we would not benefit financially from that. More to the point, a 'successful' result 
would surely cause other sceptical economists to contact the named company to seek to 
replicate the experiment independently, and failure to replicate would hardly benefit 
us!
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Essentially, our experiment was to choose a historical asset price series, 
and to run this on a computer screen with one sample of participants with 
Fiamass' lines superimposed. Then, with another separate sample of participants 
we ran the same asset price series without the lines. In section 3.2.1 the exact 
form of our experiment is described in detail. Then in section 3.2.2 we report our 
results. Finally, in section 3.2.3 we outline our conclusions.
There are three important caveats that should be kept in mind throughout. 
First, this is a test of one particular technical analysis product, not of technical 
analysis as a whole. Second, none of the sample o f students had any prior 
familiarity with technical analysis, and none of our foreign exchange dealers had 
used this particular product, though they will all have had some knowledge of 
how technical analysis was used in dealing rooms. So this is a study of the use of 
a specific product by untrained operators (though Mr. Georges of Fiamass was 
still confident that it would help). Thirdly, as reported below, our sample was 
comparatively small in statistical terms, though it took much time and effort to 
set up and complete.
3.2.1. Design of the Experiment
The Fiamass technical analysis product we tested is a software program 
which is capable of computing and displaying, together with an asset price series, 
certain lines which are then updated instantaneously on the arrival of a new data 
point. These lines are of various forms and colours. They require a long prior 
series, about six hundred observations, to construct the longer term calculations.
The purpose of the present experiment was to test whether the Fiamass 
product would help users to make a better guess of the future direction of a price 
series than not using the product. This was achieved by simulating trading by two 
groups of participants, half with the price series only on the screen, and half with 
the addition of the lines. The specific objective, to test the predictive power of 
the Fiamass product, required that participants took positions at certain points in 
time, and closed them subsequently with the intent o f making a profit, subject to
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some limitations which we will describe below.
In order to concentrate on the subject of predictive power only, instead of 
considering the overall performance of the system in a practical context, we 
ignored transaction costs and any restrictions on short selling: this enabled us to 
observe much more clearly the predictive power of the system, without biasing 
the results in any way. We also ignored alternative forms of investment for the 
participants who could only go long or short of the asset whose price series was 
on the screen, or simply do nothing. Moreover, the price series used were of 
different periodicities (with a chart representing from a single day to several 
months), and the participants were not told which periodicity they were looking 
at71. Because of all this, we cannot meaningfully talk of rates of return in this 
context and compare these across assets; although this might have been 
preferable in principle, it would probably not have added much here, given the 
specific purpose of the experiment, but it would have made it much more difficult 
to set up the experiment and more complex for the participants to understand.
Fiamass made available to us many potential asset price series of differing 
markets, frequencies and dates. On all of these their lines could be added, using 
up the first 664 observations, so that the participants would have a series of 
length of 336 observations to unroll (with or without the lines) on the computer 
screen before him/her. In each case the new observation appeared on the screen 
when the participant tapped the space bar on his/her computer keyboard. Unlike 
reality, this meant that the participant had command over the speed at which the 
data-points arrived on the screen. Each participant was told of the number of 
forthcoming data points in the exercise, and that the exercise would last half an 
hour for each series.
As noted earlier, Fiamass supplied us with a large range of potential data 
series, and we were free to choose which ones to use. We found it hard to see 
quite how Fiamass might restrict our choice to series which might be inherently 
more susceptible to interpretation via their line (than without). But, being
71 Mainly in order to prevent possible identification of the series.
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sceptical, we insisted that Fiamass arrange for one data series, collected and 
chosen by us, to be included in the asset price series put before the participants. 
Our own series is labelled A l.
We advertised for participants among the student body of L.S.E. We did 
not state, either in the advertisements or at the experiment, that the purpose was 
to test the comparative value of this chartist product. Instead we told all the 
students that the aim of the exercise was to see how well they could perform as 
market dealers. We had six computers (with screens) available. They were set up 
in the same room in such a way that the participants could not see any other 
screen72, and one of us was present at all time to prevent oral communication73. 
Apart from the first occasion, when some Fiamass employees were present as 
silent observers and out of concern for the technical functioning of the computer 
programs, no-one from Fiamass attended these sessions.
We sought 60 participants from the students, with 30 working with lines 
and 30 without. In practice, one or two did not arrive at the appointed time, and 
there were also occasional cases of computer malfunction. Each session, with six 
participants at a time, lasted two hours. First there was half an hour of  
explanation and practice on the keyboard with a trial asset price series on the 
screen. Then there were three consecutive half-hour exercises on three different 
asset price series.
We also wanted to test whether experience would improve student 
dealing performance, so we asked our first participants whether they would be 
willing to try again, on new asset series, but sticking in each case to either having 
the extra chartist lines, or not. About half the original sample agreed to come
At the outset, for the first few sittings, the computer screens were set up in such a 
fashion that some peeking might have been possible. Since subjects could go at 
different speeds, this might have allowed peekers perfect information about future 
prices. We tested whether there were any signs of some outliers among our subjects at 
these few sessions, appearing at any time to have perfect information, and we have 
convinced ourselves that there are no such signs.
It would, indeed, have been preferable to have used single, sound-proofed cubicles, but 
we did not have these facilities to hand.
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back on two further sessions. So these participants undertook some 414 hours of 
simulated screen dealing on nine separate asset series.
Many, perhaps most of the students, came primarily out of interest in how 
well they could perform as screen dealers. However, we devised an incentive 
scheme which would encourage the students to try and guess the direction of the 
market. We paid them £5 per session for attendance and an equivalent amount 
divided up depending on how well each participant performed74. We believe that 
such a payment system, a fixed wage plus a bonus for comparative profit 
performance, is quite close to that followed in real conditions, and provides no 
undue incentive for either excessively risky or cautious behaviour.
We felt, however, that any results might be ascribed to the fact that we 
were using a sample o f students, unfamiliar not only with the chartist product but 
also with screen dealing. So we also sought, through personal contacts, to run 
the same exercise with a smaller sample of professional foreign exchange dealers, 
drawn from the trading rooms of two banks. All will have had some (varying) 
exposure to chartist techniques, but none had used this particular product. We 
wanted 24 participants (12 with, 12 without), but we only got, for the usual 
reasons, 21. In order to compare their results with the students, we gave them 
three of the same asset series (Al, A8 and A9) in their identical two hour 
sessions.
Motivation for the professional traders was more difficult, especially for 
the control group who were not using the lines (one of the banks was considering 
buying the product). Our financial resources would not stretch to meaningful 
sums for this group. In the event we stated that we would publish the names of  
the most successful in each session75. This may have given an incentive to 
excessive risk taking, and hence have contaminated our results, but, short of
The method was as follows. Suppose that there were five subjects in the group. They 
made the following returns: -200, -100, 0, 100, 200. We gave the first nothing extra. 
The excess over the first's bottom result was 100, 200, 300 and 400. This totals 1000. 
We then gave the second subject 0.1 x 25 = £2.50, the third £5, the fourth £7.5 and the 
fifth £10.
These were Mr Trevor R. Carr and Mr Nick Lindholm.
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making much larger payment to these professionals, we were not able to think of 
anything better.
The nine assets price series which we employed, together with their 
frequencies, are reported in table 3.1; these include both cash (spot) prices and 
futures prices76. Each asset series loaded into the computer had 1000 data 
points. The first 664 represented the ’known' history; the screens were set up 
initially so the participant saw the most recent 55 of these 664 data points, but 
the horizontal scale could be shifted by the participant by pressing the relevant 
control key to see, more, or fewer, prior data points, up to the whole 'known' 
history. These prior observations also formed the basis for calculating the lines, 
various shorter and longer control lines, harmonic support and resistance lines, 
and other proprietary constructs, which Fiamass had calculated to help indicate 
the flow of the market77.
Once the initial position was on the screen, the participants could make 
the next data point appear by pressing the space bar. In each case there were 336 
further data points in the frill series. The participants were given half an hour to 
work through these. They were told in advance of the number of forthcoming 
data points in the series, and warned five and two minutes ahead of the end of the 
exercise. When they wanted to buy, or sell, at a particular data point, they would 
press the relevant control key. Each single press would buy (sell) one unit. They 
could press as many times as they wanted at any data point (price)78. The 
computer recorded the purchase (sale), and the price at which it was made on a 
computer printout that was immediately available. Each participant signed and 
dated their printouts at the end of each session. The computer also showed on 
the screen the profit/loss made in each transaction.
The use of technical analysis in the futures markets is very popular. See J.A. Murphy 
(1986); Neftci and Policano (1984).
See also appendix 3.2.4.
Although no limit was imposed on the number of positions which could be open at any 
time, the fact that they had to be entered one by one with a procedure which lasted a 
few seconds, meant that in practice a limit existed.
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Table 3.1 Asset price series employed in the experiment
Name Asset Cash/Futures Frequency
Al DM/$ exchange rate Cash Continuous time
A2 FTSE Index Futures 5 minutes
A3 German Bond Futures 15 minutes
A4 US Treasury bond Futures 5 minutes
A5 Long Gilt Futures 15 minutes
A6 10 year T-notes Futures hourly
A7 BP/$ exchange rate Cash 15 minutes
A8 JP/$ exchange rate Cash hourly
A9 SF/S exchange rate Cash 4 hourly
At the end of each exercise, the participant's remaining net position was 
valued at the price of the final data point which he/she had reached, in order to 
calculate his/her dealing profits/losses for the exercise. Each participant was told 
in advance that this would be done. In several cases the participant did get to the 
end of the series by the end of the exercise, but many were too slow to do so79. 
We then had a record of each participant's complete transactions, showing at 
which data point (price) she/he transacted, number of deals, volume of each deal 
and price of each deal, as well as our calculation - based on price of final data 
point reached - of the total profit from dealing of each participant.
An alternative method of valuation might have been to value the net positions of the 
slow (unfinished) at the price at the end of the exercise, rather than at the observation 
which they actually reached, but an objection to this is that they might well have 
wanted to adjust their positions had they observed the change in prices between their 
final observation and the end of the exercise.
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3.2.2. Results
We have tested the predictive power of the Fiamass product, using both 
parametric and non-parametric tests, by looking at three measures:
1. percentage of times that positive profits were made with a trade;
2. total amount of profits/losses;
3. amount of profits/losses per trade.
Since participants could keep more than one position open at any time, 
the computation of the first measure is affected by the convention used. The one 
used here is LIFO (last in first out) which means that the position which is closed 
with a trade is the last one which has been entered into. The results for the 
percentage of profitable trades are reported in table 3.2 below. Together with the 
standard test for the equality of two means from independent samples, we also 
report the results of the Mann-Whitney test which is a distribution-free test for 
the equality of two medians. This can give different results due to the non­
normality of the distribution of returns, especially at high frequencies, and to the 
small sample size; it is also preferable in presence of outliers since it uses only 
information on the position of the observations rather than their magnitude.
Al-S shows that this was a sample of Students on the exercise with the 
first asset, Al; The results for the average profits/losses per trade are shown in 
table 3.3 and those for the total profit/loss are shown in table 3.4. In table 3.5 we 
also report the results for the average number of trades made for each asset.
From table 3.2 we can see that the percentage of profitable trades is 
significantly higher for the participants without lines in just one case (Al-T) at 
the 5% significance level, and in two cases (A3-S and A7-S) at the 10% level 
according to the t-statistic, while is significant only for Al-T at the 5% level 
according to the Mann-Whitney test. Surprisingly, the number of profitable 
trades is always greater than 50%, both when the lines are used and when they 
are not: this may be due to the fact that the participants were reluctant to close 
positions which would result in a loss and so preferred to take fewer (and 
probably bigger) losses. Although this is an interesting aspect of traders'
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psychology, and it deserves further attention, we believe that it does not affect 
the results in the next two tables, on which we will concentrate our attention.
Table 3.2 Sample statistics of the percentage of profitable trades
lines no lines
Obs Mean st dev Obs Mean st dev t stat M-W
Al-S 28 84.95 12.23 29 87.23 13.45 -0.68 746.5
A2-S 28 66.53 18.04 29 68.94 20.28 -0.47 736.0
A3-S 22 77.44 14.50 29 84.45 10.51 -1.92* 464.5
A4-S 16 67.43 21.51 18 68.03 20.73 -0.08 285.5
A5-S 15 71.07 15.50 18 67.32 13.08 0.74 271.1
A6-S 16 67.05 20.60 18 66.87 18.67 0.03 280.0
A7-S 12 66.46 10.41 17 74.62 15.89 -1.67* 147.0
A8-S 12 77.12 16.17 17 77.26 16.56 -0.02 176.5
A9-S 13 77.19 19.74 17 67.92 22.84 1.19 234.0
Al-T 11 70.61 20.71 10 90.56 6.57 -3.03** 83.0**
A8-T 11 66.79 20.89 10 70.08 28.56 -0.30 113.0
A9-T 11 82.04 17.43 10 77.30 16.73 0.63 134.0
Note Obs is the number of participants (observations); Mean gives the mean percentage of 
profitable trades from dealing in this asset; st dev is the standard deviation among this 
set of participants; t-stat is the value of the t statistic for the hypothesis that the means 
in the two samples are equal; and M-W is the value of the Mann-Whitney statistic for 
the difference of two medians. A * (**) next to either the t-stat or the M-W value 
means that the statistic is significant at the 10% (5%) level.
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Table 3.3 Sample statistics of average profits/losses per trade
lines no lines
Obs Mean st dev Obs Mean st dev t stat M-W
Al-S 28 35.15 11.93 29 44.65 28.79 -1.64 721.0
A2-S 28 1.65 43.62 29 13.12 69.65 -0.75 761.0
A3-S 22 4.04 3.62 29 8.57 8.86 -2.49** 453.0**
A4-S 16 0.28 6.08 18 1.23 5.29 -0.48 266.0
A5-S 15 -0.31 3.11 18 -2.60 5.88 1.43 299.0
A6-S 16 -1.96 15.36 18 -0.18 13.65 -0.37 278.0
A7-S 12 3.52 7.89 17 5.80 16.24 -0.50 175.0
A8-S 12 14.82 36.78 17 15.04 42.69 -0.01 164,5
A9-S 13 37.15 76.74 17 -45.81 111.5 2.41** 248.0**
Al-T 11 20.61 13.80 10 35.34 15.29 -2.31** 88.0**
A8-T 11 26.53 65.31 10 0.34 144.2 0.53 117.0
A9-T 11 84.92 74.31 10 42.79 102.7 1.07 138.0
Note See note for table 3.2
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Table 3.4 Sample statistics of total profits/losses
lines no lines
Obs Mean st dev Obs Mean st dev t stat M-W
Al-S 28 2422 1621 29 2881 2574 -0.81 779.0
A2-S 28 317.7 2824 29 1507 5525 -0.98 752.5
A3-S 22 227.5 211.6 29 555.8 537.9 -2.99** 432.5**
A4-S 16 40.19 180.7 18 58.83 254.5 -0.25 263.5
A5-S 15 -0.200 140.2 18 -173.3 544.4 1.30 294.0
A6-S 16 -28.19 547.4 18 -135.3 924.4 0.42 280.5
A7-S 12 96.08 282.8 17 370.2 929.8 -1.14 170.5
A8-S 12 857.6 1425 17 977.8 2282 -0.17 166.0
A9-S 13 2353 4223 17 -2733 6319 2.64** 251.0**
Al-T 11 1650 1593 10 2500 1249 -1.37 99.0
A8-T 11 2619 6984 10 -564 13267 0.68 115.0
A9-T 11 7424 8730 10 5740 15133 0.31 138.0
Note See note for table 3.2
The results in tables 3.3 and 3.4 are similar: for the total profit/loss 
figures, only in two cases (out of twelve exercises) A3-S and A9-S, there was a 
significant difference at the 5% level between the samples with and without lines, 
according to both the t-statistic and the Mann-Whitney test, in one case there 
was a better result without the lines (A3-S) and in another a better result with the 
lines (A9-S). There is, therefore, no significant difference between the mean
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profit/loss with, and without, the lines for this sample of students. For the 
average profit/loss per trade, an additional case (Al-T) is significant, with a 
better result obtained by participants without the lines.
Moreover, in the six cases when students and professional traders faced 
exactly the same exercise (Al, A8 and A9, with and without lines), there was 
evidence of difference between their total profits/losses only in A9 where traders 
outperformed students significantly (at the 10% level) both with and without 
lines.
In table 3.5 the average numbers of trades for all nine charts is 
reported80. In eight out of nine cases the students with lines traded less often 
than the students without and in two out of three cases similarly for the traders, 
but the difference was in most cases small81. In all six cases, the average number 
of trades for the traders was higher than for the students. For the students, the 
difference between the average number of trades was significant only in two 
cases at the 5% level (A5-S and A6-S) and in one case at the 10% level (A4-S). 
The Mann-Whitney test is significant at the 10% level only for A5-S.
When shown these results, Mr Georges of Fiamass made two points. First 
he asserted the likely value of training in the use of the system; second he noted 
that in 18 cases out of 24, the dealers made simulated profits on balance (five out 
of six for the professional traders, thirteen out of eighteen for the students). He 
suggested that, even though there was no significant difference (among the 
untrained) between lines and no lines, that any one (of university level training at 
least) faced with an asset price series on screen could sense the flow of the 
market and immediately make some money - presumably at the expense of 
outsiders putting in orders without the assistance of being able to do so - from 
following screen price series. Our experiment was not, however, structured to 
provide an adequate test of this last hypothesis.
For the purpose of this calculation, two or more consecutive trades executed at the 
same data point are counted as distinct trades.
For both students and traders, the only exception was Al.
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Table 3.5 Sample statistics of the average number of trades
lines no lines
Obs Mean st dev Obs Mean st dev t stat M-W
Al-S 28 70.42 42.76 29 68.07 33.50 0.23 800.5
A2-S 28 52.29 34.21 29 60.45 28.82 -0.97 726.0
A3-S 22 58.91 26.23 29 66.03 30.77 -0.89 544.5
A4-S 16 38.00 14.31 18 48.56 19.53 -1.81* 233.0
A5-S 15 50.07 20.90 18 68.72 30.25 -2.09** 203.0*
A6-S 16 42.06 12.86 18 60.94 36.42 -2.06** 239.0
A7-S 12 39.08 17.22 17 51.76 24.46 -1.64 151.5
A8-S 12 45.50 16.47 17 50.35 23.56 -0.65 167.0
A9-S 13 48.00 19.54 17 58.00 26.20 -1.20 174.5
Al-T 11 74.45 32.26 10 69.60 22.25 0.40 126.5
A8-T 11 68.09 28.79 10 68.90 31.66 -0.06 121.0
A9-T 11 72.91 32.40 10 77.80 39.90 -0.31 116.5
Note See note for table 3.2
These results (with the possible exception of the ones on the percentage 
of profitable trades) are probably what most economists would have expected. 
The next result was, however, a surprise to us. This is that in every single case 
the standard deviation of the calculated profits/losses made by the students in the 
nine exercises was smaller with the lines than without them. In four cases (out of 
nine) the difference was twice (taking A2-S as twice) or more; in A5-S it was
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3.88 times, in A7-S, 3.28 times. Using an F test these differences were significant 
in 5 exercises. It is not, however, the significance in the individual cases, but the 
repetition of having a smaller (though by varying degree) standard deviation in all 
nine student exercises that we find impressive.
This result did not however, carry through to our professional traders. In 
two exercises (A8-T and A9-T), they did have a broadly similar result, with those 
without lines having a standard deviation 1.9 and 1.73 times those with lines. But 
in the other exercise, those with lines had a slightly larger standard deviation 
(1.28 times in Al-T). Furthermore in four cases out of six, the traders had much 
larger standard deviations than the students (A8 and A9), and only in one case 
(Al without lines) a markedly lower standard deviation. It is possible that our 
method o f motivation of the professional traders caused them to adopt riskier 
strategies. Be that as it may, there is no evidence from this very small sample of 
professional traders that the use of this chartist product altered their usual dealing 
behaviour.
By contrast, we have put forward evidence that the use of this Fiamass 
product did cause the individual profit outcomes o f the students to be more 
bunched together, reducing the incidence of both very bad and very good results 
from dealing. To the extent that dealers or their employers are risk averse and 
would prefer a lower standard deviation of outcomes, the use of this chartist 
technique would appear, on this latter sample, to be utility enhancing, given that 
the average (and median) results are generally not significantly different. Again 
our caveats must be kept in mind, especially the small samples (of students and 
asset price series), reinforced by the failure of the professional traders to confirm 
the result.
We now put together the results for the means and variances of the 
distributions of returns, and test for stochastic dominance among the distributions 
of profits/losses obtained with and without lines. The distributions on which we 
will perform the test are the ones obtained for the same asset by the different
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participants with and without lines82: the result that one distribution 
stochastically dominates the other means that a trader would be better off using 
the system (with or without lines) which stochastically dominates the other, for 
trading that particular price series on which the test was carried out.
The mean-variance approach for comparing two distributions of returns is 
equivalent to stochastic dominance in the case of normality of the distributions or 
under other restrictive assumptions. In our case, however, we cannot rule out 
that the distributions of the profits/losses are non-normal and, indeed, we could 
reject normality in our samples in most cases (using skewness and kurtosis tests). 
It is worth noting that the condition needed for the validity of the mean-variance 
criterion, normality of the distributions, is also the condition needed in order to 
apply both the F test for the equality of two variances and the t-statistic test for 
the equality of two means: therefore, in order to derive results about mean- 
variance dominance we rely on these tests.
In table 3.6 we report results for the mean-variance test (EV), first degree 
(FSD) and second-degree (SSD) stochastic dominance. A plus sign in a column 
means that the distribution obtained with the lines dominates the distribution 
obtained without the lines according to the criterion on top of the column, a 
minus sign means that the distribution without the lines dominates the one with 
the lines, and a zero means that no distribution dominates the other.
First-degree stochastic dominance of a distribution with respect to 
another implies that any individual, with an increasing utility function, would 
prefer the first distribution to the second one. For the FSD criterion we tested the 
significance of the maximum differences (in either directions) in the two empirical 
cumulative distributions using the two-sample Kolmogorov statistic. We found 
that according to this criterion, the distribution without the lines dominates the 
one with the lines in A3-S and Al-T, at the 10% significance level.
Second-degree stochastic dominance applies to increasing and concave
The test for stochastic dominance performed here is not applied to the distribution of 
returns obtained with and without lines on different assets, since this is not possible 
due to the lack comparability of profit/loss figures across assets.
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utility functions. This class of utility functions includes the decreasing absolute 
risk aversion class, power, exponential, and quadratic utility functions. The test 
that we employ for SSD is illustrated in Whitmore (1978) and is valid for single­
crossing distribution families, which include the normal, lognormal, gamma, and 
most of the two-parameter families83. The test procedure combines the 
significance of the difference of the two means, with a test on the lower tail of the 
distribution. We found SSD in four additional cases (A5-S, A6-S, A9-S and A9- 
T), and, in all four of them, the distribution with the lines dominates the one 
without the lines84.
The results of the tests on stochastic dominance can be read together with 
the ones about EV dominance. If we accept normality of the distribution of 
profits/losses, the EV criterion and the tests applied, are correct; however, the 
FSD and SSD criteria can give us additional information. For example, a zero in 
A3-S under EV does not mean that an individual would be indifferent between 
the two distributions, but that there is not enough evidence to rank them 
according to the EV criterion. But since we can rank the two distributions 
according to the FSD and the SSD criteria, we can assert that any individual with 
an increasing utility function would prefer the distribution without lines to the 
one with the lines. The summary column combines the rankings obtained with the 
EV, FSD, and SSD criteria and is valid under the most restrictive assumptions of 
both EV and SSD85.
An exact test for second-degree stochastic dominance has been proposed by Tolley and 
Pope (1988) and involves looking at all permutations of the sample data. Even if this 
test is preferable to the one employed here since it is not restricted to distributions in 
the single crossing family, it does require substantial amount of CPU time.
Due to the lack of a suitable testing procedure, we could not test for third-degree 
stochastic dominance.
One should take into account that multiple tests have been performed, and adjust the 
confidence regions accordingly.
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Table 3.6 Mean-variance and stochastic dominance results
EV FSD SSD Summary
Al-S + 0 0 +
(5%) (5%)
A2-S + 0 0 +
(5%) (5%)
A3-S 0 _ - _
(10%) (5%) (5%)
A4-S 0 0 0 0
A5-S + 0 + +
(5%) (5%) (5%)
A6-S + 0 + +
(5%) (10%) (5%)
A7-S + 0 0 +
(5%) (5%)
A8-S 0 0 0 0
A9-S + 0 + +
(5%) (5%) (5%)
Al-T 0 _ _ _
(10%) (10%) (10%)
A8-T + 0 0 +
(10%) (10%)
A9-T 0 0 + +
(10%) (10%)
If we accept the assumptions of the EV and SSD criteria, we have that in 
8 cases out of 12, the distribution of returns with the lines is preferred to the one
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without the lines in a significant way. In only two cases out of 12 the opposite is 
true. For the students alone, the ratios are 6 out of 9 against 1 out of 9. The main 
reason for this result is that the students working with the lines had a much 
smaller variance in their outcomes.
Subjects to the caveat of non-normality, this evidence, therefore, seems to 
suggest that the use of this chartist technique does change operational behaviour 
and may act as a means of controlling risk, even if it does not lead to improved 
mean returns. How might it do so?
Before we investigate the possible reasons for this result, we report, in 
table 3.7 various test statistics computed on the series A l, A8 and A9 (limited to 
the 336 observations used for trading). These are: the skewness and kurtosis of 
the returns series together with the value of the Jarque-Bera normality test; the 
values of the Breusch-Godffey LM tests for autocorrelation (1 and 10 lags); a 
test for the presence of Arch effects (significance of the lagged square residual in 
the regression of the square residual); and the values of the Augmented Dickey- 
Fuller statistics (computed by adding lags until the p-value of the t-statistic on the 
next lag is greater than 0.10) for the unit root test on the levels of the series.
Table 3.7 Summary statistics for the time series A1, A8 and A9
Skew. Kurt. Norm. AR1 AR10 Arch ADF
Al 0.062 3.440 2.643 96.24** 137.3** 28.84** -1.165
A8 -0.106 4.686 38.66** 0.347 6.620 1.210 -2.428
A9 -0.625 5.144 83.61** 0.052 17.72* 0.028 -3.81**
Note A **(*) indicates that the statistic is significant at the 5% (10%).
Significant first and higher-order serial correlation and Arch effects are 
present in Al, while mildly significant (10%) higher-order serial correlation is 
detected in A9. Normality is rejected in A8 and A9, while the null hypothesis of a
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unit root in the levels series is rejected in A9 only.
Below we will look at four possible reasons for our result on stochastic 
dominance by analysing in detail the behaviour of both students and professional 
traders in the experiment with the three assets series which they both used: Al, 
A8 and A9. The four reasons for a lower variance in the profit/loss figures for the 
people using the lines which we will investigate are:
1) the possibility that participants using the lines tend to keep similar 
positions open because they respond to the same "hints” from the lines;
2) the possibility that people using the lines adopt broadly similar strategies;
3) the possibility that the people using the lines are less "aggressive" by 
keeping positions open for shorter times;
4) the possibility that the people using the lines are less "aggressive" by 
trading smaller amounts.
We will examine them in turn.
One possible reason why people using the lines have a lower variance in 
their results might be that they follow the same hints given by the system, and 
maintain similar positions at each point in the chart. We tested this by computing 
the average position profile during the 336 prices for both groups and computing 
correlations among the position of each individual and the average for his/her 
group. In table 3.8 we report the average of these correlations for students and 
traders for the charts Al, A8 and A986. There is no evidence from this table that 
the position profiles of the people using the lines are more correlated than those 
of the people not using the lines.
For those tests which require the knowledge of the exact speculative position of the 
trader at each point in time, we had to exclude some observations, due to the 
impossibility of reconstructing the position profiles. This has been due to occasional 
malfunctioning in computers and in printers. The percentage of observations affected 
is about 25%.
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Table 3.8 Mean correlations with average position
lines no lines
Obs mean
correlation
Obs mean
correlation
Al-S 20 0.584 16 0.629
Al-T 8 0.408 7 0.507
A8-S 12 0.705 15 0.662
A8-T 8 0.670 5 0.622
A9-S 13 0.464 16 0.455
A9-T 7 0.263 6 0.449
The second aspect of our participants' behaviour that we examined was 
their strategies. We counted the proportion of occasions in which participants 
bought (sold) after a prior price increase, and also sold (bought) after a prior 
price fall87. We termed those who followed this strategy 'trend followers' 
('contrarians'). The hypothesis in this case was that students, being unused to 
screen trading, might exhibit a wide variety of strategies without the lines; the 
lines might tend to induce such students to move towards a common strategy, 
thereby reducing the range of outcomes. On the other hand professional traders 
might have learned already to adopt broadly similar strategies, so that the use of 
the lines would cause no additional bunching of strategies.
In any case we were interested to see what strategies students and 
professional traders would adopt when faced with no information at all except an 
asset price path on the screen, with and without chartist lines. In so far as asset
We also examined the proportions of buying (selling) after two consecutive price rises, 
and selling (buying) after two consecutive price declines. The results are qualitatively 
similar to those shown above, and are not reported.
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prices follow a random walk, neither a trend-following nor a contrarian strategy 
should dominate. Our hypothesis was that generalised concepts about equilibrium 
and the fact of watching a series within physical bands imposed by the screen 
itself would cause most participants to impose a contrarian strategy upon the 
asset price series, and that this would be more marked in the case of students 
than of professional traders.
A common prejudice among economists is that chartist techniques cause 
dealers' behaviour to be more trend-following, extrapolative. Thus Frankel and 
Froot (1990a, p. 183) write: "Many so called 'chartist' forecasters, or technical 
analysts, are thought to use rules that are extrapolative, such as, Buy when the 1 
week moving average crosses above the 12-week moving average'." Chartists, 
however, contend the accusation that they are just extrapolators, and the formal 
test by Allen and Taylor (1989c, p. 550) bears out their case: "This last point - 
the inelasticity of expectations - was reinforced by formal econometric analysis of 
the survey data: chartists' advice does not appear to be intrinsically destabilising, 
in the sense that chartists' expectations do not appear to overreact systematically 
to changes in the current exchange rate". There are, therefore, conflicting 
hypotheses about how the introduction of chartist lines might influence strategies.
Our expectation was that they would reduce the extent of contrarian bias 
in the trading undertaken by our participants, but our results must be described as 
mixed.
In table 3.9 we report the mean degree of contrarianism for each group. 
The degree of contrarianism is defined as the percentage of contrarian trades on 
all trades. A value of 1 represents extreme contrarianism - every buy was 
preceded by a price fall and every sell by a price rise - while a value of 0 the 
opposite. For the students, with the exception of Al, the lines are associated with 
a higher degree of contrarianism, while for the traders, the converse is true. For 
the students, the lines are associated with a lower dispersion of strategies, but for 
the traders this is true only in two out of three cases.
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Table 3.9 Degree of contrarianism
lines no lines
Mean st dev Mean st dev
Al-S 0.877 0.104 0.896 0.123
Al-T 0.811 0.149 0.839 0.180
A8-S 0.662 0.190 0.515 0.269
A8-T 0.604 0.253* 0.719 0.242
A9-S 0.693 0.218 0.491 0.291
A9-T 0.586 0.250 0.655 0.289
Note Mean is the mean number of contrarian trades in each sample. St dev is the standard 
deviation.
The tentative conclusions are as follows: first, strategies without the lines 
are more diverse than those with the lines; second, without the lines the traders in 
all three cases showed a tendency to follow extreme contrarian strategies 
whereas the students only followed their example in the Al case. The availability 
of lines tended to cause both students and traders to move to a less extreme, 
contrarianism.
It is possible that the use of chartist techniques can correct a common 
misperception (even, perhaps especially, among professional traders) that asset 
prices are more stationary than is the case in reality. Examples of such apparent 
misperceptions have been noted in several other experimental cases88. While the 
Fiamass product, in the case of the traders, tended to shift strategies more 
towards trend-following, in all but one case the mean value remained contrarian.
See for example Thaler, 1987.
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There is no support here for (some) economists' prejudice that chartism can be 
equated with destabilising extrapolation, and some suggestion that it may help to 
cure an otherwise common misperception. But in view of the very small size of 
the sample, these suggestions must be treated with extreme caution, and not 
taken as statistically established.
Therefore, while there was some indication that the use of lines caused a 
bunching of strategies among the students, we doubted whether this was 
sufficiently marked to explain the lower variance of their trading profit outcomes. 
So we turned to examine the third aspect of our participants' behaviour: their 
total outstanding speculative position during the exercise. This was obtained by 
multiplying the number of positions (long or short) open at any time, by the 
number of periods for which they were kept open. This measure gives an 
indication of the total exposure during the whole exercise, table 3.10 reports the 
average total positions obtained with and without lines, together with the value 
of the t-statistic and the Mann-Whitney statistic for the hypothesis that the mean 
and medians of the two samples are equal.
Essentially this test suggests, subject to the caveat about small sample 
size, that the use of this set of chartist lines was associated with students more 
cautious in their adoption of speculative positions, although in only one case A9- 
S the average is significantly different. We already know, from table 3.5, that the 
student participants using the lines traded slightly less frequently.
The fourth aspect that we now examine is whether the actual average size 
of trade was smaller with the lines. The results are reported in table 3 .11 and 
indeed show (especially for the students) that the presence of lines is associated 
with a smaller average size of trade. However the results are again not highly 
significant and are not confirmed by the Mann-Whitney test.
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Table 3.10 Total positions open during experiment
lines no lines
Mean st dev Mean st dev t-stat M-W
Al-S 1086 1353 2163 2928 -1.36 112
Al-T 3040 6387 1324 1032 0.75 24
A8-S 1358 534.0 2515 3280 -1.34 101
A8-T 2214 1377 2454 2608 -0.19 23
A9-S 1144 725.0 3079 3184 -2.36** 75
A9-T 1077 667.0 1454 1528 -0.56 26
Note Mean gives the average; st dev the standard deviation among this set of participants; 
t-stat the value of the t statistic for the hypothesis that the means in the two samples 
are equal; and M-W the value of the Mann-Whitney statistic for the difference of two 
medians. A * (**) next to either the t-stat or the M-W value means that the statistic is 
significant at the 10% (5%) level.
Since the total outstanding is a function of the interaction of three factors, 
the average number of trades, the average size of trades and the length of time 
with which speculative positions are maintained, we can deduce that these three 
factors jointly explain the lower variance among students using the lines.
Thus the conclusion here is that the use of these chartist lines is 
associated with a more cautious behaviour with students making slightly fewer 
and smaller trades and establishing speculative positions which were closed out 
sooner. This latter tendency was not, however, apparent in the case of the 
professional traders. In both cases, the results should be treated with extreme 
caution because of the small size of the sample and the limited number of price 
series used. Moreover, the Mann-Whitney statistics is never significant in these 
tests.
159
Table 3.11 Average size of trade
lines no lines
mean st dev mean st dev t-stat M-W
Al-S 2.87 3.23 3.65 5.15 -0.53 141
Al-T 4.56 5.76 3.36 2.57 0.53 24
A8-S 2.01 0.90 3.53 3.13 -1.79* 78
A8-T 5.38 4.85 6.08 6.01 -0.22 23
A9-S 2.44 1.40 4.08 3.60 -1.67* 82
A9-T 4.13 3.66 8.37 10.4 -0.95 24
Note See note for table 3.10.
Finally, in order to obtain a measure of profit/loss adjusted for the overall 
exposure of the trader during the exercise, we compute for each participant the 
ratio of his/her profit/loss to the total position held during the experiment: we 
report the results in table 3.12.
These results show some differences to the ones in table 3.3 for the 
absolute profit/loss: for example, student using the lines in Al do better than 
those without lines in terms of 'exposure-adjusted' profit/loss, while they do 
worse in absolute terms; the opposite is true for the professional traders in Al 
and A9. These differences, however, do not alter our main conclusions which we 
summarise below.
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Table 3.12 Average profit/loss per unit of total position
lines no lines
mean st dev mean st dev t-stat M-W
Al-S 4.15 4.23 2.26 2.43 1.68* 215*
Al-T 4.26 5.06 4.15 4.68 0.08 26
A8-S 0.87 1.35 1.04 1.27 -0.30 82
A8-T -0.07 1.15 0.05 1.69 -0.14 20
A9-S 2.09 3.39 1.06 2.75 0.88 127
A9-T 2.30 3.60 4.27 3.22 -1.04 13
Note see note for table 3.10.
3.2.3. Conclusions
Our first set of conclusions does not suggest that the Fiamass product is 
able to improve performance. We would, however, stress that there was no prior 
training in this chartist technique for any of our participants, and that this is only 
one among many such techniques. Subject to that, our results indicate that:
1) there was no evidence that participants using the Fiamass lines could 
obtain better mean returns than those without;
2) there was only weak evidence that professional traders could use our 
screens to predict the future path o f prices any better than students either 
with or without lines;
3) both students, and traders, made profits more often than not in these 
tests, but our experiment was not designed to study whether screen
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trading (without any other extraneous information, such as order flows 
and news announcements) would be profitable.
We did, however, find that the use of lines was associated with a different 
behaviour of the students. This was not, however, confirmed by our sample of 
professional traders, perhaps partly because their motivation was different. Also 
the sample is too small for comfort, and the distributions possibly non-normal. 
Even so, there did seem a strong tendency for the following:
4) in 8 out of 12 cases the distribution of profits/losses obtained with the 
lines dominates (at the 10% significance level) the one obtained without 
the lines on the same price series; while in only 2 cases out of 12 the 
opposite is true;
5) the use of lines seemed to make student participants more cautious, and 
the dispersion of their outcomes was smaller;
6) student participants generally took smaller speculative positions overall. 
This was a combination of fewer trades, smaller trades and shorter 
holding periods for their positions.
We also examined whether, and how, the use of lines might cause 
participants to change their trading strategy, specifically that the use of lines 
would induce participants to follow a more trend-following, extrapolative 
strategy. Our results were, subject again to the caveat about small samples:
8) students followed, as we had expected, more diverse strategies, varying 
among students and exercises. There was some faint indication that the 
use of lines caused strategies to standardise around a mild contrarian 
mean;
9) our participants, especially when without lines, followed extreme 
contrarian strategies;
10) whereas the use of lines did seem to induce the participants to follow 
slightly less contrarian strategies, there was no evidence at all that this 
chartist technique induced extrapolative, trend-following behaviour.
Whereas there is no evidence here that this chartist technique can allow
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untrained users to predict the future course of prices any better than those just 
looking at the price series by itself, it may be that the shifting pattern of lines can 
induce greater caution, at least among some groups in particular, persuading 
participants to close out speculative positions quicker, and can reduce the 
dispersion of outcomes, effectively reducing risk.
While this was the result of this study, we would not however be 
confident that the same results would be repeated on other samples, on 
participants with more training in this technique, or on other forms o f chartist 
methods. We do, however, believe that these results are sufficiently interesting to 
warrant ourselves, and we would hope others, to do such further research.
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3.2.4. Appendix
G U ID ELIN ES
1) Keep the FLO chart horizontally scaled with enough prices to see the 
recent past but few enough to see a strong image of the current state in 
detail (between 50 and 100 prices).
Use the 4- and ^  to adjust.
2) Keep the Harmonic Support/Resistance Lines (Blue Envelopes) properly 
vertically scaled by using ^  and f
3) Go with the flow of the market. Use the multicoloured FLO lines as 
indications of cyclic currents. Use the blue envelopes as indications of  
discreet level of resistance that hold/reverse market movements.
4) Trust your intuition as it is fed visually by the computer image.
5) To avoid too much conscious analysis keep advancing the simulation 
process, doing as many trades as possible.
FLO from FIAMASS
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3.3. When Support/Resistance Levels are 
Broken, Can Profits be Made? 
Evidence from the Foreign Exchange 
Market
In this section we report the results of a study of the behaviour of three 
exchange rate series (Dm/$, $/£, and Yen/S) around their support and resistance 
levels, and of the profitability of technical trading rules based on these levels. In 
academic circles, there has recently been a renewed interest on technical analysis 
and the ability of technical trading rules to generate profits. The latest studies in 
the field (Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron, 1992; Levich and Thomas, 1991; our 
study on chartism in section 3.2) have tried to remedy two main weaknesses of 
previous empirical tests of the effectiveness of technical analysis: first, the 
absence of a proper determination of the significance of the results obtained; and 
second, the fact that profitable strategies, which cannot be expected to work out 
of sample, are bound to emerge in a finite sample even in the presence of a 
random walk (Tomek and Querin, 1984).
In order to avoid both the assumptions of normality of returns (which is 
easily rejected by formal tests) and the specification of the data generation 
process, Levich and Thomas (1991) use a bootstrap technique to measure the 
significance of their results. They find that certain technical rules can earn 
abnormal profits, but their work falls, though, under the second criticism since 
their rules have been arbitrarily chosen. The same applies to Brock, Lakonishok 
and LeBaron (1992) who also use the bootstrap technique while considering the 
possibility that the data generating process is an AR(1), a Garch-M process or an 
E-Garch process. They also find that the abnormal profits which they detect 
cannot be explained by the possibility that their price series follows any of these 
processes.
Our experiment described in section 3.2 avoids the criticism that the 
particular product tested uses techniques that technical analysts may not believe 
appropriate, since the test mimicked the way in which the product is marketed to
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be used. The main limitation of our experiment is that it is a test of a single 
product so that the (mixed) results obtained cannot be generalised to the whole 
market of chartist products. In fact, technical analysts do not go as far as to claim 
that their rules, in so far as they can be expressed in the form of an algorithm, can 
be profitable for all time periods and for all assets; their claim is that some rules 
work for some assets in certain periods of time, and that they can predict which 
rule is going to work in a specific situation. It is therefore important to rely on 
the subjective input of technical analysts for the particular price series and 
periods considered.
In the present section we test one prediction which most technical 
analysts tend to accept: this is that particular levels of the exchange rate, called 
supports and resistances, can provide useful buying and selling signals. In 
particular, it is believed that once a support or resistance level has been broken, 
this is a sign that a trend in that direction has started and that it is likely to 
continue89.
The literature on technical analysis reports several possible ways of  
computing where support and resistance levels are going to appear, but no 
definition of support and resistance exists which can identify these levels 
unequivocally. In fact, technical analysts use subjective inputs to locate these 
levels of the exchange rate. In order to test the significance of support and 
resistance levels is therefore necessary to rely on inputs from the technical 
analysts themselves.
We are able to use data on support and resistance levels provided by 
technical analysts and we apply simple trading rules based on the crossings of 
these levels - which we believe would be accepted by the majority of technical 
analysts - to three exchange rate series. We hope to minimise in this way the 
criticism from economists that we use arbitrary rules among a potentially infinite 
set, and from technical analysts that we do not use models and data that they 
themselves believed to be relevant.
89 See Edwards and Magee (1966) and J.J Murphy (1986).
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The data on supports and resistance levels is obtained from Reuters' 
screens, which are continuously updated with what their panel of advisers in each 
of the three main foreign exchange markets, London, New York and Tokyo 
believes to be the support and resistance levels of these three spot exchange 
rates. Supposing such panel estimates to be both reasonably representative of 
market opinion, and indeed helping to form market opinion through publicity on 
Reuters screens, we investigate the profitability of signals generated by the 
breaking of such levels of support and resistance and compare it to the one 
obtained with similar technical rules which involve breakings of certain levels of 
the exchange rate. We confirm previous findings that trading-range breaks 
generate profitable signals, even after the inclusion of transaction costs, and we 
show that signals originated from chartists' inputs are more frequent and 
profitable.
In the section 3.3.1 we introduce the concepts of support and resistance 
as they appear in the technical analysis literature and present the data we use, 
while in section 3.3.2 we describe the test devised and present the results, section 
3.3.3 contains our conclusions.
3.3.1. Support and Resistance Levels
One branch of technical analysis is concerned with support and resistance 
levels and trading ranges. In the work of Edwards and Magee (1966), which is 
considered by many as the "bible" of technical analysts, we find a definition of 
support and resistance which we believe is widely accepted by the profession:
[W]e may define support as buying, actual or potential, sufficient in 
volume to halt a down trend in prices for an appreciable period. Resistance is 
the antithesis of support; it is selling, actual or potential, sufficient in volume 
to satisfy all bids and hence stop prices from going higher for a time.
(Edwards and Magee, 1966, p. 211).
Support is found under the current price of an asset, while resistance 
above it; a breaking of a support or resistance level occurs when the price of an 
asset penetrates through one of them. Given the above definition of support and
167
resistance, a breaking of either of them can be interpreted as a sign that the 
demand or the supply of that particular asset has shifted substantially and that the 
new equilibrium level is to be found beyond the previous support or resistance 
level.
One of the fundamental claims of technical analysis is that investor 
psychology is important and that the level at which an investor has bought an 
asset is an important determinant of the level at which he will sell it. We will try 
to illustrate this with a typical example:
Imagine yourself, for the moment in the place of those new owners 
[who bought at 50], They see prices turn up, reach 55, 58, 60. Their 
judgement appears to have been vindicated. They hang on. Then the rally 
peters out and the prices start to drift off again, slipping to 57, 55, 52, finally 
50. They are mildly concerned but still convinced that the stock is a bargain 
at that price. Probably there is a momentary hesitation in the decline at 50 
and then prices break on down. Briefly there is a hope that the break is only a 
shake-out to be recovered quickly, but that hope vanishes as the down trend 
continues. Now our new owners begin to worry. Something has gone wrong.
When the stock gets down below 45, the former bargain doesn't look so good.
"Well, I guess I picked a lemon that time but I won't take a loss in it Til just 
wait until it gets back up to 50 some day where I can get out even (expect for 
expenses) and then they can have it. (Edwards and Magee, 1966, p. 213)
This quotation is an example of the type of reasoning frequently given as 
an explanation for the asserted effectiveness of technical analysis. This type of 
reasoning is generally not compatible with utility maximisation and efficient 
markets, but its validity is not crucial for the profitability of technical trading 
rules. First, a trading rule may be generating profits simply because it is taking a 
greater risk that is involved in the benchmark with which the rule is being 
compared. Second, time-varying risk premia may be altering the expected returns 
on both the benchmark and the trading rule portfolio, making any comparison 
worthless90.
A concept related to that of support and resistance is the trading range;
Although this explanation is very difficult to prove wrong, it is not generally found 
plausible given the magnitude of the risk premium necessary to explain the results 
(Taylor, 1992; Sweeney, 1986).
168
this may be defined as the price range within which an asset has traded in the past 
and can be characterised by the maximum and minimum of the series (of various 
length) of latest prices. Although support and resistance levels bear some 
relationship with the boundaries of a trading range, they are not the same thing. 
Supports and resistances arise at levels where a substantial volume of transaction 
has taken place: it is this high turnover which creates what are sometimes called 
by technical analysts "vested interests" at that level of price.
3.3.2. Methodology and Data
As we mentioned above, one of the technical rules which seems to be 
accepted by all technical analysts is that the breaking of a support or a resistance 
level, or of a trading range, represents the beginning of a trend in the same 
direction. In the present study we test this prediction by simulating a trading 
strategy based on such breakings.
We use hourly data on the exchange rate of three currencies, the 
Deutsche Mark, Sterling and Yen, against the dollar, over a period of 12 weeks 
(less one day) from 10 April 1989 to 29 June 1989. The data are mid-points 
(average of ask and bid prices) of the latest prices which appeared in the page 
FXFX of Reuters screens at the end of each hour during our sample period91. 
The data employed in this study is part of a larger dataset, which spans the 12 
week period, collected by Prof. Goodhart92.
From a different page (FXNB at that time) on Reuters screens, we also 
have data on support and resistance levels for the three exchange rates, as well as 
their likely future trading ranges, according to the panel of technical analysis 
advising Reuters. The values of the support and resistance levels are obtained by 
Reuters through a telephone survey of a small number of major institutions 
(around five, but not always the same ones) and are updated two or three times a
Due to the thinness of the market at weekends, only weekdays are considered. 
A description of the dataset can be found in Section 3.4.1.
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day: at the opening of the London and Tokyo markets, plus occasionally during 
the day if some event (in the judgement of Reuters) has significantly changed 
expectations. The values reported on the screen are the modes of the 
distributions of the survey values.
The methodology employed here involves computing the returns from a 
strategy which holds $s if the exchange rate (expressed in foreign currency per 
dollars) breaks above the resistance and holds the foreign currency if the 
exchange rate breaks below the support. The strategy remains neutral in other 
periods. Since we also compute the returns from breakings of supports and 
resistances separately, we can think of this strategy as the sum of two strategies: 
the first holds dollars unless the exchange rate breaks below the support level, 
and the second holds the foreign currency unless the exchange rate breaks above 
the resistance.
We will be ignoring issues connected with the tax treatment of gains from 
foreign exchange trading, and we will be assuming that trades can take place at 
the advertised price on the screen (bid or ask). This last assumptions is not strong 
since financial intermediaries quoting their prices on Reuters' screens are 
expected to be able to trade standard amounts of currency at those prices93. An 
additional assumption which we are also implicitly making is that the buying and 
selling generated by the rules do not affect the exchange rate.
In this study we ignore interest rate differential and the possibility of 
earning interests by depositing the currency holdings. This is done for two 
reasons: first, since we use hourly data, few are the occasions in which the 
portfolio is invested in the same currency for a long enough period to earn a 
meaningful interest; second, in a study by Sweeney (1986) in which he takes into 
account interest rate differentials, he finds that excluding them does not cause the 
results to change significantly.
In the same study, Sweeney (1986) proposes a test statistic for the 
existence of excess profits which takes into account that risk is being taken when
93 A more detailed discussion of this point can be found in Section 3.4.1.
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switching between currencies. His statistic is easy to compute and has the 
property of being compatible with versions of the Capital Asset Pricing Model or 
the Arbitrage Pricing Model, when risk premia are constant. We have computed 
also the values of his X statistic, which is approximately normally distributed, for 
the two benchmarks ($s and foreign currency) for each exchange rate. We will 
not be reporting these results since they do not differ significantly from the simple 
t-statistics for the average excess return. The main difference between the two 
statistics is that Sweeney's X statistic takes into account how many hours a $ 
based investor has not been into the foreign currency, so avoiding the risk 
connected with its fluctuations.
3.3.3. Results
In order to test for the possibility of earning abnormal profits by looking 
at breakings of support and resistance levels we have devised 6 technical trading 
rules and applied them to our three hourly exchange rate series for the Deutsche 
Mark (DEM), Sterling (GBP) and Yen (JPY), all against the dollar; table 3.13 
contains summary statistics for these series, while plots of the hourly data are in 
the Appendix. In table 3.13 we report the skewness and kurtosis of the returns 
series together with the value of the Jarque-Bera normality test; the values of the 
Breusch-Godfrey LM tests for autocorrelation (1 and 10 lags); a test for the 
presence of Arch effects (significance of the lagged square residual in the 
regression of the square residual); and the values of the Augmented Dickey- 
Fuller statistics (computed by adding lags until the p-value of the t-statistic on the 
next lag is greater than 0.10) for the unit root test on the levels of the series. 
Normality, as expected, is rejected for all three series and, in two series (GBP 
and JPY), Arch effects seem to be present.
Each of the 6 trading rules devised consists of a range within which the 
exchange rate is expected to fluctuate: if the exchange rate moves above the 
higher end of the range, a buy signal is generated, while a sell signal is generated 
if the exchange rate moves below the lower end of the range. The position 
opened following a signal is then kept open until either the exchange rate moves
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back into the range, or the range is revised to include the actual value of the 
exchange rate.
Table 3.13 Summary statistics for daily returns
DEM GBP JPY
Mean 0.003151 -0.0065054 0.0057267
St dev 0.158396 0.172137 0.171235
Variance 0.025089 0.029631 0.029321
Skewness 0.13422 0.12888 -0.75413
Kurtosis 11.04728 7.88556 13.22628
Normality 7143* * 3640** 10368**
AR1 2.548 2.599 0:314
AR10 10.90 8.674 13.43
Arch 1.396 21.3** 8.158**
ADF -1.705 -2.388 -1.728
Obs 1415 1415 1415
Note Mean is the average return of the series; St dev is the standard deviation of the return. 
Normality reports the value of the Jarque-Bera normality test; AR1 and AR10 are the 
values of the Breusch-Godfrey LM tests for autocorrelation (1 and 10 lags); Arch is a 
test for the presence of Arch effects (significance of the lagged square residual in the 
regression of the square residual); and ADF shows the values of the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller statistics (computed by adding lags until the p-value of the t-statistic on 
the next lag is greater than 0.10) for the unit root test on the levels of the series. A * 
(**) means that the statistic is significant at the 10% (5%) level.
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In the first rule we use the values of the support and resistance levels as 
they appear on Reuters screens as the lower and upper bounds of the range, 
while in our second rule we apply an outer band of 0.1% to these values in order 
to take into account the possibility that the exchange rate has to fall outside of 
the range by a substantial amount in order to be perceived as a break. The third 
rule uses forecasts of the likely trading range as reported by Reuters as our lower 
and upper bounds, and in the fourth rule we apply a 0.1% band to these values. 
The fifth rule requires the exchange rate to fall outside both of the ranges of the 
first and third rule in order to generate a signal, and the sixth rule applies a 0.1% 
band to the boundaries of the previous one.
For each of the rules we separately compute the average returns earned 
by following the buy and sell signals, and we test whether the difference between 
the average return obtained following the signals and the average return during 
the whole sample period is significant (we do not test whether the average return 
earned by following signals is greater than 0).
In tables 3.14, 3.16 and 3.18 we report the results obtained by applying 
the six rules to our three exchange rate series. A few interesting results can be 
immediately noted by looking at these tables:
1) the average returns from following both buy and sell signals are always 
positive and higher than the average returns for the whole series (the t- 
statistic for the hypothesis of equal returns varies from 1.27 to 2.85);
2) the average returns from following both signals are substantially higher 
than the average returns of the whole series by an order of magnitude of 
at least 5 for the DEM series, positive instead of negative for the GBP 
series, and between 3 and 8 times higher for the JPY series;
3) for the DEM and the JPY series, only the buy signals are profitable while 
for the GBP series only the sell signals are profitable;
4) the number of total signals generated varies from a minimum of 149 for 
the JPY series to a maximum of 527 for the GBP series out of a possible 
maximum of 1408.
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Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron (1992) test the significance of trading- 
ranges breaks by using as upper and lower bounds of the ranges the maximum 
and minimum of the previous 50, 150 and 200 daily values of the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average with and without a band. We test similar rules on our data for 
two reasons: one is to confirm their results by using a different asset class 
(exchange rates instead of a stock market index), the other is to compare the 
performance of these technical rules with that obtained by using data supplied 
directly by technical analysts.
In tables 3.15, 3.17 and 3.19 we report the results obtained by following 
the technical rules suggested by Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron (1992). The 
results from applying these rules can be summarised as follows:
1) the average returns from following both the buy and sell signals are
always positive and higher than the average returns of the series, but with 
generally lower t-statistics (ranging from 0.41 to 2.21) than those 
obtained with rules constructed with Reuters data;
2) the average returns per signal are substantially higher than the average
returns for the whole sample and also somewhat higher than those 
obtained with our rules above;
3) again, for the DEM and JPY series only the buy signals are profitable,
while for the GBP series only the sell signals are;
4) the number of total signals is much lower than that obtained with the
previous rules, ranging from 39 to 20894.
Consequently, despite the somewhat higher return per signal obtained 
with these rules, the total return from following the signals is likely to be greater 
with the previous rules which generate a higher number of signals.
These results clearly show that on average positive abnormal returns can 
be made by opening and closing positions according to signals generated by
94 The maximum number of possible signals with these rules is also lower since we lose 
the first 50,150 and 200 observations in order to compute the ranges.
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range breaks, with more significant results obtained by using chartists' predictions 
rather than technical rules. There is, however, an important asymmetry to 
consider: breakings of supports and resistances do not seem to give similar 
results. In our sample period, all three exchange rates trended considerably, with 
the dollar appreciating by between 5% and 10% against the other currencies. 
Remembering that the Sterling exchange rate is quoted in the opposite way as the 
other two currencies, so that an appreciation of the dollar is reflected in a 
lowering of the exchange rate, it appears that in our samples upper bounds tend 
to work with rising prices and lower bounds with falling prices. This is not 
merely a tautology since we always compare returns obtained by following 
signals with the average returns of the series; in other words, if the exchange rate 
was generated by a random walk with drift process, we would obtain, by 
following any of the previous rules, average returns per signal equal to the drift 
parameter, which is also the average return of the series.
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Table 3.14 DEM: mean returns from following rule
Rule N. buy N. sell buy sell buy-sell
SUP-RES 189 181 0.025912
(1.85)
0.011772
(0.69)
0.018995
(1.71)
SUP-RES 0.1 140 120 0.035046
(2.27)
0.004012
(0.06)
0.020722
(1.64)
LR-HR 190 170 0.033105
(2.45)
-0.00114
(-0.33)
0.016936
(1.47)
LR-HR0.1 147 126 0.039692
(2.66)
0.005647
(0.17)
0.023979
(1.99)
BOTH 120 122 0.035519
(2.15)
0.010781
(0.51)
0.023048
(1.81)
BOTH 0.1 91 89 0.035268
(1.91)
0.010422
(0.42)
0.02326
(1.62)
Note in the column labelled N. buy (N. sell) we report the number of buy (sell) signals 
generated by the rule, while under the buy (sell) column we report the mean return 
from following the buy (sell) signals together with the t statistic for the test of the 
hypothesis that this mean return is equal to the mean return of the whole series. The 
buy-sell column reports the mean return and t statistic obtained by following both the 
buy and sell signals
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Table 3.15 DEM: mean returns from following rule
Rule N. buy N. sell buy sell buy-sell
50 118 73 0.020498
(1.14)
-0.00082
(-0.21)
0.01235
(0.75)
50 0.1 44 35 0.04934
(1.90)
-0.03975
(-1.52)
0.010665
(0.41)
150 96 30 0.019993
(1.01)
-0.02501
(-0.96)
0.009278
(0.42)
150 0.1 33 14 0.081672
(2.81)
-0.05668
(-1.41)
0.04046
(1.59)
200 78 22 0.016711
(0.74)
0.002209
(-0.03)
0.013521
(0.63)
200 0.1 27 12 0.082637
(2.58)
-0.01523
(-0.40)
0.052525
(1.92)
Note See note to table 3.14
177
Table 3.16 GBP: mean returns from following rule
Rule N. buy N. sell buy sell buy-sell
SUP-RES 204 251 -0.01062
(-0.32)
0.018151
(2.09)
0.005251
(1.27)
SUP-RES 0.1 147 188 -0.00099
(0.37)
0.019187
(1.92)
0.010333
(1.61)
LR-HR 221 306 -0.01007
(-0.29)
0.015394
(2.02)
0.004714
(1.28)
LR-HR 0.1 227 165 -0.00894
(-0.17)
0.01758
(1.96)
0.006419
(1.32)
BOTH 152 189 0.00058
(0.48)
0.019729
(1.97)
0.011193
(1.70)
BOTH 0.1 113 140 0.014448
(1.24)
0.028777
(2.31)
0.022377
(2.46)
Note See note to table 3.14
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Table 3.17 GBP: mean returns from following rule
Rule N. buy N. sell buy sell buy-sell
50 56 125 0.018616
(1.07)
0.022766
(1.82)
0.021482
(2.06)
50 0.1 26 54 0.016879
(0.69)
0.021134
(1.16)
0.019751
(1.33)
150 10 103 0.038276
(0.82)
0.028314
(1.98)
0.029195
(2.12)
150 0.1 6 42 -0.0798
(-1.04)
0.046288
(1.96)
0.030527
(1.47)
200 6 94 -0.00422
(0.03)
0.029426
(1.96)
0.027407
(1.90)
200 0.1 4 40 -0.09912
(-1.07)
0.04831 
(1 99)
0.034908
(1.57)
Note See note to table 3.14
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Table 3.18 JPY: mean returns from following rule
Rule N. buy N. sell buy sell buy-sell
SUP-RES 179 111 0.032337
(1.96)
0.005298
(-0.03)
0.021988
(1.47)
SUP-RES 0.1 121 86 0.066373
(3.74)
0.007993
(0.12)
0.042119
(2.85)
LR-HR 188 121 0.038528
(2.47)
0.010541
(0.30)
0.027568
(2.03)
LR-HR 0.1 127 100 0.051268
(2.87)
-0.00371
(-0.53)
0.027049
(1.74)
BOTH 120 75 0.052711
(2.88)
0.015384
(0.48)
0.038355
(2.49)
BOTH 0.1 88 61 0.063721
(3.08)
0.022457
(0.75)
0.046828
(2.79)
Note See note to table 3.14
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Table 3.19 JPY: mean returns from following rule
Rule N. buy N. sell buy sell buy-sell
50 145 63 0.032823
(1.81)
-0.01832
(-1.09)
0.017331
(0.91)
50 0.1 60 36 0.064038
(2.58)
-0.02741
(-1.15)
0.029745
(1.33)
150 111 21 0.038047
(1.91)
0.004158
(-0.04)
0.032656
(1.73)
150 0.1 48 16 0.063098
(2.28)
-0.01487
(-0.48)
0.043606
(1.73)
200 102 13 0.0398
(1.94)
0.005589
(0.00)
0.035933
(1.83)
200 0.1 48 16 0.063098
(2.28)
-0.022
(-0.56)
0.046079
(1.79)
Note See note to table 3.14
181
It is important, from the point of view of market traders, for trading- 
range breaks to give the correct buy signal in rising markets and the correct sell 
signal in falling ones since it can enable them to avoid being systematically on the 
wrong side of the market. In order to illustrate how rules based on trading-ranges 
breaks can help in this, we compute the returns generated by both the buy and 
sell signals; this gives the excess returns of a strategy of holding an equal amount 
of a portfolio in two currencies and switching into one only if a signal is 
generated. In tables 3.20, 3.21 and 3.22 below, we report the returns obtained by 
applying all the trading rules considered above to this strategy95.
As can be seen from tables 3.20, 3.21 and 3.22, on average the returns 
obtained by each strategy for the whole sample is greater than zero on a before 
transaction costs basis (this is simply the result that the returns in the buy-sell 
columns of tables 3.14-3.19 are positive), with the rules based on Reuters data 
producing generally higher excess returns.
We now take into account transaction costs to see if the strategies are still 
profitable after including them into the computation o f the returns. We assumed, 
conservatively, that transaction costs are 0.03% of the amount of the transaction 
and that these are paid every time that a position is changed. In tables 3.20, 3.21 
and 3.22 we also report the returns from following each strategy, net of our 
transaction costs: the results are not altered in their substance, and the returns 
from following our six rules are still positive on average.
95 In order to ensure comparability among the rules, we have used the same sample for 
this computations, thus ignoring the first 200 observations.
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Table 3.20 DEM: total returns from following strategies
before transaction costs after transaction costs
Rule Whole
sample
First
subsample
Second
subsample
Whole
sample
First
subsample
Second
subsample
S-R 13.497 1.279 12.603 8.967 -0.626 9.730
S-R0.1 11.161 2.417 8.947 7.563 1.164 6.433
LR-HR 12.251 -2.810 15.121 8.111 -4.382 12.354
LR-HR 0.1 12.286 -1.749 14.069 9.226 -2.921 12.019
BOTH 10.348 -1.084 11.400 7.048 -2.250 9.115
BOTH 0.1 8.946 -0.546 9.456 6.426 -1.301 7.591
50 3.436 3.285 -0.105 -1.724 0.895 -2.827
50 0.1 1.256 4.359 -3.405 -2.104 3.304 -5.692
150 2.360 4.418 -2.306 -1.180 2.321 -3.666
150 0.1 3.803 5.122 -1.585 1.943 4.187 -2.523
200 2.704 4.029 -1.473 -0.296 2.222 -2.577
200 0.1 4.097 4.832 -0.943 2.657 4.130 -1.693
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Table 3.21 GBP: total returns from following strategies
before transaction costs after transaction costs
Rule Whole
sample
First
subsample
Second
subsample
Whole
sample
First
subsample
Second
subsample
S-R 5.755 2.871 3.093 1.165 1.275 0.046
S-R 0.1 7.703 1.970 5.964 4.389 0.928 3.691
LR-HR 6.187 -1.512 7.551 1.957 -3.173 4.916
LR-HR 0.1 5.531 -1.395 6.862 1.904 -2.888 4.686
BOTH 8.687 2.490 6.510 5.597 1.465 4.364
BOTH 0.1 11.437 2.658 9.358 9.247 1.980 7.740
50 7.801 5.087 3.192 2.881 3.062 0.383
50 0.1 3.082 4.698 -1.087 -0.042 3.642 -3.066
150 6.532 5.987 0.843 3.412 4.383 -0.511
150 0.1 2.853 5.315 -2.263 1.026 4.496 -3.165
200 5.481 5.483 0.235 2.721 4.166 -1.002
200 0.1 2.532 5.292 -1.967 1.452 4.589 -2.809
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Table 3.22 JPY: total returns from following strategies
before transaction costs after transaction costs
Rule Whole
sample
First
subsample
Second
subsample
Whole
sample
First
subsample
Second
subsample
S-R 14.687 2.514 12.765 11.086 0.956 10.502
S-R 0.1 19.099 2.110 17.830 16.519 1.313 15.175
LR-HR 18.362 -0.271 19.215 14.222 -1.794 16.643
LR-HR 0.1 13.862 -0.625 14.633 11.162 -1.685 12.819
BOTH 16.418 1.343 15.542 13.898 0.413 13.768
BOTH 0.1 15.612 0.198 15.922 14.052 -0.209 14.651
50 10.181 3.391 6.806 4.841 0.918 3.865
50 0.1 7.429 4.887 2:571 4.192 3.822 0.280
150 8.437 4.449 3.965 4.897 2.387 2.526
150 0.1 5.627 4.915 0.688 3.467 3.973 -0.517
200 8.265 4.449 3.807 5.145 2.445 2.746
200 0.1 5.529 4.915 0.582 3.489 3.973 -0.493
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Under the joint hypothesis of market efficiency and no foreign exchange 
risk premium, the whole of the additional return given by a trading rule is an 
excess return; if instead the efficient markets hypothesis is coupled with the 
existence of a risk premium associated with currencies, then in order to obtain 
the excess return of a trading rule, this risk premium has to be taken into account. 
The X statistic developed by Sweeney (1986) takes into account the possible 
existence of a constant risk premium compatible with either the CAPM or APM 
frameworks. We have computed the X statistic for all our rules, but this 
adjustment for risk does not alter significantly our results, so we do not report 
them. The limited effect of the adjustment for risk is not surprising, given the 
magnitude of the excess returns generated by the rules and given that the 
evidence on the existence of a risk premium in the foreign exchange market is 
still mixed (Levich and Thomas, 1991). Although our results could also have 
been generated by a time-varying risk premium, we believe that the magnitude of 
the returns generated would imply an implausibly big risk premium.
The split sample analysis, also reported in tables 3.20, 3.21 and 3.22, 
shows some interesting results: these are that most of the excess returns to the 
strategies which employ Reuters data are generated during the second subsample, 
while during the first subsample, among these, only the rules based on support 
and resistance generate excess returns (with one exception). The rules based on 
past maxima and minima, instead, generate most of their excess returns in the 
first subsample. We can only speculate on the reason for this since we do not 
have a theory of why these rules should work at all; this should, however, warn 
us about the robustness of the results so far obtained.
Finally, we want to compare our results with those of De Grauwe and 
Decupere (1992) who claim, by using 11 years of daily data for the DEM and 
JPY exchange rates, that barriers, which behave as supports and resistances, exist 
at round numbers. They look at the frequency of observations around decimal 
and unit barriers, which are defined respectively as levels of the exchange rate 
with the last 3 and 4 digits (out of 5) equal to zero, and they reject the hypothesis 
that the frequency of the distribution is uniform, concluding that this anomaly 
might be profitably exploited by foreign exchange dealers. Their interpretation of
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the results would imply that whenever an exchange rate crosses through a 
psychological barrier, it is more likely that the next move is in the same direction 
as the previous one, away from the barrier.
We, therefore, used our own data to test this hypothesis by applying our 
trading rule to decimal and hundredth (last two digits equal to zero) barriers and 
our results are reported in tables 3.23 and 3.24; we were not able to test what 
happens with breakings of unit barriers since there are too few of them in our 
samples. As can be seen from tables 3.23 and 3.24, rules based on decimal and 
hundredths barriers are not profitable in general, and generate losses in the case 
of the JPY, which had showed the strongest effect in De Grauwe and Decupere 
(1992).
Table 3.23 Mean returns from following rule
Rule N. buy N. sell buy sell buy-sell
DEM 100 136 122 0.014418
(0.79)
0.000976
(-0.15)
0.008062
(0.46)
DEM 10 7 7 0.124744
(2.03)
-0.03945
(-0.71)
0.042649
(0.93)
GBP 100 107 119 0.008006
(0.84)
0.035005
(2.53)
0.022222
(2.33)
GBP 10 7 10 0.11768
(1.90)
-0.04276
(-0.66)
0.023304
(0.71)
JPY 100 113 101 0.002365
(-0.20)
-0.02449 
O  71)
-0.01031
(-1.28)
JPY 10 7 6 0.03316
(0.42)
-0.07677
(-1.18)
-0.01758
(-0.49)
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Table 3.24 Total returns from following rule
Rule holding $ holding FC holding $ holding FC
DEM 100 4.956 -1.473 -1.764 -9.003
DEM 10 4.778 -3.584 4.358 -4.004
GBP 100 10.68 -1.936 4.992 -8.476
GBP 10 11.28 -11.34 10.98 -11.82
JPY 100 5.828 -7.874 0.608 -13.87
JPY 10 7.952 -8.049 7.232 -8.469
Although the results presented here are strong in statistical terms, we 
would like to caution about their robustness. In particular, our tests rely on the 
asymptotic normality of the distribution of the statistics employed. It would be 
preferable to employ statistical techniques which do not rely on distributional 
assumptions, but a bootstrap technique, such as the one employed by Levich and 
Thomas (1991) and Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron (1992) is not appropriate 
here. The values of support and resistance levels are in fact associated with 
contemporaneous levels of price and would be meaningless in a scrambled series, 
such as the ones employed with bootstrap techniques. On the other hand, if we 
were to scramble the series with the support and resistance levels attached to the 
contemporaneous price, then we would obtain the same results reported here 
since there is no dynamic involved in our trading rules. In addition, although the 
sample size is big in statistical terms, it is not in economic terms since it covers a 
period of only twelve weeks.
3.3.4. Conclusions
In this study we use data on support and resistance levels provided by 
chartists and made publicly available by Reuters, in order to test the profitability
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of rules based on them. Our test is, therefore, replaceable, potentially extensible 
to other time periods, and cannot be rejected by chartists as an invalid measure of 
their approach.
We find that abnormal returns could be made in our sample period by 
following such technical signals. However, all these abnormal returns were 
obtained with a relatively small sample from following the signals on one side of 
the market (buy signals for the DEM and JPY series, sell for the GBP series) in a 
time period during which the dollar was trending quite strongly. By comparing 
the results of following these signals with a simple buy and hold strategy, it 
appears that supports and resistances work to warn traders against holding 
currencies subject to adverse trends.
Support and resistance levels are found to produce higher returns than 
other rules based on trading-range breaks, while rules based on round numbers 
are shown to produce no excess returns. The split sample analysis casts doubts 
on the robustness of the results by showing that the biggest part of the excess 
returns from following a rule based on supports and resistances is generated in 
the second subsample: a discussion of why this might be the case requires a 
theory, not yet developed, of why supports and resistance levels should work.
Our results do not appear to be generated by the presence of a constant 
risk premium required for holding foreign currency, and are unlikely to be 
generated by a time-varying risk premium. Although the results suggest a form of 
inefficiency in the foreign exchange market, its particular form is not investigated; 
the profitability of trading rules is compatible with a wide variety possible 
inefficiencies, such as those given by the presence of rational bubbles or of fads, 
by central bank interventions to lean against the wind, or the presence of noise 
traders.
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3 .3 .5 . A p p e n d ix
Figure 3.1 DEM: Hourly values: 10 April-29 June 1989
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Figure 3.2 GBP: Hourly values 10 April 29 June 1989
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Figure 3.3 JPY: Hourly values 10 April-29 June 1989
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3.4. The Clustering of Bid/Ask Prices and the 
Spread in the Foreign Exchange Market
Following Harris’ (1991) study of price clustering in stock prices, we 
examine the same phenomenon in the foreign exchange market. We show that 
the pattern of clustering in the final digit of bid/ask prices depends on the 
desired degree of price resolution. The selection of spreads also involves 
clustering, but this is driven by a different behavioural pattern, consistent with 
the pure ’attraction’ hypothesis. The combination of the two patterns can 
explain the differing frequencies of final digits in the bids as compared with 
the asks.
Harris (1991) notes that the phenomenon of price clustering on round 
numbers is pervasive. In his study on stock price clustering he notes that:
Stock prices duster on round fractions. Integers are more common 
than halves, halves are more common than odd quarters, odd quarters are 
more common than odd eighths; other fractions are rarely observed. The 
phenomenon is remarkably persistent through time and across stocks. ... 
Clustering is found in quotes almost to the same extent that it is found in 
transaction prices; it is found in intradaily prices and in closing prices.
(Harris, 1991, p. 391)
This feature of asset prices has been noted for some time, and questions 
have been raised on its consistency with the random walk hypothesis and on its 
relevance when analysing the effects of price discreteness on estimators 
(Osborne, 1962; NiederhofFer, 1965; Harris, 1990), but only recently there have 
been attempts to give behavioural explanations of this pattern.
Perhaps the simplest possible explanation might be called the 'attraction' 
theory, or round number syndrome. Suppose that discrete trading prices, bids and 
asks, are obtained from continuously distributed underlying values by rounding to 
the nearest available final unit, as hypothesised by Gottlieb and Kalay (1985), but 
that, in addition, nearest does not only depend on linear distance, but also on an 
'attraction' of each particular round number. Then, in a price system based on 
eighths, one would expect to see the following ranking of the distribution of
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prices with respect to the final fraction, 0, 1/2, (l/4=3/4), (3/8=5/8), (l/8=7/8). In 
a price system with integers as final units, one would expect to see the ranking, 0, 
5, (7=3), (8=2), (4=6), (1=9).
An alternative theory, which has more behavioural content, has been 
developed by Ball, Torous and Tschoegl (1985) and refined by Harris (1991), 
and suggests that clustering is a consequence of the achievement of the optimal 
degree of price resolution. According to this theory no-one would find the extra 
time and effort of specifying the bid price of, say, the spot Dm/S rate to eight 
decimal places worthwhile, e.g. 1.71465238. On the other hand, three places of 
decimals might be too coarse, e.g. 1.715. Indeed, as it happens, the Dm/$ spot 
rate is conventionally traded to four decimal places and we would expect that if 
that did not achieve the optimal degree of price resolution, the convention would 
change. But there is no reason to expect that all traders want exactly as much 
resolution as provided by the full set of decimals in that final unit (.0001 to 
.0009). Some may not need any resolution beyond the third decimal and leave the 
final, fourth decimal always at zero. Some would be happy with halves (i.e. .0000 
to .0005 to .0010); some would ideally like quarters but cannot obtain .00025 or 
.00075, and so will choose either .0000, .0002/.0003, .0005, .0007/.0008 or 
.0010. Others may appreciate the narrower resolution provided by the complete 
range of the final decimal place; and those who would prefer an even tighter 
resolution have to make special arrangements. If such price resolution theory 
were correct, one would find that, aggregating all the traders, the ranking of the 
final decimal units would be: 0, 5, (2=3=7=8), (1 =4=6=9). Thus there is a 
testable difference in predictions.
Harris (1991) finds that the attraction theory is not supported on his data 
set, since, according to it:
the 1/8 and 7/8 price frequencies, which are adjacent to the attractive 
0/8 should be less than the 3/8 and 5/8 price frequencies, which are adjacent 
to the less attractive 4/8. The data provide no support for these additional 
implications. There are no systematic differences among the four odd eighths.
(Harris, 1991, p. 395)
Harris then goes on to estimate the factors causing the desired resolution
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to become more coarse, and hence the extent of clustering to increase. These are 
that price clustering increases with the price level (for example, if the Dm/$ went 
from 1.7000 to 10.7000, fewer traders would need to use the fourth decimal 
place), and with asset price volatility, and decreases with the average size of the 
transaction involved, and with the extent of competition and dealing frequency.
In this study, we shall look at the evidence on price clustering in the 
foreign exchange market. We describe the data set that we use in section 3.4.1. 
We will show then in section 3.4.2 that in our data there are two different kinds 
of clustering, which interact. The first is a price resolution mechanism, as 
outlined above, which, once again, proves superior to an attraction hypothesis; 
but the second is a separate, distinct form of clustering for the choice of the 
spread itself which does depend on the attractiveness of certain key numbers. 
We argue that the psychology is quite different. When deciding which final fourth 
decimal unit to choose, the final number has no importance in itself; but the 
situation is different when deciding on the number to use for the size of the 
spread itself as will be seen.
3.4.1. Methodology and Data
Between April 9th and July 3rd 1989, Goodhart (assisted by R. Lloyd) 
made a record of every single foreign exchange spot price exhibited on 
Reuters’ FXFX and FXFY screens. The busiest market is that for the Dm/$ 
for which there are approximately 5000 new quotes exhibited on Reuters 
screens each working day, thus making for a consecutive time series of about 
1/4 million, irregularly spaced, observations. Goodhart and Demos (1990, 
1991 and references therein) have produced a series of papers describing the 
characteristics of these series.
The last quote of Dm/$ on Sunday April 9th, 1.8780/90, was made by BQ 
Worms in Hong Kong, at 23-59-29 (quotes recorded to nearest second). All 
quotes for spot rates on Reuters screens, including the DM/$, are in this form, 
with first the lower number, at which the bank will sell Deutsche Marks for
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Dollars (we call this here the bid price), and then the higher number (the ask) at 
which the bank will sell Dollars for Deutsche Marks; the banks are identified with 
their name and with the location of the branch making the quote96.
The price quotes exhibited on Reuters screens are indicative; the actual 
trading is done by telephone, and there are no regular data available on actual 
transaction prices or volumes97. There are, however, pressures to prevent banks 
from quoting false prices on Reuters (prices at which it would not subsequently 
be prepared to deal), in the hopes of stampeding the market. Dealers' and banks' 
reputations would suffer, and Reuters itself keeps a watchful eye to prevent 
misuse of its information system. Indeed - and this will become important later on 
- practitioners have regularly told us that price resolution in the subsequent 
telephonic dealing is generally finer (within) that quoted on the screens.
The Reuters system works as follows. Those banks which are linked into 
the Reuters system display their own individual bid/ask prices for a selection of 
spot and forward rates on their own individual electronic page, which can be 
accessed by anyone on the Reuters FX network. Whenever one such bank 
changes its bid/ask quote for a spot rate (exhibited on FXFX for the main 
currencies, all bilateral with US$, and on FXFY for a number of minor 
currencies), the new quote is not only shown on its own individual page, but is 
also flashed up on the FXFX (or FXFY) screen98. Thus the FXFX price series 
provides a series of consecutive individual bank price revisions99.
In this exercise, we will ignore weekend price quotes since the markets on Saturdays 
and Sundays, although open, notably in mid-Eastem centres (e.g. Bahrain), are thin, at 
least until about 22.30 GMT on Sundays when the Antipodean markets come into full 
activity.
Occasionally, Central Bank surveys are made, such as the one described in Press 
Releases by the Bank of England, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Bank of 
Japan on Sept 13, 1989.
The entry procedure to FXFX and FXFY takes a fraction of a second, but if a second 
bank revises its quote while the first bank is still having its quote entered, the second 
bank's quote will not appear on the screen.
99 This series does not represent the 'touch', the finest bid or ask available at any time, 
nor would it be possible to estimate the 'touch' from these data.
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For this exercise we shall look at all the prices quoted on the weekdays of 
the first week of our sample for the DM/$ spot rate, a set of about 20,000 
observations from over 200 banks100. This is a small selection of our over-all 
sample for all currencies over 12 weeks, but, with one exception (described 
further below), statistically sufficient for our present purpose.
3.4.2. Results
In table 3.25 we record the percentage of observations with which the 
final digit in the low (bid) price took on each numerical value, from 1 to 0, 
over 5 trading days, and for the whole sample. The extent of clustering is 
clear: 0 is regularly somewhat more frequent than 5, but not by much; the 
frequency of 2, 3, 7 and 8 is broadly similar, though 8 appears noticeably 
more frequent than 7, and 3 slightly more frequent than 2, (it should be noted 
that the former is contrary to the ’attraction’ hypothesis). Next, the frequency 
of observations of final digits, 1, 4, 6 and 9 again form a set with a broad 
similarity, though 1 appears rather more frequent than 4, 6 and 9, in 
contradiction to the pure ’attraction’ hypothesis.
Then in table 3.26 we examine the associated distribution for the higher 
(ask) price. The main characteristics, the division into three groups ([0,5], 
[2,3,7,8] and [1,4,6,9]), remain the same, but the distribution in the second group 
shifts, thus now 7>8 and 2>3, whereas the inequalities had the reverse sign in 
table 3.25.
Naturally, when we take all price quotes, both bids and asks, in table 
3.27, the results average out. As expected 0>5: otherwise the frequencies in the 
other two groups are quite closely similar ([2,3,7,8] and [1,4,6,9]), except for the 
higher value of 8.
We now test the equality of the frequencies in the three groups, having
100 In this exercise, branches of the same bank located in different centres are considered 
as different banks.
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noted that the variance in the percentage frequencies from day to day is greater 
than the one consistent with an identical multinomial distribution for the 5 days. 
This suggests that the same model with identical percentages for all digits is not 
valid for the whole sample; we should keep this in mind when interpreting the 
statistical tests101.
Table 3.25 Frequencies of final digit: bid price
Day 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 Obs
10 4.60 9.03 9.93 3.58 20.3 3.03 8.8 11.5 4.30 24.9 4584
11 5.23 9.30 10.6 4.71 20.7 3.86 8.2 11.6 3.74 22.1 4012
12 4.78 8.50 7.44 2.62 21.7 4.76 8.8 14.1 4.27 23.0 3470
13 2.81 7.56 8.61 2.43 26.2 2.88 7.1 10.4 2.16 29.9 4482
14 3.47 7.05 9.84 2.85 25.8 2.75 6.9 9.51 2.56 29.2 3860
Avg. 4.18 8.29 9.29 3.24 22.9 3.46 7.9 11.4 3.41 25.8 20408
We are aware that the distribution of final digits generated by the cumulation of a 
random walk departs slightly from the uniform one, as Ley and Varian (1991) have 
shown. This, however, cannot explain the big departures that we see here.
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Table 3.26 Frequencies of final digit: ask price
Day 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 Obs
10 3.38 9.80 9.03 5.48 22.2 4.54 12.4 9.2 4.23 19.8 4584
11 4.16 10.3 9.25 5.06 19.6 5.08 10.6 9.5 4.71 21.7 4012
12 4.70 10.7 11.0 5.01 24.1 3.72 9.14 7.9 3.17 20.7 3470
13 2.90 8.95 8.05 2.92 26.5 2.63 9.42 8.4 2.79 27.4 4482
14 2.31 8.21 8.24 3.73 25.5 3.50 7.23 9.4 3.37 28.5 3860
Avg. 3.49 9.60 9.09 4.44 23.6 3.89 9.75 8.8 3.65 23.6 20408
Table 3.27 Frequencies of final digit: bid and ask  prices
Day 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 Obs
10 3.99 9.41 9.48 4.53 21.3 3.78 10.6 10.4 4.26 22.4 9168
11 4.70 9.82 9.93 4.89 20.2 4.47 9.37 10.6 4.22 21.9 8024
12 4.74 9.60 9.16 3.82 22.9 4.24 8.98 11.0 3.72 21.9 6940
13 2.86 8.26 8.33 2.68 26.4 2.76 8.23 9.4 2.48 28.7 8964
14 2.89 7.63 9.04 3.29 25.7 3.12 7.07 9.47 2.97 28.9 7720
Avg. 3.84 8.94 9.19 3.84 23.3 3.67 8.84 10.2 3.53 24.7 40816
In table 3.28 we test the equality of the frequencies of 5=0, 2=3=7=8 and
1 =4=6=9, for the tables 3.25-3.27, first for the whole sample, and then
2
independently for each day, using a X test. Note that the main reason for 
rejecting 2=3=7=8 in tables 3.25 and 3.27 is the surprisingly high frequency of 
finding a final 8 digit.
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Table 3.28 Tests for equality of the frequencies
whole sample separate days
X2 D. F. Accept or 
Reject
Accept 
at 5%
Accept 
at 1%
Reject
5=0
Table 1 37.3 1 Reject 0.1% 2 0 3
Table 2 0.01 1 Accept 1 3 1
Table 3 19.7 1 Reject 1% 2 1 2
2=3=7=8
Table 1 157 3 Reject 0.1% 0 0 5
Table 2 13.2 3 Reject 0.1% 2 0 3
Table 3 43.9 3 Reject 0.1% 1 2 2
1 =4=6=9
Table 1 28.8 3 Reject 0.1% 2 0 3
Table 2 27.8 3 Reject 0.1% 2 0 3
Table 3 6.84 3 Accept 4 1 0
In order to throw more light on some of the above findings we turn to an 
examination of the size of the spreads (between the bids and asks) quoted by the 
banks.
In table 3.29 we report the percentage of observation of all spreads in our 
sample. This table suggests the presence of clustering of a different type than the 
one found in tables 3.25-3.27.
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Table 3.29 Frequency of the spread
Date / Spread 10 11 12 13 14 Tot Obs.
<3 0.24 0.42 1.73 0.09 0.23 101
3 0.46 2.02 2.05 0.83 1.30 260
4 1.55 1.92 1.35 0.38 0.67 238
5 41.58 44.72 44.96 36.23 38.68 8377
6 0.37 0.62 0.29 0.27 0.13 69
7 17.10 14.11 11.73 12.29 9.27 2666
8 1.88 0.65 1.10 1.29 1.55 268
9 0.15 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.00 12
10 36.56 35.32 36.60 48.08 46.55 8315
11-14 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 6
15 0.04 0.10 0.09 0.42 1.04 68
16-30 0.04 0.00 0.09 0.04 0.54 28
Tot Obs. 4584 4012 3470 4482 3860 20408
The spread allows banks to recoup expenses composed of transaction 
costs and inventory costs, and is affected by the extent of informational 
asymmetries and the degree of competition. Different banks may have different 
cost structures and these could be responsible for the distribution in table 3.29. 
Our data set contains information on the bank which quoted each price, so we 
are able to investigate the matter in more detail.
In order to have a reasonable number of observations for each bank with 
which to estimate the distribution of the spread, we have selected the ones which
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quoted more than 100 prices during the week of our sample. These are 56 banks 
out of 212 and account for over 3/4 of the observations. With regard to the 
choice of the spread, these banks behaved quite differently, with some of them 
always quoting the same spread, while others chose 2 or more different spread 
sizes throughout the week. We have therefore subdivided the banks according to 
the minimum number of different spreads used in at least 90% of their quotes. 
The distribution is given in table 3.30 below.
Table 3.30 Frequency of the spread
Number of spreads used 1 2 3 4 5 6
Number of Banks 26 18 8 2 1 1
Among the 26 banks using only one spread, the size adopted was 5 in 9 
cases, 7 in 2 cases and 10 in the remaining 15 cases. The remaining 30 banks use 
at least 2 spreads in most of their quotes, so we can infer something about the 
distribution of the spread. Banks change their quoted spreads because of 
changing costs and conditions in the market; there is no theory, though, on how 
the these should evolve, and in general, we would not expect the spread to follow 
a random walk process. Nevertheless, the following observations strongly 
suggest the presence of clustering in the spread:
1) the most used spreads of the 18 banks using mainly 2 spreads are never 
adjacent, with spreads of 4, 6, and 9 never among them;
2) the 8 banks using mainly 3 spreads always have 5 and 10 among them, 
but never 6, 8, or 9;
3) a spread of 5 and/or 10 is always present among the most used spreads of 
all 30 banks (both in 17 cases), while 6, 8, and 9 are rarely present 
(respectively only twice, once, and never).
These observations suggests that clustering is present in the choice of the 
spread, but, in contrast with the bid and ask prices, the pattern of clustering is
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Table 3.31 Frequencies of final digit
Spread 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Obs.
5 5.69 9.57 10.8 5.33 18.7 5.69 9.57 10.8 5.33 18.7 16754
7 3.32 12.5 10.2 5.18 17.2 2.27 15.2 10.1 4.01 20.0 5332
10 1.52 7.07 6.95 1.56 31.0 1.62 6.36 9.28 1.17 33.5 16630
consistent with the pure ’attraction' hypothesis.
We now combine our findings of price resolution in the final digits with 
pure 'attraction' in the choice of spread. Assume that the trader starts with the 
choice of the lower bid price; 0 and 5 are the most common. But related to these, 
a spread of 7 dominates 8 (to a far greater extent than 3 dominates 2). So in the 
asks (higher price), we should expect to see 2 (given by 5+7) and 7 (given by 
0+7) more frequent than 3 or 8. This is what appears in table 3.26. Next assume 
that the trader starts with the choice o f the higher ask price: again the 
combination of 0 or 5 with 7 will imply that 3 (0-7) or 8 (5-7) will be greater than 
2 or 7 in the bid price, as indeed appears in table 3.25. The combination of these 
two distinct behaviour patterns can explain the major shifts between the results 
for these two tables, except that the doublet (8 bid / 5 ask) occurs more 
frequently than this line of analysis can readily explain.
With many of the bank traders exhibiting a spread of 5, the entry of a 
spread of 10 can, perhaps, be seen more as a general indication of a willingness 
to trade, rather than a commitment to those particular bid/ask quotes in 
subsequent haggling over the telephone. Consequently we hypothesised that the 
extent of price clustering among those entries involving a spread of 10 would be 
significantly greater than those involving the lower value of 5. The results for 
spreads of 5, 7 and 10 are shown in table 3.31, using bid plus ask prices.
Observe that in 64% of the prices quoted, those using a spread of 10 
remain at 0 or 5, compared with 37% for those using the lower spread of 5.
203
Those with the larger spread (10) only quote the marginal numbers (1,4,6,9) 
on 5.87% of all quotes compared with 22% for those with a spread of 5. For 
those with the lower spreads (5 and 7), the sum of 2+3 and 7+ 8  is greater 
than either 0 or 5, while it is less than half in the case of those with the higher 
spread. The conclusion is that the desired extent of price resolution for those 
with the larger quote (10) is nearer to 1/2 than to 1/4, while it is less than 1/4 
for those with the narrower spreads (5 and 7).
Finally, given the above conclusion that even those using the highest 
spreads desired a price resolution less than 1/2, it follows that there should be no 
clustering, at least from this source of influence, in the penultimate digit. We 
examine this in table 3.32. This does reveal a complete absence of the kind of 
clustering exhibited in tables 3.25-3.27; indeed a number (1) that was marginal 
there is the most common here. However, the frequencies are not approximately 
equal. On some days, such as April 11, 12 and 13, the extent of price movement 
in the market is so sluggish that there is a clear tendency for the digits to cluster 
around a given mean level102.
In view of this, one would either need some complex statistical adjustment process (as 
applied by Harris, 1991) or a longer series to establish that the expected frequency of 
all digits in the penultimate digit was equal. We are confident, however, that Table 
3.32 shows clearly that the pattern apparent in numerical clustering in the final digit 
does not cany over to the penultimate digit.
204
Table 3.32 Frequencies of penultimate digit: bid price
Day 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 Obs
10 2.23 3.25 2.12 0.37 2.16 21.3 44.9 18.4 4.47 0.85 4584
11 44.0 4.25 4.54 2.92 7.10 4.26 0.15 0.00 0.10 12.7 4012
12 4.41 7.61 18.6 44.0 23.7 1.61 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 3470
13 28.3 25.1 3.19 0.56 0.18 3.08 7.72 5.06 7.79 19.0 4482
14 9.43 9.61 11.4 7.49 5.34 10.5 32.1 7.33 3.24 3.65 3860
Avg 17.9 14.1 7.37 9.67 6.96 8.55 17.9 6.63 3.35 7.56 20408
3.4.3. Conclusions
We have shown that the pattern of numerical clustering in the final 
digit exhibited for foreign exchange spot bid and ask quote prices depends on 
the desired degree of price resolution by traders. Traders quoting larger 
spreads seek a coarser price resolution than those using finer spreads.
The selection of spreads also involves clustering, but this appears to be 
driven by a separate behavioural pattern, which appears consistent with the 
pure attraction hypothesis. The combination of these two behaviour patterns 
can explain most of the difference between the numerical frequencies of the 
final digits in the bids as compared to the asks.
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